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Af t e r fou r y e a r s of intense and brutally bloody combat, the Civil War was fi nally over. The Southern experiment in treason had ended 
in total defeat. The Confederate capital, Richmond, was a burned- out hulk 
(figs. 1 and 2). Across the eleven states that had formed the Confederacy, rail-
roads  were in ruins, factories (and some cities)  were in ashes, and many farms 
 were unplowed and unplanted. As Anne Sarah Rubin notes in her essay on 
Sherman’s army, in some parts of the South— Missouri, the Shenandoah 
Valley, and a sixty- mile- wide swath of Georgia and the Carolinas— homes, 
barns, and crops had been destroyed. In some places, civilians had been 
displaced by combat in their neighborhoods or by armies on both sides, 
who forced them out of harm’s way, even when they wanted to remain in 
their homes.
Even in places untouched by combat or unvisited by armies from  either 
side, the effects of the war  were vis i ble. Four million African Americans  were 
no longer slaves. At least 100,000 former slaves returned to the South in U.S. 
Army uniforms, some still carry ing their muskets and bayonets.  These com-
bat veterans  were not only willing but also able to defend the freedom they 
had helped win for themselves and their families. But their numbers would 
ultimately be insufficient to preserve black equality in the face of Southern 
white terrorism and viciously creative Southern state legislatures and 
politicians. The  Fourteenth Amendment, as chapters by Paul Finkelman, 
William E. Nelson, and Peter Wallenstein show, would be necessary to 
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Fig. 2. Ruins on Carey Street in Richmond, photographed at the end of the war by 
Andrew J. Russell. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
Fig.  1. April  1865 photo graph by Andrew  J. Russell shows the destruction of the 
 waterfront across the canal basin in Richmond with the  Virginia State Capitol and the 
U.S. Custom House in the distance. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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secure  legal citizenship for former slaves, but as we know, enforcement would 
remain insufficient for a  century.
On the other side of the equation, nearly 300,000 Southern white men 
would never return home— they lay buried all over the former Confederacy, 
as well as in other parts of the rest of the United States. Prob ably 200,000 or 
more Confederates came home visibly wounded, while countless  others car-
ried the  mental scars of combat. Lorien Foote reminds us that more than 
160,000 Confederate prisoners of war (POWs) returned as well, all carry ing 
with them the scars and nightmares of war that would last forever. “Most 
former POWs,”  whether Confederate or U.S., “never fully recovered from 
their captivity.” Even  those who went on to have successful lives  were plagued 
by “physical ailments” while “sharp, clear, unwanted memories of life in 
prison  were deeply embedded in their minds.”
Northern families, veterans, and returning POWs also suffered grievously 
from the war. The U.S. Army, despite its vast resources and logistical suc-
cesses during the war, was unable to provide medical care, food, or even 
full transportation for POWs rescued from Confederate captivity at the end 
of the war. Most POWs got home soon  after the war ended, although their 
journeys, as Foote teaches us,  were sometimes harrowing and unnecessar-
ily hard. The last U.S. POW to return home arrived in 1889. He suffered 
from amnesia for a quarter  century before miraculously regaining his mem-
ory and his  family.
 Because most of the war was fought in the Confederacy, and the Con-
federacy suffered a much higher proportion of casualties (killed, wounded, 
and captured), the effects of the conflict  were much greater and more 
obvious in the South. The social conditions of the South had been turned 
upside down, or at least fundamentally altered, and the economy was in tat-
ters. Former slaves as well as the former master class suffered from physical 
deprivation and a lack of food. Ironically, as Carole Emberton demonstrates, 
 these costs  were disproportionately borne by former slaves, who had virtu-
ally no resources or land when the fighting ended.  After the war, former 
slaves faced hunger and even starvation, but as Emberton points out, in the 
aftermath of the conflict “the majority of food relief went to white refugees.”
The lack of food, housing, and other necessities in part stemmed from a 
final cruelty of slavery: whites who had lived for so long on the  labor of slaves 
 were unwilling to help feed the newly freed blacks, and in the immediate 
aftermath of the war many former slaves had virtually no access to land, 
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seed, farm animals, and equipment to grow their own crops. The United 
States had spent fortunes on a war to end slavery but was structurally and 
ideologically ill equipped to provide for the basic needs of  those who  were 
now  free.
In addition, of course, the war had destroyed much of the agricultural 
infrastructure necessary for basic food production. The destruction of Sher-
man’s march through Georgia and the Carolinas illustrates this. Rubin 
correctly reminds us that Sherman’s March to the Sea was hardly the bar-
baric assault on humanity that lost- cause partisans and novelists like Mar-
garet Mitchell fantasize about. In real ity, Sherman’s march was nothing like 
the German invasion of Belgium in World War I, the German invasion of 
eastern and western Eu rope in World War II, or the Soviet counterattack 
in the same war. Sherman’s soldiers took food and forage as needed for their 
army, and confiscated or destroyed matériel that was useful to the  enemy; 
but soldiers  were prohibited from wanton looting, and the army never coun-
tenanced murdering or raping civilians. Sherman approved the executions 
of his own troops convicted in court martials for such be hav ior. Sherman’s 
march was not the horror show that some historians, novelists, or movie-
makers portrayed it a half  century ago. Still, it was an awful experience 
for civilians who lived through it, as well as for the Confederate soldiers 
who  were battered and defeated in  battle  after  battle for more than a year.
Nevertheless, as Clay Risen tells us, the memory filtered by a  century and 
a half of myths and some history remains contested. Even if the Civil War 
is no longer the “felt” history it once was, Risen reminds us that it remains 
very much a contested history.
The costs of the war— human and financial—as well as the profound po-
liti cal and  legal changes stemming from the war led to a massive readjust-
ment in demography, social ser vices, economics, politics, and law. The 
immediate costs in lives and blood  were staggering. More than 2.6 million 
men served in the U.S. Army and Navy, and more than a million in the 
Confederate military.1 This constituted more than 10  percent of the entire 
nation’s population in 1860. About 360,000 U.S. soldiers and sailors died 
1The website of the National Park Ser vice lists 2,672,341 U.S. soldiers and estimates 
that the Confederate army had between 750,000 and 1.2 million soldiers. This site does 
not include naval ser vice for  either side or for irregulars and guerillas fighting for the 
Confederacy. National Park Ser vice, “The Civil War,” https:// www . nps . gov / civilwar 
/ facts . htm.
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during the war, along with 290,000 Confederates. An additional 500,000 
 were wounded.2 The number who returned with emotional scars and  mental 
health issues is unknown.  Because both sides  were “Americans” before and 
 after the war,  these numbers are aggregated, at 650,000 “American” deaths 
in the war, although some scholars argue for a much larger figure.3 This is 
more than all U.S. war time fatalities in all other U.S. wars combined. In 
addition, unlike wars fought on foreign soil, some civilians died in the war 
and many  others suffered grievously from the destruction of their homes and 
crops and the confiscation of food and farm animals. Northern civilians also 
suffered from the Confederate depredations, which  were often far worse than 
 those faced by Southerners. In Missouri, psychopathic Confederate killers 
“Bloody Bill” Anderson, Frank and Jesse James, and the Younger  brothers 
murdered civilians and captured U.S. troops with a gory frenzy. Meanwhile, 
on the East Coast, Confederate soldiers  under the command of Robert E. 
Lee kidnapped and enslaved  free blacks living in the United States during 
Lee’s Mary land campaign in 1862 and his Pennsylvania campaign in 1863, 
dragging them back to  Virginia as his army retreated from its defeats at An-
tietam and Gettysburg.  These acts  violated all known and accepted rules of 
civilized warfare. Everywhere in the Western world it was considered a war 
crime to enslave civilians or to murder surrendering troops. But Confeder-
ates did both, with the tacit or active approval of their putative nation’s high 
command and civilian leadership. Confederate troops in the South mur-
dered and mutilated surrendering black troops at Fort Pillow and elsewhere; 
and as Foote notes in her chapter, at Dalton, Georgia, Confederates enslaved 
most of a regiment  after it surrendered.
To understand the magnitude of the  human cost of the war, it is useful 
to compare the Civil War casualties with the current U.S. population. In 
2010 the United States had about ten times the population it had in 1860. 
Thus, a war of similar magnitude would lead to at least 6 million deaths and 
2Claudia D. Goldin and Frank D. Lewis, “The Economic Cost of the American Civil 
War: Estimates and Implications,” Journal of Economic History 35 ( June 1975):299, 305.
3One such scholar claims that fatalities for both sides  were between 650,000 and 
850,000. Given this huge numerical spread, he settled on 750,000 as the right number. 
Guy Gugliotta, “New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll,” New York Times, Apr. 2, 2012, 
https:// www . nytimes . com / 2012 / 04 / 03 / science / civil - war - toll - up - by - 20 - percent - in - new 
- estimate . html. This higher number remains controversial, but if the higher figure turns 
out to be correct, it only underscores the huge  human cost of the conflict.
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4.75 million wounded soldiers. It is almost impossible to imagine a war of 
that magnitude in the modern era.
 Because the war was fought on U.S. soil—or what would once again 
become U.S. soil  after the defeat of the Confederacy— there  were unpre-
ce dented social and economic costs to the conflict. The length of the war 
increased  these costs. The war was more than twice as long as the two pre-
vious conflicts— the Mexican War and the War of 1812. This time line not 
only created greater suffering but led to increased destruction of nonmili-
tary property, especially in the Confederacy. Throughout the Confederacy, 
homes, factories, farms, and large parts of cities  were destroyed. By 1865 
many places in the South  were devastated and in ruins. Before the  people 
of the former Confederacy could fully feed themselves and regain economic 
stability and even prosperity, they had to rebuild much of what had been 
destroyed by the war. Thus, while peace meant an end to  battles, it did not 
lead to an immediate end to  human suffering.
Some of this destruction in the South resulted from the collateral dam-
age of war or from  battles actually being fought inside or around cities. Three 
separate  battles  were fought in and around the town of Fredericksburg, 
 Virginia, and to this day the remains of dead soldiers are sometimes found. 
But some of this physical destruction was caused by retreating Confederate 
troops who burned their own ware houses and cities to prevent matériel from 
falling into the hands of their enemies. This scorched- earth policy in Geor-
gia and the Carolinas did not do much to slow the advance of General Sher-
man’s army, as it liberated hundreds of thousands of slaves in the Deep 
South while si mul ta neously destroying Confederate armies. But the policy 
did exacerbate poverty, hunger, and the lack of infrastructure and resources 
in the postwar South.
The financial cost of the war was truly profound. Careful economic 
historians conclude that the cost to the United States4—or the Union as it 
is often called— was about $4.5 billion, in 1860 dollars. Most of this went to 
paying and equipping soldiers. The estimate for the Confederate States of 
Amer i ca was even larger, $5.8 billion, in 1860 dollars, even though the Con-
federacy had only about one- third as many  people. Much of the cost to the 
4“United States” refers to  those states that remained loyal to the Constitution, and 
excludes the Confederate states, even though technically, at least as understood by the 
Lincoln administration, they  were part of the United States.
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Confederacy resulted from the loss of “physical capital,” such as factories, 
railroads, buildings, and farm equipment.5 The Confederate costs also in-
clude the loss of “economies of scale” due to the destruction of slavery.6  These 
figures do not include the loss of capital owned by Southern whites due to 
the end of slavery. Ending slavery,  after all, transferred value from masters 
to the former slaves, who now “owned” themselves. However, before and 
during the war, slaves  were capital assets that could be sold, mortgaged, 
rented, and used as collateral for economic development. In addition, 
 because of the continuing growth of the slave population, slaves represented 
an economic asset that was constantly increasing in value. Factoring in the 
loss of  these assets increases the costs of the war to the white Confederates, 
who in fact seceded to protect and preserve slavery forever. The Emanci-
pation Proclamation, the victory of the U.S. Army, and the Thirteenth 
Amendment not only transformed four million slaves into  free  people but also 
eliminated about $2 billion worth of capital in the former Confederacy.7
 These costs can also be understood by per capita allocations. The United 
States (the Union) had three times the population of the Confederate states. 
Thus, the per capita cost of the war was $670 in the Confederacy but only 
$199 in the United States.8 None of  these figures include a value (how could 
we put a value on it?) for the emotional cost of more than 650,000 deaths 
and half a million wounded survivors.
The war left economic scars and trauma across the nation that mir-
rored the profound horrors of deaths and physical scars. Returning soldiers 
 were traumatized in both sections, but much more in the South than in the 
North. U.S. soldiers returned victorious to a society that was hopeful of the 
 future. Although as Foote notes, returning U.S. POWs suffered profoundly 
from the inability of the victorious nation to care for  these men or even figure 
out how to help them get home. But when the veterans and former POWs 
5Roger L. Ransom, “The Economics of the Civil War,” http:// eh . net / encyclopedia 
/ the - economics - of - the - civil - war / . For somewhat diff er ent but similar calculations, see 
Goldin and Lewis, “The Economic Cost of the American Civil War,” pp. 299, 305, 308, 
321–22.
6Goldin and Lewis, “The Economic Cost of the American Civil War,” p. 322.
7Ransom, “The Economics of the Civil War.” This essay puts the cost of buying all the 
slaves in 1860 at $2.7 billion, but I have reduced that to account for the value of slaves in 
states that remained in the United States: Kentucky, Missouri, Mary land, Delaware, and 
what became West  Virginia.
8Ransom, “The Economics of the Civil War.”
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did get home, they found that profound changes in Northern society made 
pos si ble by the absence of slave  owners in Congress promised a better  future. 
The Homestead Act and the Transcontinental Railroad Act increased 
access to western lands, while the Land- Grant College Act (Morrill Act) 
created the very real possibility that some veterans and their  children would 
have access to higher education.9 New industries and improved transporta-
tion, stimulated by the war, also contained the promise of a better world. As 
the economic historian Jenny Bourne shows, by 1879 the Northern economy 
had “caught up” to where it would have been without the war.10 Bourne 
notes that in the states that did not secede, “real per capita GDP grew 
faster  after the war than before, with only a small downturn during the fi-
nancial panic of 1873.” Not all parts of the North, or all Northerners, ben-
efited from the war and its aftermath. As Bourne notes, economic in equality 
increased during and  after the war, but the North nevertheless came out of 
the war on the verge of an economic expansion.
But life was less promising for the defeated soldiers of the traitorous army. 
Many returned home in tattered uniforms, in ill health, and thoroughly de-
moralized by their defeat. Their officers faced po liti cal disfranchisement 
and at least the potential of being tried for treason. Many Confederates had 
committed war crimes by murdering or enslaving captured soldiers. For ex-
ample, as Foote notes in her chapter, at Dalton, Georgia, Confederates 
enslaved most of a regiment  after it surrendered, which was a war crime 
 under all existing notions of the law of nations, as well as  under the military 
codes of both the Confederate army and the U.S. Army. Many Confeder-
ates who had committed war crimes might have faced  trials or even execu-
tions for their be hav ior. In the end  there was only one war crimes trial, for 
the barbaric and brutal Henry Wirz, the commander at the Andersonville 
prison in Georgia. He managed the camp in ways designed to unnecessarily 
harm the prisoners. For example, he denied them access to clean  water, 
which his own soldiers had and which was readily available. He then ordered 
his soldiers to shoot prisoners if they reached over makeshift barriers to fill 
their cups with fresh  water. The Wirz trial is generally seen as a failure of 
due pro cess and the rule of law  because of its many procedural irregularities. 
9See Paul Finkelman, “Introduction: The Congress, the Civil War, and the Making of 
Modern Amer i ca,” in Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon, eds., Civil War Congress and 
the Creation of Modern Amer i ca (Athens, Ohio, 2018), pp. 1–8.
10Goldin and Lewis, “The Economic Cost of the American Civil War,” p. 319.
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The prosecutors understood the concept of a war crime, and even crimes 
against humanity, but lacked the necessary  legal theory or tools to prosecute 
Wirz for such crimes. Thus, they tried him for  simple murder, and he was 
convicted and executed. Given the horrible condition of the prisoners— 
many of whom resembled survivors of Nazi death and concentration 
camps— Wirz’s war crimes  were obvious. Lost- cause partisans call his 
trial an act of vengeance, but in real ity it was the world’s first modern war 
crimes trial for crimes against humanity. What is remarkable is not Wirz’s 
conviction but the failure of the United States to try  others for war crimes, 
such as enslaving civilians and POWs or murdering surrendering soldiers.
While U.S. soldiers returned to homes that  were mostly untouched by 
the war, and to an economy that would soon boom, returning Confeder-
ates faced devastated cities, factories, and farms. As Bourne notes, the “post-
bellum South was a wasteland for de cades,” and this particularly hurt 
African Americans, 90  percent of whom remained in the South  until the 
twentieth  century. At least two or three generations of Southern whites would 
pay for the treason of their ancestors with poverty and diminished prospects. 
The economic analy sis that shows Northern recovery by 1879 underscores 
the bleaker  future of the South, where “as late as 1909 southerners on aver-
age consumed roughly thirty  percent less” than they would have if  there had 
been no war.11 Indeed, given the per sis tence of poverty in the Deep South, 
we might argue that some parts of the former Confederacy did not recover 
from the war  until the late twentieth  century—or that they still have not 
recovered.
Thus, when we contemplate the aftermath of the war, we must start with 
the profound costs for the  whole nation, but particularly the South.  These 
 human and economic costs are tied to the social and cultural change the war 
brought— and the cultural and social changes the war failed to accomplish.
The social changes ultimately led to profound  legal and constitutional 
changes. Southern whites almost universally refused to come to terms with 
black freedom—or even the loss of the war. The postwar Southern govern-
ments tried hard to prevent blacks from gaining po liti cal power, social 
rights, or any economic foothold in the postwar society. They tried, as much 
as pos si ble, to reduce blacks to something close to slavery. Eventually this 
Southern white obstinacy would lead Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act 
11Ibid.
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of 1866 and other laws, as well as to the  Fourteenth and Fifteenth amend-
ments. The goal of  these amendments and laws was to protect civil rights 
and suppress white terrorism.  These amendments and laws worked for a 
while, but in the end they  were in effec tive or in effec tively enforced for more 
than a  century. The essays on the  Fourteenth Amendment remind us of its 
necessity, the pro cess that led to it, and how it was implemented.
The chapters in this book collectively explore some of the ways in which 
the end of the war continued the trauma of the conflict and also enhanced the 
potential for the new birth of freedom that Lincoln promised in the Gettys-
burg Address. We end with Risen’s reminder of how the meaning of the 
war has changed over time, and how the memory has been filtered and 
remade by a  century and a half of myths and serious historical scholarship. 
While the Civil War is no longer the “felt” history it once was, Risen reminds 
us that despite the work of many fine scholars, it remains very much a con-
tested history. As we witness continuing conflicts and sometimes lethal dis-
putes over the place of Confederate monuments and Confederate flags in 
our public space, we realize how much the war is still “felt” in our country, 
even if the last veterans are now long gone from the debate.
11
Th e sl av es  i n  Winnsboro, South Carolina, anticipated the arrival of William Tecumseh Sherman’s troops well before they appeared in mid- 
February 1865. They knew that the state capital of Columbia, just over thirty 
miles to the south, lay in smoldering ruins. The fleeing residents and retreat-
ing Confederate soldiers, who had surrendered on February 17, brought word 
of the conflagration, and panic spread throughout the up- country plantation 
districts like the fire that had engulfed the city. While frightened plantation 
 owners worked desperately to bury the  family china and silver, to sew heirloom 
jewelry into the linings of petticoats, and to scatter and hide the scrawny, 
staggering livestock that remained in the woods and canebrakes, slaves like 
Savilla Burrell watched and waited with more anticipation than dread. “Us 
looked for the Yankees on dat place like us look now for de Savior and de host 
of angels at de second comin’,” she recalled. Burrell, who despised the brutal 
master who sold her siblings away and whipped her  mother, believed that the 
bluecoats brought the fires of atonement with them. Like so many other 
slaves, she understood the war as divine retribution for the slaves’ suffering 
as well as her own liberation. Her expectations of a joyful deliverance, how-
ever,  were soon dashed. “Dey come one day in February,” she remembered. 
“De took every thing carryable off de plantation and burnt de big  house, 
stables, barns, gin  house and dey left the slave  houses.”1
1Interview with Savilla Burrell, “Born in Slavery: Slave Narratives from the Federal 
Writers’ Proj ect, 1936–1938,” Library of Congress, https:// memory . loc . gov / ammem 
/ snhtml / snhome . html, accessed June 27, 2016.
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That was more than they left Violet Guntharpe, who also lived near 
Winnsboro. “Well,  after ravagin’ de  whole country side,” Guntharpe ex-
plained, “de army go across old Catawba [River] and left de air full of de 
stink of dead carcasses and de sky black wid turkey buzzards.” She recalled 
“de picaninnnies suckin’ their thumbs for want of sumpin’ to eat.” The troops 
moved on, leaving the newly freed to scavenge for their survival. “Lots of 
de chillun die,” Guntharpe recounted, “as did de old folks, while de rest of 
us scour de woods for hickory nuts, acorns, cane roots, and artichokes.” Bar-
nett Spencer, who had been a slave in Alabama, concurred with Guntharpe’s 
recollections of the hardships of war. Their compliance always controlled 
through the physical need for food, slaves  were accustomed to hunger, but 
the Union invasion heightened an already meager existence. “The Yankees 
starved out more black  faces than white at their stealing,” he remembered. 
 After they came, it was hard to find  either food or shelter since many of the 
buildings on his plantation, including the slave quarters, had been burned. 
Many ex- slaves “died in piles” from starvation and disease. Hunger left 
 children like Spencer and Guntharpe with an abstract understanding of 
freedom that was conditional rather than categorical. “De Yankees sho’ 
throwed us in de briar patch . . .  all us had to thank them for was a hungry 
belly, and freedom—[s]umpin’ us had no more use for then, than I have 
 today for one of them airplanes I hears flyin’ ’round de sky, right now,” said 
Guntharpe. Like the airplanes that hovered high above her, emancipation left 
only the faintest trail in her life. Her hungry belly, on the other hand, grounded 
her memories in ways that an abstract concept like freedom could not.2
 These testimonies given by ex- slaves in the 1930s to the roving bands of 
interviewers employed through the Federal Writers Proj ect reveal how the 
most basic of  human needs— the need for physical nourishment— tempered 
the experience of freedom for African Americans across the South. While 
historians tend to focus on the  great boons of formal emancipation, includ-
ing the granting of national citizenship through the  Fourteenth Amendment 
and the right to vote through the Fifteenth, we tend to avoid the curses 
that accompanied the war time expansion of freedom lest we begin to 
sound too much like the former slave masters who cried incessantly about 
2Interview with Violet Guntharpe, “Born in Slavery: Slave Narratives from the Federal 
Writers’ Proj ect, 1936–1938,” Library of Congress, https:// memory . loc . gov / ammem 
/ snhtml / snhome . html, accessed June 27, 2016.
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the degradation of postemancipation society. Yet the prob lem of hunger 
posed a very real threat not only to the lives of vulnerable populations of 
freedmen and refugees but also to the po liti cal reconstruction of the nation. 
The food crisis facing the postwar South was both a staggering institutional 
prob lem and an ideological conundrum that ignited the federal govern-
ment’s long  battle with hunger, a  battle that continues to this day.
Among the many ghosts that haunted the former Confederacy in the first 
two years  after the war, hunger shadowed the region with a desperate im-
mediacy. Shortly  after the surrender, Congress authorized the assistant com-
missioners of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands 
(Freedmen’s Bureau) to requisition surplus food, clothing, and medicine 
from local army commanders. In South Carolina, where Violet Guntharpe 
scoured the woods for food, the bureau began to distribute rations almost 
immediately; by midsummer, at least 9,000  people had received some 
300,000 rations (fig. 1). By the end of the year, the number of rations more 
than doubled, reaching a total of 25,000 individuals. One year  later, it 
would be nearly a million rations. In 1867— perhaps the leanest and mean-
est in the postwar period due to crop failures— public and private aid in 
South Carolina would exceed $300,000.3
Similar conditions existed across the South: tens of thousands  were left 
destitute, without adequate food, clothing, or shelter. In Alabama, a mix-
ture of private and public aid distributed nearly four million rations by the 
autumn of 1866, costing an estimated $643,590. But it was not nearly enough. 
According to the bureau’s assistant commissioner,  these figures “did not keep 
pace with the evidence of suffering.” In a report to the secretary of war, he 
wrote, “At all considerable towns  were seen emaciated persons, who had 
come a long way in quest of food. Letters, newspaper statements, and per-
sonal appeals came in from  every quarter, while men of prominence and 
known integrity went to solicit contributions in the north to supplement re-
lief afforded by the government.” Even the governor traveled to St. Louis to 
3Martin Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau in South Carolina, 1865–1872 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 
1967), pp. 37–48. On privation in the Confederacy during the war and its effects on public 
morale and the Confederate war effort, see William Blair,  Virginia’s Private War: Feeding 
Body and Soul in the Confederacy, 1861–1865 (New York, 2000) and Paul Escott, “ ‘The Cry 
of the Sufferers’: The Prob lem of Welfare in the Confederacy,” Civil War History 23 
(1977):228–40.
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bargain for provisions. In the end, he managed to procure 50,000 bushels 
of corn and “a few hogshead of bacon.”4
Donations from Northern churches and aid socie ties, such as the Ameri-
can Union Aid Commission, augmented federal relief, but they could not 
come close to matching the government’s ability to procure, or ga nize, and 
distribute the staggering amount of relief necessary to alleviate the extreme 
want in the postwar South. Although accounts are incomplete, a very con-
servative estimate for the number of federal rations issued by the close of 
1866 hovers around twenty million; the cost of  those provisions is somewhere 
in the range of $2 to $3 million. As one historian of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
concluded, “Never before in American history had  there been such an or-
ga nized effort  towards such a humanitarian end.”5
4“Report of the Assistant Commissioner of Alabama,” Sen. Exec. Doc., 39th Cong., 2d 
sess., vol. 1276, doc. 6, pp. 3–21.
5Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau in South Carolina, p. 44.
Fig.  1.  “Glimpses at the Freedmen’s Bureau. Issuing Rations to the old and sick.” 
This illustration in Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, Sept. 22, 1866, depicted African 
Americans receiving rations from the Freedmen’s Bureau office in Richmond,  Virginia. 
(Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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The relief was not limited to food. Outbreaks of smallpox had made it 
necessary to burn clothes and bedding and resupply affected communities. 
The approach of winter left many without warm coats or undergarments. 
Particularly vulnerable to the ele ments  were freedpeople whose masters 
had traditionally supplied them with clothing, however limited, at Christ-
mastime.  Bitter and burned out, former masters refused to supply their ex- 
slaves with much of anything, even if they agreed to stay on and work as 
before. The veil of paternalism stripped away, the bones of the social rela-
tionship between black and white  were now laid bare. The bureau’s agents 
in South Carolina found the be hav ior of landowners  toward their former 
bondsmen to be most appalling. According to one agent, “The aged and 
infirm freedmen  were turned out by their former  owners, in whose ser vice 
they had spent their strength, to shift for themselves, and had not this bu-
reau extended aid to them, very many would inevitably have perished on 
the highways.”6
Yet hunger and want did not discriminate. Whites, many of them formerly 
well- to-do,  were reduced to begging from the government they so recently 
warred against. The bureau’s agent in Charleston, South Carolina, explained, 
“ Those belonging to the upper classes of society in this city are in  actual 
daily want; the want of capital renders their lands worthless, and  there is 
no sale for that description of property at pres ent.” Bureau rec ords make 
clear that the majority of rations  were, in fact, distributed to white refugees. 
Although initial rules prohibited the distribution of rations to disloyal 
whites,  those restrictions  were soon lifted when the depth of the crisis be-
came clear. By the spring of 1866, bureau commissioners instructed their 
agents to interpret the term “refugee” as liberally as pos si ble and not limit 
it to  those white Unionists who had been driven from their homes by venge-
ful Confederate neighbors. Thus, Confederate  widows and  children, along 
with the most rabid secessionists and even the paroled rebel soldiers, lined 
up. One has to won der if the meals made from the government pork, flour, 
and coffee tasted  bitter from the aftertaste of secession, or if the blankets 
issued by the bureau  were able to fend off the chill of defeat. But if Southern 
6“Report of the Assistant Commissioner of South Carolina,” Sen. Exec. Doc., 
39th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 1276, doc. 6, pp. 112–13. On postwar smallpox epidemics, see 
James Downs, Sick from Freedom: African- American Illness and Suffering during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction (New York, 2012).
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whites feared anything more than starvation, it was equality among the 
races. They reacted violently to any hint of their former slaves being raised 
to their level or vice versa. But they  were forced to confront their greatest 
fear in the ration line. “On issuing days might be seen the white lady of re-
spectability standing side by side with the African, both awaiting their turn 
to receive their weekly supply of rations,” reported one bureau official.7
Perhaps this was why the government’s postwar relief programs received 
so much criticism. White Southerners, who grew increasingly aggressive 
in their condemnations of Radical Reconstruction, saw the bureau’s ration 
policy, among its other activities, as encouraging idleness and de pen dency 
among the freedpeople, despite the fact that the majority of food relief went 
to white refugees. Planters argued that relief interfered with the  labor mar-
ket, making freedmen less likely to sign  labor contracts  because the govern-
ment would support them. They also charged that bureau agents often sold 
rations illegally, adding to the growing perception that the organ ization 
was corrupt and inefficient. (While  there may have been some truth to this 
in isolated cases, the overwhelming evidence from the bureau’s papers sug-
gests that rations  were duly and dutifully distributed when available.) To 
them, the bureau was a “gigantic store house” created for the “individual 
ease and comfort” of freedmen who, so long as the agency existed, would 
“have nothing to do save to sing and to dance, and to eat the food, and wear 
the cloths which  will be provided for them.”8
Many Demo crats in Congress, as well as moderates within their own 
party, echoed  these charges. President Johnson vetoed the 1866 bill extend-
ing the bureau’s postwar authority  because it was not “consistent with the 
public welfare.” Johnson further explained that “[p]ending the war, many 
refugees and freedmen received support from the Government, but it was 
never intended that they should henceforth be fed, clothed, educated, and 
sheltered by the United States.” Congress passed the bill over the president’s 
opposition, but the old bugbear of “de pen dency” continued to plague efforts 
to feed the South’s vulnerable populations.9
7“Report of the Assistant Commissioner of South Carolina,” p. 113.
8Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau in South Carolina, p. 121.
9“Veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill,” in Lillian Foster, ed., Andrew Johnson: His Life 
and Speeches (New York, 1866), pp. 232–33.
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Perhaps the stiffest and most effective opposition came from within the 
bureau itself. In June 1865, Captain Charles Soule, the Freedmen’s Bureau 
agent in Orangeburg, South Carolina, called the freedpeople in his district 
together to “disabuse” them of the “false and exaggerated ideas of freedom” 
they seemed to possess. “[Y]ou are talking too much; waiting too much; ask-
ing for too much,” Soule admonished. Irritated by the fact that freedpeople 
demanded shorter workdays, provisions of food and clothing, shelter, and 
medical care, Soule warned them that deprivation and suffering  were in-
evitable. Freedom, in fact, might be worse than slavery, at least for a while. 
He endeavored to explain to the crowd the difference between slavery and 
freedom as he understood it. “You are now  free,” he said, “but you must 
know that the only difference you can feel yet, between slavery and free-
dom, is that neither you nor your  children can be bought or sold. You 
may have a harder time this year than you have ever had before; it  will 
be the price you pay for your freedom.” According to Soule, the line be-
tween slavery and freedom was a fine one indeed. The only  thing sepa-
rating the two was the custom of attaching “money value to the former 
slaves.” He found freedpeople’s expectations that they should receive 
some reprieve from the endless work they had endured as slaves outrageous. 
“If you get through this year alive and well,” he told them, “you should 
be thankful.”10
Captain Soule was not alone in his belief in the redemptive value of suf-
fering for freedpeople. Fearful that a shortage of  labor stemming from for-
mer slaves’ suspicion of the contract system would endanger agricultural 
production, Freedmen’s Bureau agents throughout the South implemented 
a variety of coercive policies aimed at reducing de pen dency on government 
support and ensuring the freedmen’s cooperation with the  free  labor enter-
prise. Commissioner Oliver Otis Howard (fig. 2) ordered his assistants to 
take steps to eliminate “the false pride which renders some of the refugees 
more willing to be supported in idleness than to support themselves.”11 
10“To the Freed  People of Orangeburg District,” June 1865, Letters Received, series 15, 
Washington Headquarters, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 
Rec ord Group 105, National Archives and Rec ords Administration, Washington, D.C. 
(hereafter NARA).
11O. O. Howard, “Circular No. 2,” May 19, 1865, Rec ords of the Commissioner, 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, RG 105, NARA.
Fig. 2.  Oliver Otis Howard from a photo graph taken ca. 1861–65. (Library of Congress 
Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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According to many of  those agents, the distribution of rations engendered 
this “false pride,” so Howard instructed them to reserve the monthly allot-
ment of one bushel of corn and eight pounds of pork for only the “aged and 
infirm” and half that amount to very young orphans, both of whom  were 
incapable of  labor and self- support. In both of  those cases, relatives or care-
takers could claim rations for  those indigent individuals. All “able- bodied” 
freedpeople  were to be denied assistance in the hope of inducing them to 
sign contracts and go to work.
Although some agents protested that without rations starvation was cer-
tain, Howard assured them in Circular No. 11, issued in August 1865, that 
“suffering is preferred to slavery, and is, to some degree, the necessary con-
sequences of events.” Within a year, Howard would halt all rations except 
for “the sick in regularly or ga nized hospitals” and  children confined to 
orphan asylums.  Because of suspicions that freedpeople  were cheating the 
system and claiming rations for  people who could actually work,  family 
and friends could no longer claim assistance for the el derly, sick, and very 
young living in their homes. While Howard understood his actions as 
beneficent and integral to the bureau’s larger civilizing mission to teach 
ex- slaves the duties of freedom, the policy gave them a dubious choice: work 
or starve.12
And starve many of them surely did. Even  those who worked found them-
selves unable to break the vicious cycle of debt and de pen dency that How-
ard believed could be avoided with enough determination. One South 
Carolina agent reported a typical case. Twenty- four freedmen contracted 
to work for a local planter, and at the end of the year, their share of the cotton 
crop came to $543.43.  After deductions for supplies, seven of the men received 
shares ranging from $4.51 to $8.15 for a year’s work. The other seventeen 
workers ended up owing more than their shares— from $1.71 to $73.62.13 
That was the power and the glory of  free  labor. Cases such as this one com-
pelled Howard to set aside additional funds in 1867 for rations despite his 
earlier admonition that only  those confined to hospitals or orphanages re-
ceive assistance. But many agents continued to blame the freedmen for not 
managing their money well enough or not spending enough time tending 
12Circular No. 11, Aug. 22, 1865, Select Series of Rec ords Issued by the Commissioner, 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, M742, roll 7.
13Abbott, The Freedmen’s Bureau in South Carolina, p. 41.
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their crops to ensure a better harvest. Their hard- headedness, the agent at 
Columbia reported, resulted in “idleness, vagrancy and theft, and was the 
main cause of half the destitution that existed throughout the District dur-
ing the year.”14 John W. De Forest, another South Carolina agent who had 
grown tired of freedpeople’s complaints, likewise dismissed their destitu-
tion as the inevitable result of their own laziness. “Regular  labor is the only 
 thing that  will keep you from suffering,” he informed the  people in his 
district.15
De Forest typified the ambivalence with which many bureau agents 
viewed their jobs. Reports from the field routinely expressed concern for 
freedpeople’s impoverishment and outrage at the treatment they received 
at the hands of their former masters but at the same time condemnation for 
what agents perceived as ignorance, laziness, and dishonesty. De Forest 
showed par tic u lar sympathy for ill- clothed  children without proper winter 
gear and fought to secure clothing, shoes, and blankets from the army. How-
ever, he felt rations of food  were “demoralizing” and begrudged anything 
to  those he described as “the notoriously idle, the habitual beggars, the 
thieves, and prostitutes.” Recalling the chaos that would erupt on “draw 
days,” when rations  were distributed, De Forest derided the “pauper classes” 
who “made for me like pigs for an oak tree in autumn.”16
De Forest’s hostility  toward the poor was not uncommon. As Chad Gold-
berg notes in his study of social welfare programs in the United States, 
“Traditional poor relief tended to conflate poverty with deviance and 
criminality” and often assumed a “rehabilitative function” that could be si-
mul ta neously paternalistic and callous. Modern efforts to establish a ratio-
nal system of government- sponsored social welfare, of which the Freedmen’s 
Bureau was the first,  were no less susceptible to the class and racial preju-
dices of their pre de ces sors. Despite the bureau’s attempts to standardize 
the aid pro cess and the guiding belief that the organ ization functioned as a 
protective force that was indispensable to the South’s reconstruction, agents 
like De Forest remained suspicious of certain aspects of the government’s 
intervention, particularly its material support of freedpeople. As a  matter of 
14Report of J. D. Greene, Oct. 30, 1866, Select Series of Rec ords Issued by the 
Commissioner, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, M869, roll 34.
15William De Forest, A Union Officer in the Reconstruction (Baton Rouge, La., 1997), p. 61.
16Ibid., p. 77.
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“general princi ple,” De Forest felt it necessary to be “merciless  toward the 
few for the good of the many” by “refusing to feed the suffering lest I encour-
age the lazy.”17
If only  these antiquated notions of radicalized de pen dency  were actually 
antiquated. Recent debates in Congress over proposed cuts to the Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), also known as “food 
stamps,” reveal that Americans’ strug gle to come to terms with hunger is still 
ongoing. Representative Stephen Fincher of Tennessee argued that SNAP 
funding should be drastically reduced by $39 billion  because it amounted 
to nothing less than thievery. “The role of citizens, of Christians, of human-
ity is to take care of each other,” Fincher said, “not for Washington to steal 
from  those in the country and give to  others in the country.” He then 
quoted 2 Thessalonians: “The one who is unwilling to work  shall not eat.” 
(Never mind that Paul was not referring to taxation or the re distribution of 
wealth; his letter addressed a group of  people who  were refusing to work for 
theological reasons,  because they believed the end of time was near.) Finch-
er’s reasoning was historical but not biblical. Combining the argument that 
government relief is a form of theft and that  those who receive aid are cat-
egorically lazy and most prob ably criminals as well (since they are receiving 
stolen property), Fincher channeled the Reconstruction- era criticisms of 
food assistance that pilloried attempts to aid a war- torn region and  people 
emerging from a system of forced servitude. Just as it seemed to escape the 
attention of nineteenth- century opponents of the Freedmen’s Bureau that 
 people could both work and starve,  today’s critics of government food aid 
ignore the real ity that many of the  house holds receiving public assistance 
have at least one adult who works full time, yet they remain on the edge of 
hunger almost daily.18
And like their Reconstruction- era counter parts,  today’s critics of SNAP 
and other assistance programs cling to a radicalized view of relief that be-
lies the facts. While at least as many white  people receive government as-
sistance as blacks— and in the case of SNAP, more whites than blacks receive 
food assistance— studies reveal that most Americans believe that the 
17Chad Goldberg, Citizens and Paupers: Relief, Rights, and Race from the Freedmen’s Bureau to 
Workfare (Chicago, 2008), p. 3; De Forest, A Union Officer, p. 60.
18Mark Bittman, “Welfare for the Wealthy,” New York Times, June 4, 2013.
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typical “welfare” recipient is black. They also tend to believe that  these pro-
grams account for a huge portion of the federal bud get, when in fact it is 
less than 1  percent. As Donald Kinder and Cindy Ham wrote in Us against 
Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion, “Means- tested programs 
like AFDC and food stamps are understood by whites to largely benefit 
shiftless black  people.” The racialization in perceptions of welfare is rein-
forced by the news media, which often use images of black  people to illus-
trate stories about welfare and poverty, as Martin Gillens points out in 
Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy. 
No won der Nevada rancher Cliven Bundy thinks African Americans  were 
“better off as slaves, when they  were picking cotton.”19
As we commemorate the 150th  anniversary of the Civil War, as we 
celebrate the destruction of chattel bondage, and as we honor the sacri-
fices of soldiers on the battlefields, let us also remember the suffering that 
accompanied freedom and the advent of peace. Let us consider the many 
diff er ent ways the war  shaped the nation we have become, for better and for 
worse. The title of the symposium at which the original draft of this chap-
ter was presented, “A Just and Lasting Peace,” invokes the idea of justice as 
articulated by Abraham Lincoln in his second inaugural address. How-
ever, when it came to the issue of hunger, it seems that the peace could be 
 either just or lasting but not both. Too many government officials believed it 
was not only necessary but also just that freedpeople should suffer and 
starve in order to learn the lessons of freedom. In this worldview, freedom 
was a callous, vindictive force that punished instead of protected and left 
our nation spiritually malnourished.
I would like to end with a meatier vision of justice than the one posed by 
Lincoln, one that, I think, encompasses the importance of hunger to the 
lived realities of Americans like Violet Guntharpe, who found that freedom 
failed to satiate her hungry belly. It is by the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, 
from his poem “The  Great Table cloth”:
Let us sit down soon to eat
with all  those who  haven’t eaten;
let us spread  great table cloths,
19Donald Kinder and Cindy Ham, Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American 
Opinion (Chicago, 2010), p. 199; “A Defiant Rancher Savors the Audience That Rallied at 
His Side,” New York Times, Apr. 23, 2014.
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put salt in lakes of the world,
set up planetary bakeries,
 tables with strawberries in snow,
and a plate like the moon itself
from which we can all eat.
For now I ask no more
than the justice of eating.20
20Pablo Neruda, “The  Great Table cloth,” reprinted on The PeaceMeal Proj ect, 
https:// peacemealproject . com / resources - 2 / poems / , accessed June 27, 2016.
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A s t h e Con f e de r at e war effort collapsed in February, March, April, and May 1865, Union officials tried to retrieve the thousands of 
federal prisoners of war (POWs) still suffering in Confederate prisons. It 
would prove to be a disordered, tragic, and troublesome pro cess.
Disorder reigned in February and March, when Confederate prison au-
thorities attempted to deliver nearly 8,684 federal prisoners being held in 
South Carolina to Union military officials in Wilmington, North Carolina. 
Union forces  were at that exact moment engaged in active military opera-
tions to capture the city, and the delivery disrupted the Confederate army’s 
defense and hampered the Union’s subsequent occupation. To add to the 
confusion, more than 3,000 federal POWs escaped from Confederate stock-
ades and found their own way to the U.S. Army rather than being returned 
through a formal exchange pro cess.
Tragedy struck in April. Confederates delivered prisoners from Ander-
sonville in Georgia and Cahaba in Alabama to an exchange point at Vicks-
burg in Mississippi. Careless and corrupt military officials loaded nearly 
2,000 of them onto a wooden- hulled steamer that had just made hasty re-
pairs for leaking boilers. A few miles north of Memphis, Tennessee, on the 
Mississippi River, the boilers of the overcrowded Sultana exploded, killing 
1,500 men in the worst maritime disaster in American history (figs. 1 and 2).
Trou ble finding federal prisoners who remained in Confederate hands 
marked both April and May. In some remote locations in the South, 
Lorien Foote
Federal Prisoners of War 
and the Long Recovery
Fig. 1.  The steamboat Sultana, overcrowded with Union ex- POWs, was photographed 
on the Mississippi River by Thomas W. Bankes the day before its boilers exploded. 
(Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
Fig. 2.  The May 20, 1865, issue of Harper’s Weekly illustrated the horror of the explo-
sion and sinking of the Sultana on April 28, 1865. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs 
Division)
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Confederate camp guards dis appeared without telling prisoners that the war 
was over. It took the Union cavalry  until the end of May to find the minor 
Confederate camps and  either liberate the prisoners inside or round up for-
mer prisoners  running around at large in the vicinity of abandoned prisons.1
The United States did not recover all of its POWs  until 1866, and federal 
soldiers liberated themselves throughout 1865. Between May and Decem-
ber, 257 federal prisoners escaped from locations where they  were still being 
held in the states of the former Confederacy. The bulk of  these, 240, bolted 
in May. But former Yankee POWs continued to trickle home in the follow-
ing months. Ten arrived in June. A soldier who had been captured at Green-
leaf Prairie, Oklahoma, reported back to the army in August. Four more 
arrived in September. In October, three sailors of the Union navy escaped 
from the vicinity of Camp Ford, Texas. The last recorded federal POW to 
escape did so in January 1866, when Corporal Henry Scott of the Forty- 
Fourth United States Colored Troops (USCT) showed up at the camp of 
the First Iowa Cavalry stationed in Sherman, Texas. He was the last of 
thirty- two soldiers from his regiment to escape captivity. The col o nel of the 
Forty- Fourth USCT had surrendered his entire garrison at Dalton, Geor-
gia, in October 1864, and Confederates returned many of the enlisted men 
to slavery. From January to December 1865, thirty- one of them fled from 
locations in Mississippi, Georgia, and North Carolina. Henry Scott’s escape 
from slavery in Texas, several months  after “Juneteenth,” marked the end 
of the Confederate prison system.2
1Proceedings of the Ohio Association of Union Ex- prisoners of War, at the Reunion Held at Dayton, 
O., July 29, 30, and 31, 1884, with Register of Members (Columbus, Ohio, 1884), p. 6; Roger 
Pickenpaugh, Captives in Blue: The Civil War Prisons of the Confederacy (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2013), 
pp. 199–200, 224, 225; William Marvel, Andersonville: The Last Depot (Chapel Hill, N.C., 
1994), pp. 220–28, 234–40; Paul J. Springer and Glenn Robins, Transforming Civil War 
Prisons: Lincoln, Lieber, and the Politics of Captivity (New York, 2015), pp. 23–24; Brian 
Matthew Jordan, Marching Home: Union Veterans and Their Unending Civil War (New York, 
2014), pp. 30–31.
2Lorien Foote, “Fugitive Federals and the Collapse of the Confederacy,” www . Ehistory 
. org. This database is compiled from the following documents in the National Archives: 
Federal List of Prisoners Who Escaped, Rec ord Group (RG) 249, Entry 109; Provost 
Marshal Rec ords from Hilton Head, South Carolina, RG 393, Part I, Entries 4318 and 
4294; and Knoxville, Tennessee, RG 249, Entry 32, Box 1; Registrar of Federal Prisoners 
Who Escaped, RG 249, Entry 31, No. 45; and Letters Received Relating to Union Naval 
POWs, Reports from Officers and Seamen of the U.S. Navy who  were Prisoners of War in 
the South, RG 45, Entry 56. National Park Ser vice, “The Civil War,” http:// www . nps . gov 
/ civilwar / search - soldiers - detail . htm ? soldierId​=​61B12FCE - DC7A - DF11 - BF36 - B8AC6F5 
D926A, accessed June 22, 2015; The USCT Chronicle, “What Happened to Private Pryor 
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The fiasco at Wilmington, the escape of 3,000 prisoners, and the story of 
Henry Scott exemplify the challenges of repatriating Civil War prisoners. 
Pro cessing exchanged, escaped, and liberated POWs posed serious bu-
reaucratic, medical, and humanitarian prob lems for the federal govern-
ment, especially  because the pro cess often occurred in the midst of the active 
military operations that ended the war (figs. 3 and 4).  Because the pro cess 
of recovering POWs was chaotic, the consequence for the federal gov-
ernment and Congress was a humanitarian disaster that contributed to de-
mands that Congress recognize the special sufferings of ex- POWs.
The exchange at Wilmington, North Carolina, provides an illustration 
of the hurdles that prisoners, military officials, doctors, and bureaucrats 
and the 44th US Colored Infantry?,” http:// usctchronicle . blogspot . com / 2011 / 02 / what 
- happened - to - private - pryor - and - 44th . html, accessed June 22, 2015. It is my surmise that 
Scott escaped from slavery; federal rec ords do not indicate his escape location. It is a 
logical conclusion considering the history of the Forty- Fourth USCT and the fact that 
other African American soldiers  were listed as escaping from a “rebel plantation.” Camp 
Ford prison in Texas closed in May and the Tenth Illinois Cavalry burned the remnants of 
the compound in July 1865. F. E. Lawrence and Robert W. Glover, Camp Ford C.S.A.: The 
Story of Union Prisoners in Texas (Austin, Tex., 1964), pp. 76–79.
Fig.  3.  “Serving out rations to our exchanged prisoners of war on board the ‘New 
York,’ ” sketched by William Waud, Harper’s Weekly, Dec. 10, 1864. (Library of Congress 
Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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faced as the war ended. When U.S. and Confederate officials concluded an 
agreement in February 1865 to exchange federal POWs being held in South 
Carolina, a federal joint army- navy operation had recently captured Fort 
Fisher on the North Carolina coast, the last Confederate stronghold for 
blockade runners. By February 19, federal forces  under the command of 
Major General John M. Schofield  were closing in on the port city of Wilm-
ington from three directions. But neither Schofield nor the Confederate gen-
erals defending the city had been informed by their respective governments 
that federal POWs from South Carolina  were being sent their way for ex-
change. Confederate Major General Robert F. Hoke became discombobu-
lated when 2,500 federal prisoners of war arrived, with thousands more on 
the way, just as he was trying to move government property from the city in 
advance of evacuating his garrison.  Under a flag of truce, Hoke sent a mes-
sage to Schofield proposing to deliver the prisoners immediately. Since 
Schofield was unaware of any exchange agreement and did not want any-
thing to impede his advance, he asked the Confederate general for more 
Fig.  4.  “Our released prisoners at Charleston, S.C., exchanging their rags for new 
clothing,” sketched by William Waud, Harper’s Weekly, Jan. 14, 1865. (Library of Congress 
Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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information about the terms of delivery and continued to press  toward 
Wilmington with his troops. The beleaguered Hoke sent panicked dis-
patches to Confederate prison officials ordering them not to send any more 
prisoners to Wilmington. He sent staff officers to the front lines to impress 
on commanders the necessity of delaying the federal advance in order to 
gain time to remove the prisoners.3
The result was chaos and humanitarian disaster. Hoke sent the prison-
ers to Goldsboro, North Carolina, where they  were turned out into an open 
field with no shelter. Transporting the federals out of Wilmington took up 
the train cars that  were supposed to evacuate Confederate naval stores. 
Confederate prison officials and railroad man ag ers had no idea where to 
put thousands of other prisoners who  were on their way to Wilmington, who 
could not now be delivered, and ended up moving them back and forth be-
tween points on the railroad at Salisbury, Greensboro, Raleigh, and Golds-
boro, consuming the transportation that was needed to move military 
supplies. At least 2,500 of  these prisoners  were severely ill from exposure and 
malnourishment. Three hundred and sixty of them  were put in a makeshift 
hospital on the fairgrounds outside of Goldsboro. Confederate prison offi-
cials, no strangers to the suffering of federal prisoners, reported that the 
“neglect, filth, and squalor” of this place was unequaled in their experi-
ence. It was a “state of affairs that I felt disgraced our character for human-
ity,” admitted Col o nel Henry Forno, the officer in charge of moving federal 
prisoners out of South Carolina.4
Early on the morning of February 22, Confederate forces evacuated 
Wilmington and withdrew across the Northeast Cape Fear River, abandoning 
3Maj. Gen. R. F. Hoke to Gen. B. T. Johnson, Feb. 20, 1865, Maj. Gen. R. F. Hoke  
to Maj. Parker, Feb. 20, 1865, and Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield to Maj. Gen. R. F. Hoke, 
Feb. 21, 1865, in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Rec ords of the Union and 
Confederate Armies (Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 2, vol. 8, pp. 276, 286 (hereafter 
O.R.); Chris E. Fonvielle Jr., The Wilmington Campaign: Last Rays of Departing Hope 
(Campbell, Calif., 1997), pp. 393–414; Johnson Hagood, Memoirs of the War of Secession 
(Columbia, S.C., 1910), pp. 342–43.
4Col. H. Forno to Brig. Gen. Johnson, Feb. 22, 1865, Gen. L. S. Baker to Gen. Johnson, 
Feb. 22, 1865, Brig. Gen. L. S. Baker to Lt. Gen. Braxton Bragg, Feb. 21, 1865, Col. H. 
Forno to Asst. Adj. Gen. Brig. Gen. Gardner’s Staff, Mar. 10, 1865, in O.R., ser. 2, vol. 8, 
pp. 288, 294, 378; Duncan McKercher Pocket Diary, Feb. 27–28, 1865, HM48562, 
Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.; Leon Basile, ed., The Civil War Diary of Amos E. 
Stearns, a Prisoner at Andersonville (East Brunswick, N.J., 1981), p. 113; A. O. Abbott, Prison Life 
in the South: At Richmond, Macon, Savannah, Charleston, Columbia, Charlotte, Raleigh, Goldsborough, 
and Andersonville, during the Years 1864 and 1865 (New York, 1865), pp. 179–80.
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200 federal prisoners who had escaped and hidden for three days in the 
swamps and woods around Wilmington, waiting for federal forces to capture 
the city. The advance units of the Union army, including the Third New 
Hampshire and the Seventh Connecticut, encountered  these escaped pris-
oners as they emerged from their hiding places, or found them dead along 
the road. Hoke, from his position in the field across the river, contacted 
Schofield again and urged him “in the name of humanity” to accept the 
delivery of the federal prisoners waiting at Goldsboro and other points. 
“They have been subjected to  great suffering and considerable mortality by 
the delay,” he pointed out. On February 23, firmly in command of Wilm-
ington, Schofield agreed to halt active operations along the Northeast Cape 
Fear River and to receive 2,000 prisoners a day, beginning on February 26.5
Between February 26 and March 4, Confederate officials delivered 8,684 
federal POWs to the exchange point at a railroad crossing on the Northeast 
Cape Fear River.6 From the moment of their arrival, Union medical offi-
cials scrambled to appropriately address the returned prisoners’ medical 
needs. Regiments stationed at the Northeast Cape Fear River, on order from 
Schofield, had prepared a feast with plenty of strong coffee for the famished 
prisoners, who mobbed the cooking  kettles and devoured as much food as 
they could get their hands on. When the prisoners arrived at Wilmington, 
federal soldiers stationed in the city also fed them, and initially the federal 
commissary distributed sugar, meat, onions, soft bread, and hardtack. “We 
drank the army coffee  until we  were filled, and still its delicious fragrance 
filled the air and intoxicated our senses,” wrote one former prisoner. “I drank 
5Maj. Gen. R. F. Hoke to Commanding General U.S. Forces, Wilmington, Feb. 22, 
1865, Lt. Gen. U. S. Grant to Lt. Col. Mulford, Feb. 26, 1865, Special  Orders 12, 
Headquarters Department of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio, Feb. 23, 1865, in O.R., 
ser. 2, vol. 8, pp. 290, 310, 296; Daniel Eldredge, The Third New Hampshire and All about It 
(Boston, 1893), p. 636; Stephen Walkley, History of the Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, 
Hawley’s Brigade, Terry’s Division, Tenth Army Corps, 1861–1865 (Southington, Conn., 1905), 
pp. 196–99; Sidney S. Williams, “From Spotsylvania to Wilmington, N.C. by Way of 
Andersonville and Florence,” in Personal Narratives of Events in the War of the Rebellion, Being 
Papers Read before the Rhode Island Soldiers and Sailors Historical Society, Fifth Series, No. 10 
(Providence, R.I., 1899), pp. 44–45.
6Brevet Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Abbott to Maj. J. A. Campbell, Mar. 5, 1865, Cpt. J. 
Louis Smith to Inspector General Samuel Cooper, Mar. 31, 1865, in O.R., ser. 2, vol. 8, 
pp. 358, 449–50; Walkley, History of the Seventh Connecticut, p. 200; Henry F. W.  Little, The 
Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion (Concord, N.H., 1896), pp. 412–16; 
Benjamin F. Booth and Steve Meyer, Dark Days of the Rebellion: Life in Southern Military 
Prisons (Garrison, Iowa, 1995), p. 226.
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so much of it that I was positively and helplessly drunk.”  Others became 
desperately ill as their famished and debilitated stomachs rejected the food. 
Too late for many prisoners, who suffered the consequences of the orgy of 
eating for weeks, army physicians intervened. They watched over the pris-
oners to keep them from overeating and ordered the commissary to issue 
limited rations four times a day to keep the returned prisoners from eating 
their food all at once, a temptation that proved impossible to resist.7
 Because the prisoner exchange took place during an active military cam-
paign,  there had been no preparation to receive the prisoners. The arrival 
of 8,684 captives exhausted local resources and military supply lines and 
threatened the health of the community. Caring for the POWs hindered the 
federal army’s ability to occupy and stabilize Wilmington. The majority of 
the prisoners  were forwarded by steamer within a few days to Camp Parole 
in Annapolis, Mary land, but 2,475  were too sick to be moved for several 
weeks. Several hundred of  these prisoners died before they could be removed 
from the city; deaths averaged seventeen a day. Military commanders had to 
improvise and provide ad hoc care. Ware houses  were converted to hospitals, 
and citizens took men into their homes. Major General Alfred H. Terry 
diverted shoes and clothing intended for Major General William Tecum-
seh Sherman’s army to the paroled prisoners, and was therefore unable to 
immediately supply Sherman when his army arrived in North Carolina. 
The emergency was not alleviated  until March 19, when the United States 
Sanitary Commission arrived to take charge of the prisoners, bringing a 
steamer from New York City with enough food (including 3,300 pounds of 
choco late), clothing, and medical supplies to adequately care for the sick pris-
oners. Ultimately, caring for returned POWs delayed the advance of the 
Union troops out of the city for their intended rendezvous with Sherman’s 
army.8
7Maj. William M. Wherry to Maj. Gen. A. H. Terry, Feb. 23, 1865, in O.R., ser. 2, vol. 8, 
p. 297; B. F. Travis, Story of the 25th Michigan (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1897), p. 342; Walkley, 
History of the Seventh Connecticut, p. 201; Booth and Meyer, Dark Days of the Rebellion, p. 227; 
Basile, Diary of Amos Stearns, p. 115.
8Fonvielle, The Wilmington Campaign, pp. 446–50; Brig. Gen. A. F. Terry to William T. 
Sherman, Mar. 13, 1865, Joseph R. Hawley to Col. J. A. Campbell, Mar. 20, 1865, in O.R., 
ser. 1, vol. 42, part 2, pp. 818–19, 926–27; Paul Murray and Stephen Russell Bartlett Jr., 
“The Letters of Stephen Chaulker Bartlett Aboard the U.S.S. ‘Lenapee,’ January to 
August 1865,” North Carolina Historical Review 33, no. 1 ( Jan. 1956):82; U.S. Sanitary 
Commission, No. 87: Preliminary Report of the Operations of the U.S. Sanitary Commission in North 
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Prisoners who returned to Union lines, no  matter when or where, faced 
an extended journey home that usually lasted weeks. The three enemies of 
a short passage  were convoluted transportation routes, government bureau-
cracy, and the wasted bodies of the liberated prisoners. Escaped prisoner 
Chauncy S. Aldrich spent seven days in Washington, D.C., trying to ob-
tain his necessary paperwork. He visited the adjutant general’s office, spent 
two full days sitting in the Quartermaster’s Department, and finished with 
an examination by auditors who fi nally issued the necessary certificates for 
him to visit the paymaster. His terse diary entry summarized his feelings: 
“Got very much vexed.”9
Benjamin Booth’s journey from Wilmington to his home in Iowa exem-
plified the physical and  mental endurance necessary to transform out of the 
condition of being a POW. The government provided aid for only part of 
the journey, which contributed to Booth’s physical decline. The federal 
steamship Sunshine transported Booth from Wilmington to Camp Parole, 
Mary land, a pro cessing station for returned prisoners (fig. 5).  There, military 
officials lined up the ex- prisoners of war, issued a complete suit of clothes, and 
marched them en masse to the bath  house to an assembly line for cleanli-
ness that was so efficient it took ten minutes per person. The returned pris-
oners  were stripped naked, had their heads shaved to remove lice,  were 
scrubbed in the bath by two strong men,  were wiped dry with coarse towels 
by two  others, and  were passed to the final room, where they put on their 
new clothes.  After his cleansing, Booth filled out paperwork and received 
twenty- five cents a day for  every day he was in prison; the pay was for ra-
tions he did not receive from the Union army while he was incarcerated in 
Confederate prisons.
The government provided transportation for part of Booth’s journey 
from Annapolis to his home in Iowa. Trains took Booth on an eight- day 
journey through Baltimore, Columbus, and Indianapolis to Benton Bar-
racks in St. Louis. The trip was difficult  because of Booth’s extreme physical 
weakness. His digestive system was a wreck. “To me, every thing eatable 
is loathsome, yet I am hungry all the time,” he wrote of the common 
Carolina, March, 1865, and upon the Physical Condition of Exchanged Prisoners Lately Received at 
Wilmington, N.C. (New York, 1865), pp. 3–9, 17.
9“Army Life and Prison Experiences of Major Charles G. Davis,” Special Collections, 
University of Tennessee- Knoxville Libraries; C.S. Aldrich, Civil War Diary, SM1, Folder 1, 
Chauncy S. Aldrich Collection, Pritzker Military Museum and Library, Chicago.
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symptom experienced by returned prisoners that lasted for months  after 
the war: an insatiable desire to eat accompanied by the inability to eat. His 
desire to get home obsessed his mind and turned minutes into weeks. He 
hid his burning fever from the doctor so he would not have to go to the 
hospital.
Booth reached Iowa City on March 18. He had not eaten for two days. 
In some cities, local charity organ izations provided soldiers’ rest stations for 
returned POWs with food, a place to stay, and information to ease the tran-
sition. Booth found no such help. The government did not provide trans-
portation for the final twenty- five miles of his journey from the train station 
to his home. He and a comrade hired a  ride and stopped at a farm house for 
dinner ten miles from his home.  There Booth collapsed, “powerless to move.” 
The kind lady of the  house offered her bed, but Booth refused  because he 
still had vermin crawling on him, despite his cleansing in Annapolis. He 
lay on the ground and writhed in pain. The next morning his wife and 
brother- in- law arrived to take him home in a wagon. For the next three 
weeks Booth was delirious and unconscious, unable to recognize the wife 
who nursed him day and night. Although he had reached home in March, 
Booth was not able to rec ord his homecoming in his diary  until Decem-
ber 20, 1865.10
10Booth, Dark Days of the Rebellion, pp. 233–43; Austin A. Carr, Three Years Cruise of 
Austin A. Carr in Co. F 2nd N.Y.S.M. or 82nd N.Y. Vol. Second Division, Second Corps, Army of the 
Fig. 5.  Camp Parole, Annapolis, Mary land, in a print issued by E. Sachse and Co. in 
May 1865. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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 There  were more than 164,525 former POWs in the North  after the 
war, and Congress faced the consequences of their physical devastation. 
The belief that the Confederate leadership and its minions deliberately and 
systematically abused federal prisoners was pervasive in the North and 
played a critical role in postwar politics. The Northern public was satu-
rated with stories of atrocities and starvation that appeared regularly in the 
press and in congressional reports. Andersonville in par tic u lar, and federal 
POWs in general, became the overarching symbol used in the North to 
represent the barbarity of the rebellion. Congressmen debating plans for 
Reconstruction in 1866 referred to reports about Confederate prisons to 
justify their proposed programs; the Republican Party’s 1868 election cam-
paign continually referenced Andersonville and images of Confederate 
stockades. The initiation ritual for the  Grand Army of the Republic, the 
po liti cally power ful veterans’ organ ization, involved dressing the initiate as a 
POW and marching him past a coffin labeled with the name and regiment 
of a soldier who died at Andersonville. The House of Representatives in-
vestigated the treatment of federal POWs in 1869 and concluded that 
atrocities  were the “inevitable results” of slavery, treason, and rebellion. 
Historians have suggested that bitterness over this issue obstructed recon-
ciliation between Northerners and Southerners through the de cade of the 
1870s. The historian of one of the Union regiments that witnessed the ex-
change at the Northeast Cape Fear River encapsulated in 1885 the lingering 
anger. Even though Northern and Southern soldiers now meet in frater-
nal friendship, he wrote, the deliberate abuse of prisoners “is a crime never 
to be forgotten nor forgiven.”11
Potomac, Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.; W. F. Lyon, In and out of Andersonville 
(Detroit, Mich., 1905); Alfred S. Roe, “Richmond, Annapolis, and Home,” in Personal 
Narratives of Events in the War of the Rebellion, Being Papers Read before the Rhode Island  
Soldiers and Sailors Historical Society, Fourth Series, No. 17 (Providence, R.I., 1892), 
pp. 29–30.
11U.S. House of Representatives, 38th Cong., 1st sess., Report No. 67, Joint 
Committee on the Conduct and Expenditures of the War, “Report: Returned 
Prisoners,” May 9, 1864, Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.; Narrative of Privations 
and Sufferings of United States Officers and Soldiers While Prisoners of War in the Hands of the 
Rebel Authorities: Being the Report of a Commission of Inquiry, Appointed by the United States 
Sanitary Commission (Boston, 1864); Benjamin G. Cloyd, Haunted by Atrocity: Civil War 
Prisons in American Memory (Baton Rouge, La., 2010), pp. 24–45; Stuart McConnell, 
Glorious Contentment: The  Grand Army of the Republic, 1865–1900 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992), 
pp. 93–94; B. F. Thompson, History of the 112th Regiment of Illinois Volunteer Infantry in the 
 Great War of the Rebellion, 1862–1865 (Toulan, Ill., 1885), p. 310. Brian Matthew Jordan 
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Most former POWs never fully recovered from their captivity, even when 
they enjoyed a generally fulfilling life  after the war. Physical ailments plagued 
them  until death, and sharp, clear, unwanted memories of life in prison  were 
deeply embedded in their minds. Modern science suggests that biochemi-
cal reactions produced during traumatic experiences cause per sis tent, de-
tailed, and intrusive memories of the event. One former POW wrote that 
his experience “did not leave a misty impression upon the mind, but is eaten 
into the imagination as if by an acid— etched indelibly upon the memory.” 
Union ex- POWs became a distinct and honored subset of veterans whose 
claim to have endured the greatest suffering and sacrifice for the cause of 
any Union soldier was conceded to them by other veterans and by the North-
ern public.12
 Because former POWs claimed to have endured unique and long- lasting 
suffering, they demanded that Congress automatically grant a pension to 
any man who could prove that he was confined in a Confederate prison dur-
ing the war. This demand took place in the context of a national debate 
over federal pensions for veterans. In order to reward and care for citizens 
who fought to save the Union, Congress had passed a series of ever more 
liberal and expansive pension laws between 1861 and 1879 that incorporated 
increasing numbers of veterans into their provisions. Applicants for pensions 
had to prove that they suffered a disability owing to wounds or disease that 
was a direct result of their military ser vice. Proponents of liberal pensions 
argued that the nation owed this debt to veterans who had sacrificed their 
health, rather than their lives, to save the Union. Opponents feared the drain 
on the Trea sury, accused the Pension Bureau of corruption and fraud, and 
argues that at the end of the 1860s the Northern public was tired of the POW issue and 
that ex- POWs no longer had a friendly audience for their tales. They became  bitter, 
more vocal, and more unable to heal as the rest of society tried to move on. See Jordan, 
Marching Home, pp. 130–34.
12A. H. Hazelett, “Prison Life, East and West,” in War Sketches and Incidents as Related 
by the Companions of the Iowa Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States 
(Des Moines, Iowa, 1898), 2:388; G. E. Sabre, Nineteen Months a Prisoner of War: Narrative  
of Lieutenant G.E. Sabre, Second Rhode Island Cavalry, of His Experience in the War Prisons and 
Stockades of Morton, Mobile, Atlanta, Libby, Belle Island, Andersonville, Macon, Charleston, and 
Columbia, and His Escape to the Union Lines (New York, 1865), p. 9; Barbara A. Gannon, 
The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the  Grand Army of the Republic (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., 2011), pp. 10, 125; Jordan, Marching Home, p. 73; James Marten, Sing Not War: The 
Lives of Union and Confederate Veterans in Gilded Age Amer i ca (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2011), 
pp. 268–69.
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worried that liberal pension laws undermined the manly in de pen dence of 
veterans.13
Former POWs joined associations that lobbied Congress to recognize 
them as a special class of veteran.  These organ izations served multiple pur-
poses in helping ex- POWs navigate their long recovery. Meetings served as 
a place where they could share the power ful memories they endured; they 
began by singing prison songs, and then each veteran had the opportunity 
to share some of his experiences. Constitutions for such organ izations 
proclaimed the intent of preserving a historical rec ord of the  causes of the 
war, the true character of Confederate prisons, and the sufferings en-
dured by their inmates. Members pledged to cultivate a spirit of forgive-
ness  toward their torturers and to share their resources with destitute 
comrades. Former POWs produced an abundance of prison narratives that 
described the horrors of Confederate prison, proclaimed that suffering in 
prison was as noble and heroic as battlefield wounds, and demanded that 
the public acknowledge that prisoners played a central role in the Union 
victory.14
Felix LaBaume, the president of the National Ex- Prisoners of War As-
sociation, sent just such a message to Congress in one of the numerous peti-
tions that flowed into that body. He pointed out that the U.S. government 
deci ded not to exchange prisoners during 1863 and 1864 so that healthy 
Confederate POWs would not be able to return to the front lines and fight. 
Therefore, he argued, Union POWs played an active part in the war by being 
confined in prison; they helped end it sooner than it would have other wise 
ended. But many former prisoners could not secure pensions  because of 
flaws in the law regarding evidence: they could not secure a surgeon’s affida-
vit  either  because U.S. surgeons had not examined them or  because their 
physical symptoms did not fall  under the categories covered by the laws. “It 
should be clear by now that all former prisoners of war  were permanently 
disabled by being in prison,” LaBaume exhorted the members of Congress.15
13John William Oliver, History of the Civil War Military Pensions, 1861–1885, Bulletin of the 
University of Wisconsin, No. 844, History Series, 4, no. 1 (Madison, Wis., 1917), pp. 35–71.
14Proceedings of the Ohio Association of Union Ex- prisoners of War, pp. 5–12; “Prison 
Experience of Maj. Charles G. Davis”; John L. Ransom, Andersonville Diary, Escape, and List 
of the Dead, with Name, Co., Regiment, Date of Death and No. of Grave in Cemetery (Auburn, N.Y., 
1881), pp. 189–99; Cloyd, Haunted by Atrocity, p. 65.
15Proceedings of the Ohio Association of Union Ex- prisoners of War, pp. 5–12; “Prison 
Experience of Maj. Charles G. Davis”; Ransom, Andersonville Diary, pp. 189–99.
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Congressmen responded with two proposals to provide pensions to all 
former POWs. In 1880 during the Forty- Sixth Congress, Representative 
 Joseph Warren Keifer of Ohio, who had been a major general of volunteers 
during the war and would serve as Speaker of the House for the Forty- 
Seventh Congress, introduced HR 4495 to represent the demands of his 
1,500 constituents who  were members of the Ohio Association of Union Ex- 
Prisoners of War. Echoing LaBaume’s language, the proposed bill stated 
that all POWs  were permanently injured but their debilities often  were too 
general and indefinable to be covered  under existing law. The bill required 
the government to place on the pension rolls all men who  were confined for 
more than six months in a Confederate prison and to pay eight dollars a 
month to  those men who  were confined for six months to a year. Any former 
POW who was confined for longer than a year would get an additional 
dollar for  every additional month of his confinement. When this bill failed, 
Ohio Representative James S. Robinson introduced a more liberal bill, 
HR 5968, in the Forty- Seventh Congress. Former POWs who  were confined 
for two to six months would get a half pension,  those confined for six to 
twelve months would get a three- quarter pension, and  those in prison for 
twelve months would receive a full pension. In addition, ex- POWs would 
receive two dollars a day for  every single day they spent in a Confederate 
prison. As the historian Brian Matthew Jordan has pointed out, this leg-
islation would have written into law the “harrowing consequences of cap-
tivity” and deemed  mental injuries “worthy and heroic.”16
Despite four efforts to secure passage of  these and similar bills during the 
1880s, they failed. Not all Americans conceded that confinement in Con-
federate prisons created an automatic disability that lasted for life. Demo-
crats in Congress, many of whom  were former Confederates, worried about 
economy in government spending and the sectional bitterness such propos-
als stimulated. Former POWs did not have their special sufferings encoded 
as they wished. But survivors who lived to 1890 did receive a pension. In that 
year, Congress passed the Dependent Pension Act, which granted a pension to 
16Ransom, Andersonville Diary, pp. 189–99; Proceedings of the Ohio Association of Union 
Ex- prisoners of War, pp. 13–14; Jordan, Marching Home, pp. 148–49, 274; History, Art & 
Archives: United States House of Representatives, “Keifer, Joseph Warren,” http:// history 
. house . gov / People / Detail / 16140, accessed Apr. 2, 2015; History, Art & Archives: United 
States House of Representatives, “Robinson, James Sidney,” http:// history . house . gov / People 
/ Detail / 20503 ? ret​=​True, accessed Apr. 2, 2015.
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any disabled veteran who was honorably discharged  after at least ninety 
days of ser vice. The veteran did not need to prove that his disability was 
incurred during military ser vice. By 1893, the federal government was de-
voting 43  percent of its expenditures to pensions.17
Federal soldiers who  were confined in Confederate prisons faced a long 
pro cess of repatriation that extended across the months and years  after the 
war and a long personal recovery that lasted for de cades. In 1889, the last 
federal POW returned to his home. John B. Hotchkiss had escaped from 
Andersonville prison during the war and headed to Florida. But illness in-
duced amnesia. Residents of a small coastal town found him compulsively 
trying to board any vessel heading out to sea. He could not identify himself 
or explain his intentions. The villa gers thought he was crazy. Eventually he 
reached Key West and lived and worked  there as John Schooner. One day 
Hotchkiss read an obituary in the newspaper about a man killed in Brook-
lyn, New York. The  widow’s  brother had dis appeared during the war but 
she never lost faith that she would recover him. The article triggered his 
memory and his realization of his identity. He was John Hotchkiss, escaped 
POW, and he was fi nally  free.18
17Marten, Sing Not War, p. 17; Jordan, Marching Home, p. 149.
18Marten, Sing Not War, p. 226.
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Th e Ci v i l  Wa r radically changed the role of the federal government in the macroeconomy. It also cost a lot: per capita federal debt in 1859 
was less than two dollars but  rose to over seventy- six dollars by 1865.1 Once 
the war ended, so did government payouts for men and matériel. That with-
drawal, coupled with the need to repay government creditors, might seem 
to set the stage for recession. In fact, real per capita GDP grew faster  after 
the war than before, with only a small downturn during the financial panic 
of 1873.2
But the fruits of growth did not fall evenly. What  little data we have in-
dicate an increase in wealth in equality throughout the nineteenth  century. 
Postbellum farm productivity lagged relative to overall productivity, and the 
new industrial economy brought terrible workplace conditions for ordinary 
laborers. Most notably, the postbellum South was a wasteland for de cades, 
1Susan B. Car ter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, 
Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, eds., Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times 
to the Pres ent: Millennial Edition (New York, 2006), http:// dx . doi . org / 10 . 1017 / ISBN 
- 9780511132971 . A . ESS . 01, Series Ea650–51.
2Willard Thorp, writing during World War II, noted that depressions typically follow 
wars when the government withdraws as a customer for military goods and ser vices. 
Willard Thorp, “Postwar Depressions,” American Economic Review 30 (1941):352–61. Thorp’s 
work suggested a need for postwar planning. Depression did not occur  after the Civil War; 
 because of booming economic conditions, per capita federal debt actually halved between 
1866 and 1880. Car ter et al., Historical Statistics, Series Ea650–51.
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particularly for black Americans— nine- tenths of whom remained below the 
Mason- Dixon Line in 1900.3
Overall Growth and Its Components
Figure 1 shows the upward climb in real GDP per capita from 1840 to 1890. 
Annualized growth rates tell a more nuanced story: the rate was 1.65  percent 
in the two de cades before the Civil War but  rose to 1.89  percent in the years 
 after the war up to 1890.4
3Car ter et al., Historical Statistics, Series Ac43; Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, 
Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek, Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 (Minneapolis, 2010) [machine- readable database].
4I fit an exponential function to estimate the annual rates for each period. The 
annualized growth rate in real GDP per capita was 1.15  percent during the Civil War.  
The data before 1840 are spotty, but estimates indicate an annualized growth rate of 
0.73  percent for the period 1790 to 1840. Paul Rhode and Richard Sutch, “Estimates of 



























Fig. 1.  Real GDP per capita, 1840–90. Source: Car ter et al., Historical Statistics, Series 
Ca16.
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Fig.  2.  Sectoral production, 1859–99. Source: Robert Gallman, “Commodity Out-
put, 1839–1899,” in Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth  Century (Prince ton, N.J., 
1960), p. 26.
Why?  Because productivity increased: a given amount of inputs yielded 
a greater quantity of output than before. This was true for both manufac-
turing and agriculture, although productivity growth was markedly greater 
in industry. And industry mattered more by the mid-1880s, as figure 2 shows.
in the half de cade following the financial panic of 1873, which began the third week of 
September and was followed by an industrial downturn. The trigger for the 1873 panic, 
like the one for the panic of 1857, was excessive lending to railroad companies. One of the 
victims of the 1873 panic was Jay Cooke and Com pany, which had offered large advances 
to the Northern Pacific Railroad. Warren Persons, Pierson Tuttle, and Edwin Frickey, 
“Business and Financial Conditions following the Civil War in the United States,” Review 
of Economics and Statistics 2 (1920):5–21. Joseph Davis, “An Annual Index of US Industrial 
Production 1790–1915,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004):1177–215, uses physical volume 
data on forty- three manufacturing and mining industries to suggest that the downturn 
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Productivity growth was fueled in part by hardworking new Americans. 
Immigration to the United States exploded  because of the opening of cheap 
fertile land to the west, with a net 2.2 million  people arriving during the 
1870s and 4.7 million during the next de cade.5 Extensive railroad growth 
aided the westward movement. In 1860, 31,000 miles of main- line track  were 
in operation. This figure climbed to 74,000 by 1875 and 167,000 by 1890.6
Not only did railroads expand, but early in the 1870s the country replaced 
its iron rails with steel, which has significantly greater load- bearing capa-
bility.7 This meant im mense savings on transportation costs. In 1868, the 
cost to send a bushel of wheat from Chicago to New York was 30.49 cents; 
by 1898 the cost had fallen to 1.55 cents.8
Lawmakers set the stage for western growth during the Civil War, with 
1862 being an especially busy year. The Thirty- Seventh Congress passed 
the Homestead Act on May 20 and authorized a transcontinental railroad 
on July 1, encouraging the population of the trans- Mississippi West to swell 
from 4.5 million in 1860 to 16.4 million in 1900.9
One indicator of pro gress is the amount of patent activity. Figure 3 shows 
its escalation  after the Civil War, in part due to war- related inventions. The 
United States issued half a million patents from 1860 to 1890 and became 
the world leader in applied technology.10
5Car ter et al., Historical Statistics, Series Ad22. Persons et al., “Business and Financial 
Conditions,” point to the steady and rapid increase in national output, the surplus revenue 
of the government, and the increasing immigration to the United States as evidence of a 
quick recovery from the Civil War.
6Car ter et al., Historical Statistics, Series Df884.
7Jacob Conner, “Industrial  Causes Affecting American Commercial Policy Since the 
Civil War,” Annals of American Acad emy of Po liti cal and Social Sciences 23 (1904):43–54. 
Railroads expanded in the South as well. Maury Klein, “Southern Railroad Leaders 
1865–1893: Identities and Ideologies,” Business History Review 42 (1968):288–310.
8Conner, “Industrial  Causes.” Some of the decline was due to general deflation, but 
most was true savings.
9Sidney Ratner, James Soltow, and Richard Sylla, The Evolution of the American Economy: 
Growth, Welfare, and Decision Making, 2nd ed. (New York, 1993), p. 259. Overall U.S. 
population doubled from 1860 to 1890 and tripled from 1860 to 1910. Car ter et al., Historical 
Statistics, Series Aa2. On the same day as it blessed the transcontinental railroad, Congress 
established the Internal Revenue Ser vice and outlawed bigamy. The next day, it passed 
the Land- Grant College Act. Congress in 1862 also made fiat money  legal tender and 
freed slaves in the District of Columbia and the territories. Legislative bodies can be 
amazingly active when the dissidents have departed!
10Persons et al., “Business and Financial Conditions”; John Hope Franklin, From Slavery 
to Freedom, 6th ed. (New York, 1988), p. 202; Nathan Rosenberg, Perspectives on Technolog y 
(New York, 1976).
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Distribution of the Fruits of Growth
Although information about personal wealth during the nineteenth  century 
is sketchy, the best estimates indicate that the wealthy  were getting wealth-
ier.11 The top 20  percent of  house holds possessed just  under three- quarters of 
wealth in 1820 but owned over 97   percent by 1900. In part, this trend 
occurred  because of the unusual amount of equality that existed in the 
colonies.12
Some of the wealthy bear familiar names: Andrew Car ne gie (who was 
superintendent of military railroads and telegraph lines during the Civil War 
11Jeffrey Williamson, “In equality, Accumulation and Technological Imbalance: A 
Growth- Equity Conflict in American History?,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 27 
(1979):231–53; Jeffrey Williamson and Peter Lindert, American In equality: A Macroeconomic 
History (New York, 1980); Richard Steckel and Carolyn Moehling, “Rising In equality: 
Trends in the Distribution of Wealth in Industrializing New  England,” Journal of Economic 
History 61 (2001):160–83; Jeremy Atack, Fred Bateman, and Robert Margo, “Skill Intensity 
and Rising Wage Dispersion in Nineteenth- Century American Manufacturing,” Journal of 
Economic History 64 (2004):172–92.




























Fig. 3.  Patents issued for inventions, 1790–1900. Source: Car ter et al., Historical Statis-
tics, Series Aa9, Cg30.
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and supervised the evacuation of the Union army  after First Bull Run), Jay 
Cooke (who, with Lincoln’s gratitude, generated effective ways to market 
government bonds directly to the public during the war), and John D. Rocke-
fel ler (who was an abolitionist supporter of Lincoln but hired surrogates to 
fight in his place). Some call  these men “robber barons,” but  others note they 
succeeded largely  because they  adopted efficient technology and innovative 
methods.13
The Gilded Age had other success stories, however. From having noth-
ing in 1865, one- fifth of black farm operators actually owned their land by 
1880.14 The wealth of black Georgians grew 9  percent annually from 1875 to 
1892.15 Of course, blacks’ income and wealth remained substantially below 
that of whites; but, in some ways, the achievements of newly freed blacks 
outshone  those of the white men at the top. Still, wealth generally became 
more unequally distributed.
Monetary Policy, Price Changes, Creditors, and Debtors
One  factor contributing to the unevenness of growth was money market ac-
tivity during the Civil War and Reconstruction. To finance the war, the 
nation moved from commodity money (backed by gold and silver) to fiat 
money (backed by nothing other than the full faith and credit of the federal 
government).16 Although the United States operates with fiat money now, it 
was a major innovation in the 1860s.
13Ellis Oberholtzer, Jay Cooke: Financier of the Civil War, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1907); 
Allan Nevins, Study in Power: John D. Rocke fel ler, Industrialist and Philanthropist, 2 vols. (New 
York, 1953); Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rocke fel ler Sr. (New York, 1998); David 
Nasaw, Andrew Car ne gie (New York, 2006); Jenny Bourne, “To Slip the Surly Bonds of State 
Rights and Form a More Perfect (Financial) Union: One Legacy of the Thirty- Seventh 
Congress,” in Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon, eds., Civil War Congress and the 
Creation of Modern America (Athens, Ohio, 2018), pp. 30–58.
14Joseph Reid, “Sharecropping in American History,” in James Roumasset et al., eds., 
Risk, Uncertainty, and Agricultural Development (New York, 1979), pp. 283–319; Joseph Reid, 
“White Land, Black  Labor and Agricultural Stagnation: The  Causes and Effects of 
Sharecropping in the Postbellum South,” Explorations in Economic History 16 (1979):31–55.
15Stephen DeCanio, “Accumulation and Discrimination in the Postbellum South,” 
Explorations in Economic History 16 (1979):182–206; Robert Higgs, “Accumulation of Property 
by Southern Blacks before World War I,” American Economic Review 72 (1982):725–37.
16For discussion, see Jenny Bourne (Wahl), “Give Lincoln Credit: How Paying for the 
Civil War Transformed the U.S. Financial System,” Albany Government Law Review 3 
(2010):700–39.
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Fiat money essentially means that the government prints up pieces of pa-
per and requires  people— suppliers and soldiers—to accept them as  legal 
tender. The Civil War– era federal government printed enormous amounts 
of the so- called greenbacks and other federal notes; not surprisingly, this led 
to substantial inflation. Despite the increased cost of living, the wages of 
white privates in the Union army remained constant  until May 1864. Wages 
 were even lower for black soldiers.17
The departure from specie was always intended to be temporary, and 
 after the war the nation stumbled its way back to the prewar specie stan-
dard. Financial conservatives wanted to accomplish this quickly, but Presi-
dent Ulysses S. Grant allowed the reissuance of greenbacks to lubricate 
financial markets  after the panic of 1873. The Senate  under John Sherman 
( brother of William Tecumseh) subsequently drafted a resumption bill to re-
turn the United States to commodity money on January 1, 1879, and Grant 
signed it in January 1875.18
 Because of population and productivity increases, the macroeconomy ef-
fectively “grew up” to the amount of currency in circulation. But consider-
able uncertainty remained about what the government might do and how 
much deflation to expect when.19 Unanticipated price changes affect credi-
tors and debtors differently, particularly when building flexibility into interest 
rates is difficult. In the nineteenth  century (and much of the twentieth), 
fixed interest rates  were nearly ubiquitous. Unexpected deflation thus hurt 
17Wesley Mitchell, “Greenbacks and the Cost of the Civil War,” Journal of Po liti cal 
Economy 5 (1897):139–67; U.S. National Archives, http:// www . archives . gov / education 
/ lessons / blacks - civil - war / .
18Jean Edward Smith, Grant (New York, 2001), pp. 578 ff.; William McFeeley, Grant 
(New York, 1981), p. 394.
19 Because public officials wanted to resume specie payments at the exchange rate 
prevailing before the war and  because Civil War inflation was massive, resumption required 
a revaluation of the currency and thus a decline in prices. James Kindahl, “Economic 
 Factors in Specie Resumption in the United States, 1865–79,” Journal of Po liti cal Economy 69 
(1961):30–48; Irwin Unger, “The Business Community and the Origins of the 1875 
Resumption Act,” Business History Review 35 (1961):247–62; Richard Timberlake Jr., 
“Ideological  Factors in Specie Resumption and Trea sury Policy,” Journal of Economic 
History 24 (1964):29–52; Jeffrey Williamson, “Watersheds and Turning Points: Conjectures 
on the Long- Term Impact of Civil War Financing,” Journal of Economic History 34 
(1974):636–61. One feature of the postbellum economy that made the transition back to 
commodity money easier was the rise of demand deposits, which meant that the number 
of bills in circulation was not as critical in determining the money supply. Charles Dunbar, 
“Deposits as Currency,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 (1887):401–19.
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borrowers, who had to pay back in dollars that  were worth more than when 
they  were borrowed.
And who  were the borrowers? Farmers, for one.
Par tic u lar Prob lems for Farmers
Not only did borrowing farmers suffer from unanticipated deflation, but 
farm prices fell faster than other prices during the immediate postbellum 
years. Farm income therefore did not keep up with the purchase prices for 
manufactured goods.  After 1873, farm prices generally turned around, but 
they remained highly volatile, creating considerable uncertainty about 
expected farm revenue.20
What is more, although overall farm acreage grew, farm sizes shrank 
(fig. 4). This meant that  people— particularly Southern blacks— had to farm 
their land more intensively than before.21 As a consequence, agricultural 
productivity did not grow as fast as productivity in other sectors of the econ-
omy. Figure 5 shows that per capita real output was lower in the farm sec-
tor throughout the nineteenth  century, with the gap widening significantly 
 after the war.
Farmers  were further frustrated by what some thought was price- gouging 
by railroads, particularly on short- haul routes where the local line held a 
mono poly. This frustration gave rise to the Granger movement, which uni-
fied farmers across the nation.22 In fact, the first major postbellum national 
convention held in the South was a Granger gathering in Charleston, South 
Carolina, in 1875.23 The aggregate macroeconomy did well  after the war, 
but farmers understandably felt left  behind.
20Morton Rothstein, “Farmer Movements and Organ izations: Numbers, Gains, 
Losses,” Agricultural History 62 (1988):161–81; Car ter et al., Historical Statistics, Series Da1, 
Da14, Da28, Da1066; Bureau of  Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of  Labor, Consumer 
Price Index https:// www . bls . gov / cpi / .
21Gavin Wright, The Po liti cal Economy of the Cotton South (New York, 1978), p. 181. Getting 
land into the hands of freed blacks was a major issue during Reconstruction, with most 
efforts being in effec tive. Eric Foner, Reconstruction, Amer i ca’s Unfinished Revolution 1873–1877 
(New York, 1988), p. 375.
22Jenny Bourne, In Essentials, Unity: An Economic History of the Grange Movement (Athens, 
Ohio, 2017), offers an in- depth analy sis of the Grangers.
23Solon Buck, The Granger Movement: A Study of Agricultural Organ ization and Its Po liti cal, 
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Fig.  4.  Farm acreage and average farm size, 1850–90. Source: Gary Walton and 























Fig.  5.  Per capita real output, 1800–1900. Source: Car ter et  al., Historical Statistics, 
Series Ba817, Ca11, Da28, Da1285.
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The South: A Wasteland
By far the largest postbellum discrepancy was regional. The North was 
larger than the South, both in geographic area and in population, so it is 
not surprising that the North also had more total wealth in 1850 than the 
South. But, as figure 6 shows, the difference grew much larger by 1870—in 
part  because slaves no longer counted as wealth, and  because much of the 
war’s destruction took place on Southern soil. The South lost one- third of 
its hogs in the war, for instance.24
On a per person basis, output and income in the South compared favor-
ably with that in the North on the eve of the Civil War. But real per capita 
output in the 1870s and 1880s in the South mea sured only half that in the 
North.25
24Wright, Po liti cal Economy, p. 164.
25The South received 26  percent of the nation’s personal income in 1860 but only 
15  percent by 1880. Per capita personal income in the South was 72  percent of the national 
Fig. 6.  Wealth by Region, 1850–70. Source: https:// www2 . census . gov / prod2 / decennial 
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The cotton states stagnated even  after the Reconstruction years. The 
annual growth rate in real per capita income between 1879 and 1899  in 
 these states amounted to only half the rate for the United States as a  whole.26 
Not only did the South have to adjust to a diff er ent sort of  labor market 
 after the war; it also had to cope with a large decline in world demand for 
cotton.27
Wages in the postbellum South lagged  behind  those in the North across 
economic sectors. Figure  7 shows that agricultural wages in the South 
Central region  were roughly comparable to  those in the North from 1818 
average in 1860 but only 51  percent in 1880. Mark Aldrich, “Flexible Exchange Rates, 
Northern Expansion and the Market for Southern Cotton 1866–1879,” Journal of Economic 
History 33 (1973):399–416; Foner, Reconstruction, p. 535.
26Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, One Kind of Freedom: The Economic Consequences of 
Emancipation (New York, 1977), p. 192.
27Gavin Wright, “Cotton Competition and the Post- Bellum Recovery of the American 























Fig. 7.  Farm laborer monthly earnings with board by region, 1818–90. Source: Car ter 
et al., Historical Statistics, Series Ba4234–43.
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 until 1860;  after the war, wages for farm  labor  were much higher in the 
North. Figure 8 reveals that manufacturing wages in the North and the 
West outstripped  those in the South through the end of the nineteenth 
 century.
Of course, the character of the regions was very dif fer ent— the South 
was much more rural and much more devoted to agriculture, making its 
woes even more pronounced. During Reconstruction, the South gener-
ated only 11   percent of manufacturing despite containing more than a 
third of the population.28 Inventive activity was practically non ex is tent: 
28Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss, A Deplorable Scarcity: The Failure of Industrialization in 
the Slave Economy (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981), p. 6.
Fig.  8.  Average relative annual earnings, males in manufacturing by region, 1879–
99. Source: Joshua Rosenbloom, “Was  There a National  Labor Market at the End of 
the Nineteenth  Century? New Evidence on Earnings in Manufacturing,” Journal of 
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Southerners held only 6.7  percent of new patents in 1880 and only 8  percent 
in 1910.29
Like Northern farmers, Southern ones often owed debts, so price defla-
tion hit them hard. Obtaining currency and credit was even more difficult 
in the South than it was in the North. Adding to the South’s misery was the 
advance of hookworm owing to unsanitary conditions spread by both armies. 
Hookworm affects physical stature as well as  mental capacity, and over 
40  percent of the postbellum Southern population suffered from it.30 As one 
scholar put it, the South in the 1880s was very much like a third- world 
economy.31
Unsurprisingly, immigrants did not find the postbellum South attractive. 
About one- third of the native- born U.S. population lived in the South be-
tween 1865 and 1940, but less than 10  percent of the foreign- born.32 And 
many of the more able or more fortunate Southerners simply packed up and 
moved out. According to census rec ords, millions of  people left the region 
bounded on the north by the Mason- Dixon Line and on the west by the 
Mississippi River in  every de cade between 1860 and 1890, even as popula-
tion grew in other parts of the country.
Who stayed in the South? The poor and uneducated:  those who could 
not afford to leave and  those who had few prospects elsewhere. Lower wages 
in the South— especially for blacks— were due in part to the dismal state of 
schooling. In the cotton states in 1870, more than half of persons over age ten— 
and more than 90  percent of blacks age twenty and over— were illiterate.33 
 After the war, Southern whites did not want to finance black education, and 
Southern employers did not want to lose workers to migration, so public 
schools generally languished.34
29Louis Ferleger, “Capital Goods and Southern Economic Development,” Journal of 
Economic History 45 (1985):411–17.
30Garland Brinkley, “The Decline in Southern Agricultural Output, 1860–1880,” 
Journal of Economic History 57 (1997):116–38.
31Edward Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life  after Reconstruction (New York, 1992), 
p. 22.
32Car ter et al., Historical Statistics, Series Ad705–6; Joshua L. Rosenbloom, “Was  There 
a National  Labor Market at the End of the Nineteenth  Century? New Evidence on 
Earnings in Manufacturing,” Journal of Economic History 56 (1996):626–56.
33Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch, “Debt Peonage in the Cotton South  after the 
Civil War,” Journal of Economic History 32 (1972):641–69.
34Stephen DeCanio, “Agricultural Production, Supply, and Institutions in the 
Post- Civil War South,” Journal of Economic History 32 (1972):396–98; Michelle Connolly, 
“ Human Capital and Growth in the Postbellum South: A Separate but Unequal 
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When the Redeemer governments returned in the 1880s, one of their first 
acts was to try to reduce public spending even more, as well as to imple-
ment regressive tax structures.35 This made circumstances even worse for 
blacks and the poor. As of 1900, income for blacks was about 35  percent of 
white income in the United States as a  whole, and the figure was even lower 
in the South.36
But leaving the South was not an option for many blacks, despite the 
dreadful conditions. Only  after the huge reduction in foreign immigra-
tion to the United States around 1920— due mostly to restrictions enacted 
 after World War I— did the  great migration northward occur for black 
Americans.37
What Johnny Found
The postbellum U.S. economy was in some ways a golden age: economic 
growth was at an all- time high, and the nation was well on its way to be-
coming the world’s largest economy. Amazingly, this took place on the heels 
of the most devastating war the country has ever known— a war in which 
one in four soldiers never returned home.
But the nation also suffered some ugly growing pains. Farmers did not 
share equally in productivity gains or wealth accumulation. Cities  were rife 
with po liti cal corruption and xenophobia.38 Industry created unsafe 
Story,” Journal of Economic History 64 (2004):363–99. Resentment ran rampant among 
Southern whites. Mississippi was on the verge of war in 1875, for instance, due to 
outrage over the black militia maintained by Governor Adelbert Ames. Franklin,  
From Slavery, p. 228.
35Ayers, Promise of the New South, p. 45.
36Robert Higgs, “Black Pro gress and the Per sis tence of Racial Economic Inequalities, 
1865–1940,” in William Darity and Steven Shulman, eds., The Question of Discrimination: 
Racial In equality in the U.S.  Labor Market (Middletown, Conn., 1989), pp. 9–31.
37William Collins, “When the Tide Turned: Immigration and the Delay of the 
 Great Black Migration,” Journal of Economic History 57 (1997):607–32; Connolly, “ Human 
Capital.”
38William Tweed of Tammany Hall is a prime example of po liti cal corruption. For a 
lively discussion, see Kenneth Anderson, Boss Tweed (New York, 2005). Likewise, the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 is one of the more egregious examples of postbellum 
xenophobia.
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workplaces and horrible sorts of accidents, but existing law favored capi-
tal over  labor.39 And the South remained eco nom ically stunted for de cades 
 after the Civil War, with the brunt of misery falling on the poor and on 
former slaves.
39Attempts to regulate U.S. working conditions largely failed  until the mid-1930s. The 
landmark case striking down workplace regulation is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905). Nineteenth- century  free workers enjoyed much less  legal protection than the  owners 
of hired slaves; in fact, slave cases  were used as pre ce dent in postbellum cases to challenge 
mainstays of nineteenth- century employer defenses such as the fellow- servant rule and 
assumption- of- risk doctrine. Jenny Bourne (Wahl), The Bondsman’s Burden (New York, 
1998), chap. 3.
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Me rch a n t of Te r ror .” “Demon.” “Attila.” If you type “was Sherman a . . .” into Google, the autocomplete includes “war crimi-
nal,” “hero or villain,” and with a few more letters “terrorist.” The Urban 
Dictionary, a popu lar website, describes General William Tecumseh 
Sherman as having employed the “vicious” tactic of targeting civilians, 
continuing:
Such tactics had previously been deemed morally unacceptable. The delib-
erate targeting of civilians for attack was taken up in World War II ending 
in the deaths of millions. The bombing of Eu ro pean cities by both sides of 
the war and Japa nese cities by the U.S. as well as attacks on civilians 
in China, the Philippines, and  Korea by Japan  were consistent with and 
encouraged by Sherman’s pre ce dent. The logic of saving lives in the long- 
run by  these tactics seems to have been refuted by history.
The “words related to General William T. Sherman” at the bottom of the 
entry include collateral damage, modern warfare, murder, terrorist, and war crimi-
nal.1 To be honest and fair, this is not the most reliable of sources. It is writ-
ten by someone named “Tex in Tex,” it misquotes the general, and the 
word association also includes “war hero.” But, it does represent a 
popularly held view that William  T. Sherman and the March through 
1“General William T. Sherman,” The Urban Dictionary, http:// www . urbandictionary 
. com, accessed Apr. 25, 2014.
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Sherman’s March and the Laws of War
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Georgia and the Carolinas (figs. 1–4) during the final months of the Civil 
War have something to do with the creation of total war, and that the mil-
lions of civilian deaths in the wars of the twentieth and twenty- first centu-
ries can be somehow laid at his feet.
Nor does this view reside entirely on the internet, noted repository of 
crackpot theories. A history of Henry County, Georgia, explains simply that 
“Sherman’s March to the Sea was the first hint of the concept of ‘Total War,’ 
which was to come to full fruition during the Second World War, in which 
civilian infrastructure is considered a legitimate military target.”2  Later 
writers, notably James Reston Jr., tried to connect the March to atrocities 
in Vietnam, arguing that “when a rash Confederate ventured a shot on his 
trains from a court house, the court house was burned. When a lady burned 
her corncrib, she lost her  house. The ‘proportionality’ of the retaliation is 
roughly the same, if geometrically less, as hostile fire from a jungle  rifle be-
ing greeted by a B-52 strike.”3
More recently, the writer Matthew Carr has used Sherman in a slightly 
more subtle fashion as the central figure in his “antimilitarist military his-
tory,” Sherman’s Ghosts: Soldiers, Civilians, and the American Way of War. While 
conceding the obvious point that  there are vast differences between nine-
teenth and twenty- first- century warfare, Carr nevertheless argues that Sher-
man “embodies a very specific use of military force as an instrument of 
coercion and intimidation that has often been replayed by the U.S. Mili-
tary and also by other armies.”4 In this case, the evils of mass warfare are 
not entirely Sherman’s, but he still bears considerable responsibility, even if 
at times only symbolically.
Not that most writers even define what they mean by total war or laws of 
war. Often Sherman seems to be judged by the standards of  today rather 
than  those of his own time. Often total war seemed to refer to the degree of 
national mobilization, as opposed to the range of targets.5 But a closer look 
2Michael Reaves, Historic Henry County (San Antonio, Tex., 2004), p. 20.
3James Reston, Sherman’s March and Vietnam (New York, 1984), pp. 92–93.
4Matthew Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts: Soldiers, Civilians, and the American Way of War (New 
York, 2015), p. 8.
5Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler, eds., On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and 
German Wars of Unification, 1861–1871 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 8. Mark A. Smith has argued 
that Sherman did not stray far from the teachings of Jomini and Clausewitz on the March. 
Mark A. Smith, “Sherman’s Unexpected Companions: Marching through Georgia with 
Jomini and Clausewitz,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 81 (1997):1–24. Several historians have 
Fig.  1.  “Sherman’s March to the Sea,” by Felix Octavius Carr Darley, engraved by 
Alexander Hay Ritchie, ca. 1868. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
Fig. 2.  “Contrabands accompanying the line of Sherman’s march through Georgia,” 
Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, Mar. 18, 1865. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs 
Division)
Fig.  4.  “Sherman’s March through South Carolina— Burning of McPhersonville, 
February 5, 1865,” Harper’s Weekly, Mar. 4, 1865. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs 
Division)
Fig. 3.  Regiment of Michigan engineers and mechanics destroying railroad tracks in 
Atlanta, from a stereograph by George N. Barnard. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo-
graphs Division)
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at Sherman’s March, in the context of the changing nature of Union poli-
cies over the course of the war, paints a more nuanced picture.
The Laws of Hard War
In 1864  there  were no Hague or Geneva conventions to govern the actions 
of belligerents. That is not to say  there  were no guides for military be hav ior 
and conduct. But  those rules  were also fluid and evolving, changing as the 
very nature of the Civil War changed. Initial Union policy  toward the 
nascent Confederacy and its civilians had been one of conciliation. Es-
sentially, it was designed to animate a perceived  silent majority of Union-
ists, and it emphasized the targeting of armies rather than civilians. In 
effect, Southern civilians  were still treated as American citizens rather 
than as belligerents.
But as early as 1862 that had begun to change. During the summer of 
1862, Union General John Pope issued a series of  orders that allowed the 
Army of  Virginia to subsist on the produce of the local countryside (among 
other  things), and a desperately frustrated Lincoln approved them. Pope’s 
soldiers went on a tear of destruction and vio lence reminiscent of the stories 
that would come out of Georgia and the Carolinas two years  later. So  great 
 were the abuses perpetrated on civilians that Pope was forced to condemn 
his own men.6
Once Lincoln issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in Sep-
tember 1862, the opportunity for conciliation was over and the war would 
become, in Mark Grimsley’s phrase, “hard- handed.” At the same time, 
Union General in Chief Henry Halleck had been consulting with the 
Prussian- born professor Francis Lieber about devising a military code. 
Lieber had already drafted two more limited opinions— one dealing with 
explored the question of  whether Sherman’s March qualified as “total war”: Mark 
Grimsley, “Modern War/Total War,” in Steven E. Woodworth, ed., The American Civil 
War: A Handbook of Lit er a ture and Research (Westport, Conn., 1996), pp. 379–89; Mark A. 
Neely Jr., “Was the Civil War a Total War?,” Civil War History 50 (2004):434–58; Wayne 
Wei- Siang Hsieh, “Total War and the American Civil War Reconsidered: The End of an 
Outdated ‘Master Narrative,’ ” Journal of the Civil War Era 1 (2011):394.
6Daniel Sutherland, “Abraham Lincoln, John Pope, and the Origins of Total War,” 
Journal of Military History 56 (1992):577, 580, 584.
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the treatment of captured Confederate soldiers, and the other, more signifi-
cant one with Confederate guerrillas and other partisans.7 Lieber called his 
1863 comprehensive work A Code for the Government of Armies, but the War 
Department issued it as General  Orders No. 100 and it is popularly known 
as the Lieber Code.8 The code was designed to codify the laws of war, es-
pecially as they pertained to interactions between civilians and soldiers.
One of the most significant sections of the code was its relatively broad 
construction of “military necessity.” In the language of Article 15:
Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed 
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable 
in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of  every armed 
 enemy, and  every  enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of pecu-
liar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruc-
tion of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all 
withholding of sustenance or means of life from the  enemy; of the appropria-
tion of what ever an  enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence 
and safety of the army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking 
of good faith  either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into 
during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who 
take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account 
to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.
Lieber’s relatively broad definition, while deploring “cruelty” and acts of 
vengeance, did allow the making of war on civilians in certain manners and 
circumstances. For example, Article 17 explic itly permitted using starvation 
of civilians as a method of putting pressure on an  enemy. This was  because, 
according to the code, a citizen of a hostile nation or  enemy was “one of 
the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and as such is subjected to the 
7The latter pamphlet, Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of 
War, was drafted in 1862 at the request of General Halleck. Its conclusions  were largely 
incorporated into the full Lieber Code. Paul Finkelman, “Francis Lieber and the Modern 
Law of War,” review of Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History, by John Fabian 
Witt, University of Chicago Law Review 80, no. 4 (Fall 2013):2071–132, 2084–86; Stephen C. 
Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A  Legal History of the Civil War (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 
pp. 76–77; John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History (New York, 
2012), pp. 193–94.
8David Bosco, “Moral Princi ple vs. Military Necessity,” The American Scholar, 2008; 
Burrus M. Carnahan, “Lincoln, Lieber, and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of 
the Princi ple of Military Necessity,” American Journal of International Law 92 (1998):213–31.
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hardships of the war.”9 The other  factor to keep in mind about the code is 
that it was designed in part to justify short, sharp wars. The more intense 
and punishing a war, Lieber believed, the sooner it would be over. In a 
sense, the code enshrined an idea of war as, perhaps paradoxically, both 
ferocious and humanitarian.10
Among the code’s prohibitions, however, was the theft and/or destruc-
tion of artworks and the like (Article 35); and,  under the punishment of death, 
“all wanton vio lence committed against persons in the invaded country, all 
destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all rob-
bery, all pillage or sacking, even  after taking a place by main force, all rape, 
wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants.”11
Confederates claimed that the code was so broad as to license “mischief” 
 under the grounds of military necessity; certainly, by 1864 Lincoln and the 
Union had become comfortable with a high degree of destruction of pri-
vate property (cotton and the contents of homes, if not homes themselves) 
in areas such as Missouri and the Shenandoah Valley.12 Thus one could 
argue that the Lieber Code, at least as it pertained to the treatment of civil-
ians, was honored more in the breach than closely followed.13
Francis J. Lippitt’s Field Ser vice in War, a manual on military logistics 
published just  after the war, leans on military necessity to justify foraging, 
arguing that it was a “well- established right of war.” But at the same time, 
Lippitt did concede that it was incumbent on commanders and soldiers to 
restrain themselves. To do other wise would be to bring dishonor on the 
country.14 Lippitt’s own work demonstrates the complexity of the moral is-
sues surrounding foraging. By its very nature, the act of seizing supplies 
inflicts hardships on the civilian population. To inflict the least amount of 
harm (and thus to operate within the moral, if not the  legal, bound aries of 
so- called civilized warfare), tight control must be maintained. Without 
9“General  Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code,” http:// avalon . law . yale . edu / 19th 
_ century / lieber . asp.
10Finkelman, “Francis Lieber and the Modern Law of War,” pp. 2101–2.
11“General  Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code,” Article 44, http:// avalon . law . yale . edu 
/ 19th _ century / lieber . asp#sec2.
12Carnahan, “Lincoln, Lieber, and the Laws of War,” pp. 218, 228.
13Bosco, “Moral Princi ple vs. Military Necessity.”
14Francis J. Lippitt, Field Ser vice in War: Comprising Marches, Convoys, Camps and Cantonments, 
Reconnaissances, Outposts, Foraging, and Notes on Logistics (New York, 1869), pp. 115–18.
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defined foraging parties and a centralized distribution system— that is, 
when a commander allowed troops to supply themselves— chaos would 
ensue. Specifically, Lippitt warned, it would lead:
(1) To an entire relaxation of discipline without which a military force is 
only an armed mob.
(2) To universal pillage, and to murders and other outrages by the troops 
upon the inhabitants, which always follow in its train.
(3) To the consequent massacre of straggling parties, in retaliation, by the 
inhabitants, who are thus made  bitter enemies.
(4) To an enormous waste and destruction of the supplies themselves over 
and above what is actually consumed.15
One might have expected Lippitt to use the recent example of Sherman’s 
March, but he did not, hearkening instead to Napoleon’s Rus sian campaign.
Lippitt did not just ignore the March; he defended it, noting Sherman’s 
orders that when seizing  house hold goods the men carefully “discriminat[ed] 
between the rich, who  were generally hostile to us, and the poor and indus-
trious, who  were usually friendly or at least neutral.” Also, he described an 
or ga nized and controlled system, complete with detailed rules and receipts. 
Any deviations from the prescribed system  were the fault of a few bad apples, 
stragglers, and the like, not the main force of marchers.16
Sherman’s Laws
Despite innumerable allegations to the contrary, Sherman himself was well 
aware that war was governed by rules, and must have been familiar with 
the Lieber Code. In fact, Sherman’s aide Major Henry Hitchcock was the 
nephew of one of Lieber’s collaborators and maintained a correspondence 
with Lieber throughout the March.17 Sherman’s knowledge allowed him 
to shape his  orders and campaign such that they skated just up to the edge 
of legality as he understood it. This is best seen in two examples: Sherman’s 
15Ibid., pp. 130, 135.
16Ibid., pp. 138–39.
17Witt, Lincoln’s Code, p. 280.
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expulsion of civilians from Atlanta in September 1864, and then the March 
itself, taken as a  whole.
Sherman’s army took control of the city of Atlanta on September 2, 1864. 
Sherman had no plans to remain  there for the long term; rather, he sought 
to turn the city into a purely military base, a place for his soldiers to briefly 
rest and resupply. He did not want to have to worry about  either caring for 
civilians or protecting his men from spies and guerrilla actions. To that 
end, on September  4 he issued Special Field  Orders No. 67, which began 
quite simply, stating: “The city of Atlanta, being exclusively required for war-
like purposes,  will at once be vacated by all except the armies of the United 
States and such civilian employees as may be retained by the proper de-
partments of the government.” Over the following days, additional  orders 
directed civilians to register and then make arrangements to be moved 
through the lines  either north or south of the city.18
 Those who would condemn Sherman for making unjustified war on non-
combatants have often pointed to this incident as a prime example. One 
reason may be the series of increasingly angry correspondence between 
Sherman and Confederate General John Bell Hood and Atlanta’s mayor 
James M. Calhoun between September 7 and September 14.  These letters, 
in which Hood and Calhoun argue with Sherman about the expulsion, show 
us Sherman at his most controlled and analytical.19
The first letter is from Sherman to Hood on September 7, asking for 
Hood’s assistance in evacuating civilians  toward the south, via the town of 
Rough and Ready. Hood replied on September 9, agreeing to appoint guards 
to assist in the pro cess, but then he continued: “And now, sir, permit me to 
say that the unpre ce dented mea sure you propose transcends, in studied and 
ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark 
history of war.”20 Sherman countered this charge by pointing out that Hood 
himself used and destroyed civilian homes during the defense of Atlanta. 
Sherman then went on to remind Hood that it was Southerners who in fact 
18Stephen Davis, What the Yankees Did to Us: Sherman’s Bombardment and Wrecking of Atlanta 
(Macon, Ga., 2012), pp. 290–95; Wendy Hammond Venet, A Changing Wind: Commerce and 
Conflict in Civil War Atlanta (New Haven, Conn., 2014), pp. 174–77; Special Field  Orders 67, 
in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Rec ords of the Union and Confederate Armies 
(Washington, D.C., 1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 38, part 5, p. 837 (hereafter O.R.).
19For an extremely detailed discussion, see Davis, What the Yankees Did to Us, pp. 297–
308. The entire correspondence can be found in O.R., ser. 1, vol. 39, part 2, pp. 414–22.
20O.R., ser. 1, vol. 39, part 2, p. 415.
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plunged the nation into war. Sherman argued that his removal of  women 
and  children from the zone of  battle was in fact “a kindness” and “more 
humane” than leaving them in place, subject to  battle and attack.21 Sher-
man therefore staked out the position that by forcing civilians out of Atlanta, 
he was in fact protecting rather than attacking them.
Hood would have none of that. He charged Sherman with violating the 
customs “usual in war among civilized nations” by shelling Atlanta with-
out warning. Hood then went on to challenge Sherman’s complaints about 
the Confederacy as a  whole, closing with a final denial of Sherman’s legiti-
macy.22 Sherman then responded testily, “I was not bound by the laws of 
war to give notice of the shelling of Atlanta, a ‘fortified town’ with maga-
zines, arsenals, foundries, and public stores. You  were bound to take notice. 
See the books.”23 Sherman could hardly have been more explicit than this 
in his demonstration that he believed himself to be working within the rules 
of legitimate warfare.
But this is not the most quoted passage from the September exchanges 
of letters. Rather,  those who would condemn Sherman often point to his Sep-
tember 12, 1864, letter to the mayor and city council of Atlanta, in which 
Sherman wrote that “war is cruelty and you cannot refine it,” to make the 
argument that he was willing to do what ever worked to wreak all kinds of 
havoc on civilians in order to end the war. But to quote only that line is to 
miss the fuller context of his reply. Sherman’s letter went on to make the 
point that his ultimate goal was peace, and that only a speedy end to the 
war would bring that about. A harsher war, Sherman believed, would be a 
shorter one. Or, as he explained, “I want peace, and believe it can now only 
be reached through  union and war, and I  will ever conduct war with a view 
to perfect an early success.” Then Sherman went on, “but, my dear sirs, 
when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then  will I 
share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes 
and families against danger from  every quarter.” Hard war was not vindic-
tive or punitive, Sherman believed, but a means to an end. Once the war 
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demonstrated that he was in fact operating within the bound aries of a code 
that allowed war to be made on civilians.25
What of the March itself? Before leaving Atlanta on November 15, 1864, 
Sherman set some ground rules for his 62,000 men. He did this in the form 
of his Special Field  Orders No. 120. The nine articles described the divi-
sions of his army, their marching  orders, and, importantly for our purposes, 
what the army could and could not do. The men  were instructed to “forage 
liberally on the country” and “to destroy mills,  houses, cotton- gins,  etc,” but 
within limits. The foraging parties  were supposed to be regularized and 
 under the control of “discreet” officers; soldiers  were not supposed to enter 
homes; should the army be left “unmolested,” Southern property was also 
supposed to be left alone. Significantly, Sherman also ordered that when 
seizing livestock, his men  ought to discriminate “between the rich, who are 
usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly.” If 
the army was well treated, they  were instructed to “leave with each  family a 
reasonable portion for their maintenance.”26
As for African Americans, Sherman was willing to permit commanders 
to put “able- bodied” men who could “be of ser vice” into pioneer corps, but 
urged them to be mindful of their limited supplies. Well aware of his logis-
tical limitations, Sherman wanted his officers to leave the newly freed  women 
and  children  behind.27
Most of  these rules  were honored more in the breach than in real ity, but 
their very existence gave Sherman (and to an arguably lesser extent his men) 
a degree of moral cover. They undoubtedly allowed for a certain elasticity— 
harsher treatment of some  people in some places, leniency elsewhere. The 
prob lem with them seemed to arise from the degree to which individual 
Union soldiers  were left to their own discretion when foraging. In that way 
real damage and devastation, arguably beyond the bound aries of what was 
intended by the code, did happen. But it is impor tant to remember that the 
worst destruction seems to have happened in violation of  orders, rather than 
in ser vice of them.28
25Witt, Lincoln’s Code, p. 252.
26Special Field  Orders 120, O.R., ser. 1, vol. 39, pp. 713–14.
27O.R., ser. 1, vol. 39, part 3, pp. 713–14; William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General 
William T. Sherman (Bloomington, Ind., 1957), pp. 175–76.
28Witt, Lincoln’s Code, pp. 281–82; Finkelman, “Francis Lieber and the Modern Law of 
War,” pp. 2102, 2105; Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts, p. 116.
An Infamous Disregard?    65
Sherman believed he was operating within the laws of war and para-
meters of so- called civilized be hav ior, but that did not mean that he was 
unwilling to push up against the bound aries of  those rules. Frightening 
 people, stealing their supplies, even burning their barns was one  thing; 
 wholesale killing or raping, as happened in areas riven by guerrilla vio lence, 
was beyond the pale. One could argue that Sherman exploited the language 
of vio lence and fear in order to reach his ends. Sherman biographer Michael 
Fellman has argued that while the March “stopped well short of a ‘total war’ 
in the twentieth  century Nazi sense,” Sherman’s rhe toric of destruction im-
plied that he could make war on whomever he chose, and that Southern 
whites would be powerless to stop him.29
Did that make Sherman a terrorist? He certainly used calculated bru-
tality to terrorize the Southern population. Fellman describes Sherman as 
having “terrorist capacities.”30 And what responsibility, for both destroying 
and reigning themselves in, accrues to the soldiers on the March? Part of 
the reason that the March was not total in the twentieth- century sense was 
 because the soldiers limited themselves, held back by their own internal, 
cultural sense of morality.31
Sherman himself may have overstepped the bounds of legality a few 
times, each time in retaliation for Confederate actions, each time regard-
ing his use of prisoners of war. In the first instance, when Sherman learned 
of torpedoes or mines buried outside Savannah, he called for prisoners to 
be brought up to clear them. In the second, when Union foragers  were cap-
tured and killed by Wade Hampton’s men in South Carolina, Sherman 
ordered prisoners to draw lots and chose one to be killed, thus setting an 
example.32
But what keeps Sherman from being a terrorist, in the modern sense of 
the word, is that he was operating during war time, with the full sanction 
and support of his government. When the war ended, so too did his hos-
tilities and destruction. A better analogy to terrorism in the wake of the 
29Michael Fellman, Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman (New York, 1995), 
pp. 171, 179; Michael Fellman, “At the Nihilist Edge: Reflections on Guerrilla Warfare 
during the American Civil War,” in Förster and Nagler, On the Road to Total War, p. 535.
30Fellman, Citizen Sherman, pp. 182–83.
31Ibid., pp. 225–26.
32Cornelius Cadle, “An Adjutant’s Recollections,” in Sketches of War History, 1861–1865, 
Papers read before the Ohio Commandry of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of 
the United States, 9 vols. (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1883–93), 5:397–99.
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Civil War would be the waves of vio lence that confronted African Ameri-
cans during Reconstruction as they sought to exercise their new economic, 
social, and po liti cal freedoms.
The notion that Sherman brought forth a diff er ent kind of war with the 
March makes sense only retrospectively. As the nineteenth  century became 
the twentieth, and as wars of increasing deadliness and destructive power 
broke out around the globe, the March seemed to reappear again and again. 
Often, the analogy was strained, but it revealed much about the common 
understanding of the March, or of a simplified version of it.
Modern War
In 1902 a humor column in the New York Times reproached the Demo crats 
for criticizing soldiers’ activities in the Philippines. Written by Robert Welch 
in the colloquial voice of Silas Larrabee of Ogunquit, Maine, the column 
called for loyalty to the soldiers (rather than criticism). He minimized the 
cruelties perpetuated on the Filipinos, comparing them first to American 
activities against Indians in the West, and then moved on to the more 
distant past:
And how about Sherman’s march through Georgy? That was deverstation, 
 wasn’t it? And  didn’t the  people of the North say it was a good job? Ever 
know a band up North that  couldn’t play ‘Marchin’ Through Georgy? Why 
they sing it to babies— make it a cradle song. Somehow I rayther think when 
we come to know the hull story  we’ll pootty much all of us agree that Smith’s 
operations was jest about on a level with Sherman’s accordin’ to.33
Welch highlighted an essential hy poc risy: if Americans  were comfortable 
with swaths of destruction at home, why should they have a prob lem with 
them further afield? If excuses could be made for Sherman’s bummers, why 
not for Gen. Jacob H. Smith’s soldiers? In fact, this was part of the very de-
fense offered before Senator Henry Cabot Lodge’s committee investigating 
American conduct during the so- called Philippine Insurrection, which 
resulted in the deaths of several hundred thousand Filipino civilians.34
33“Mr. Larrabee Defends the Army,” New York Times, May 11, 1902.
34Carr, Sherman’s Ghosts, pp. 152–58.
An Infamous Disregard?    67
Over a de cade  later, Sherman’s March reappeared in the national and 
international discourse, as Germany marched through Belgium, and the 
world erupted into war. A piece in the New York Times in September 1914 
attempted to calculate the collective cost of all wars in  human history, con-
cluding that the  human toll was some fifteen billion lives. As for the cost of 
destroyed property, the authors threw up their meta phorical hands, deter-
mining it to be both “enormous” and incalculable. This is where Sherman’s 
March came in: they used it as an example, citing Sherman’s own estimate 
of $300 million in property destroyed. But the value of the property lost in 
the Civil War would pale in comparison to the amount currently at risk in 
Eu rope, particularly in Belgium and France. In this instance, the devas-
tation of Sherman’s March is being minimized rather than connected to 
the wars of the twentieth  century.35
More commonly, the devastation of Sherman’s March was used to re-
mind Americans of the costs of war, however justifiable. William M. Sloane 
of Columbia University prophetically called the war “a world disaster of un-
paralleled significance” and warned against American intervention over-
seas. He cautioned Americans against becoming too outraged by atrocities 
perpetrated against civilians, lest that lead them to intervene. Patronizingly, 
Sloane opined that “the sense of outrage which Americans feel over the 
horrors of war, while most creditable to them, is very often based upon an 
ignorance of the rules and regulations of so- called civilized warfare, and 
upon a sentimentality which, though also very creditable, is unfortunately 
not one of the  factors in the world’s work.” He called on his readers to put 
their sentimentality aside and to recall both Sherman’s March and Hunter’s 
1864 Valley Campaign, noting “and yet at that time, in what we consid-
ered the supreme danger to our country, the conduct of  those men was 
approved and they themselves  were almost deified for their actions.”36 
Sloane seems to be saying to readers that if Sherman could be not only 
forgiven but also celebrated, then Americans should also remember the 
Monroe Doctrine and give the Germans a pass in the interests of their 
own security.
35“Fifteen Billion  Human Lives Have Been Sacrificed in War since the Beginning of 
Au then tic History,” New York Times, Sept. 13, 1914.
36“Prof. Sloane Warns Amer i ca against War,” New York Times, Sept. 20, 1914.
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 These early references to the Civil War and Sherman continued to pop 
up during the years of World War I. In May 1915, Yandell Henderson of 
Yale University wrote a pro- German column in the New York Times, again 
encouraging American neutrality. Henderson minimized Germany’s inva-
sion of Belgium, and then went on:
as for atrocities, Belgium, Serbia, East Prus sia, and Poland have prob ably 
been no more thoroughly desolated than Georgia  after Sherman’s march to 
the Sea. Away from ordinary social restraints, men always do such  things. 
It is rare for a militia com pany  here to have a field day, or a college class to 
hold a reunion without a certain percentage making beasts of themselves.
Like earlier writers, Henderson downplayed the March in order to make 
his broader po liti cal point: atrocities overseas should not warrant interven-
tion, and Amer i ca should not go to war with Germany.37
Henderson’s letter prompted a series of angry responses. The historian 
G. M. Trevelyan listed the atrocities being perpetrated in Eu rope, and chal-
lenged Henderson’s “boys  will be boys” attitude. The attacks on civilians in 
Eu rope did not constitute normal be hav ior by soldiers or young men, and 
Trevelyan wrote to “deny that Sherman’s troops  either burned  women and 
 children alive or gouged  peoples eyes out or murdered civilians  wholesale, 
as the Austro- Hungarian troops did in Serbia.”38 The following day’s pa-
per contained a letter from Mary Cadwalader Jones, who had lived in the 
South during the waning days of the Civil War. She remembered seeing 
“grim” evidence of devastation and starving civilians, “but  here  were no 
‘atrocities’ and no ‘frightfulness.’ ” She deplored the damage, for which she 
blamed bummers and faithless slaves, “but it was not accompanied by beast-
liness or cruelty, nor was the desolation to be even compared with that of 
Belgium and Serbia now.”39 This flies in the face of the conventional wis-
dom that to Southern whites Sherman’s March was the ultimate destruc-
tion, the worst of the worst.
George Haven Putnam, whose Civil War  career included ser vice in New 
Orleans in 1862, the Shenandoah Valley in 1864, and North Carolina and 
Savannah in 1865, joined the attack against Yandell Henderson. Henderson 
drew a distinction between Germany’s officially ordered and sanctioned 
37Yandell Henderson, “Ourselves as Germans See Us,” New York Times, May 21, 1915.
38G. M. Trevelyan, “An Historian Mystified,” New York Times, May 22, 1915.
39Mary Cadwalader Jones, “What Sherman’s Men Did,” New York Times, May 26, 1915.
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shootings of civilians, sinking of ships, and generally making war on non-
combatants and the destruction of property in the Civil War South. Put-
nam perceived Henderson’s essay as an attack on the honor and reputation 
of American (read Union) soldiers, and one that he felt was not befitting a 
professor at Yale.40
Thus far the responses to Henderson’s initial article took issue with his 
equating Sherman’s March and German attacks on civilians. But at least 
one reader, a military historian named John A. Bigelow, thought that the 
quest to minimize Civil War antecedents went too far. Bigelow rightly 
pointed out that just  because Sherman’s men  were not as brutal as German 
troops does not mean that they should be absolved of all guilt. Bigelow noted 
that the men of 1864 and 1865 went well beyond their written  orders and 
seemed to be unstoppable. Is “an army which waits to act frightfully,  until 
it is ordered to do so . . .  more to be criticized than one which resorts to such 
action without  orders and persists in it when ordered to desist?” wondered 
Bigelow. That is, where do the moral bearings of the men themselves come 
in?  Isn’t terrorizing civilians terrorizing civilians,  whether  under  orders or not? 
Similarly, Putnam wondered, “If Sherman was not wanton in his harshness 
 because he had a military object in it, may not the Germans be similarly 
justified?” Bigelow raised one of the central moral questions of the March 
and its legacy: do we retrospectively excuse the excesses of Sherman’s men 
 because we agree with their cause? Do we excuse them  because they won?41
In an editorial on June 15, the editors of the New York Times weighed in 
on the controversy, proclaiming that “Georgia was not Belgium.” They re-
minded their readers that the “atrocities” in Belgium shocking the world 
included using civilians as shields, misuse of white flags, taking and mur-
dering hostages— all crimes of which Sherman’s men  were not even accused, 
much less guilty.42 The next column featured a reply to Bigelow, this one 
advocating intervention precisely  because of the level of German cruelty 
against civilians, which was so much greater than that of the Union army.43
40George Haven Putnam, “War as We Made It,” New York Times, June 4, 1915.
41John A. Bigelow, “Nothing but Their Eyes to Weep With,” New York Times, June 13, 
1915. Bigelow is the author of The Princi ples of Strateg y (Philadelphia, 1894). Bigelow’s letter 
was also reprinted as “Did Grant, Sherman and Sheridan Teach Militarism to 
Germany?,” William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine 24 ( July 1915):66–72.
42“Georgia Was Not Belgium,” New York Times, June 15, 1915.
43Frank Jewett Mather Jr., “The Degree of War,” New York Times, June 15, 1915.
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Bigelow responded in turn on June 19, arguing that the differences in 
execution between the Germans and Sherman’s men did not account for 
similarities in impulse. That is, both sides  were animated by the same in-
tentions: “Each officer placed efficiency before humanity, except so far as 
efficiency meant humanity to him. If one may take Sherman at his word, 
he would not have stopped at a massacre had it seemed to him necessary to 
the attainment of his military object.” Bigelow went on to clarify his earlier 
point about the differences between 1864–65 and 1914–15, explaining that 
“ things do not have to be parallel to be properly comparable.” Bigelow 
continued to insist on the utility of the American past for the global 
pres ent.44
Once the United States became involved in World War I, the usable past 
of Sherman’s March ceased to be a significant point of discussion.45 The 
analogy reappeared briefly  after the war, during testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Propaganda in 1919. Grant Squires, a New York  lawyer who 
visited Belgium, testified to the cruelties he saw perpetrated by the Germans: 
men and  women beaten with  rifle butts,  children and babies murdered, 
and families starving without shelter. Squires was then asked to  counter 
earlier testimony by German sympathizer Edmund von Mach, to the effect 
that Sherman’s March had “also been a very cruel expedition.” This en-
raged Senator Knute Nelson (a Civil War veteran), who angrily proclaimed 
that American soldiers had never “killed  women and  children. What ever 
they did, they did not do that.” Nelson specifically asked Squires to address 
von Mach’s charges that the Germans  were no worse than Sherman’s men; 
Squires confirmed that the Germans  were diff er ent from any pre de ces sors.46
Essentially, what this exchange shows is that a new standard was being 
set for violations of civilians. Where once the thefts and fires of Sherman’s 
men  were the worst that could be  imagined, the  Great War issued horrors 
of an entirely diff er ent order of magnitude.
Not every one got the memo that Sherman was no longer the epitome of 
evil. The En glish novelist, critic, and travel writer Ford Madox Ford reflected 
44John Bigelow, “Georgia and Belgium,” New York Times, June 19, 1915.
45Some contributors to Confederate Veteran complained about this new silence. See 
Henry E. Shepherd, “Historic Ironies— Sherman and German,” Confederate Veteran 26 
( Jan. 1918):17–19;  Will T. Hale, “Historic Exposures Commended,” Confederate Veteran 26 
(Feb. 1918):91.
46“Tells of German Insurance Scheme,” New York Times, Jan. 10, 1916; “Tells of Horrors 
Seen in Belgium,” New York Times, Jan. 16, 1919.
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on Sherman during his travels in the United States during the 1930s. Un-
like other writers who began their musings by visiting the sites of the March 
( whether in Georgia or the Carolinas), Ford began his reverie far away, at 
the home where a  woman was killed during the  Battle of Gettysburg. Why 
was such a fuss made over this one unfortunate  woman, he wondered, as 
“ there  were plenty  women killed and worse by Sherman’s licensed plun-
derers, and one does not much bother about them.”47 Ford then went on to 
condemn Sherman for burning “Columbus” (clearly he meant Columbia), 
blaming Wade Hampton, and admitting that his soldiers  were drunk when 
they did it. He compared the burning of Columbia to the burning of Liège, 
Belgium, but noted approvingly that “the  Great German Staff had at least 
the decency to deny fiercely that their troops  were drunk,” regardless of 
 whether they  were actually inebriated or not. Ford praised Confederate 
generals Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson while condemning Grant, 
Sherman, and Sheridan as “murderers” who disobeyed “the dictates of 
humanity.” His ultimate point, clearly influenced as much by his World 
War I experiences as his travels in Amer i ca, is that
it is silly to say that the butchering of civilians shortens wars and is therefore 
more humane. . . .  Or burning their  houses or crops or furniture or cloth-
ing. I suppose that if you completely wiped out a  whole nation, civilians plus 
armed forces, you might stop a war. But, horrible as they are, modern meth-
ods of war are not as efficient as all that— and not quite stamped out  peoples 
develop a philoprogenitiveness, a tenacity of purpose, a vindictiveness.48
The “war to end all wars” reanimated debates over attacks on civilians. Ford 
was certainly right about the vindictiveness that would continue to burn 
through the survivors of scorched- earth tactics.
 There  were few mentions of Sherman’s March during World War II, but 
the Vietnam War, perhaps  because it coincided with the centennial of the 
Civil War, raised more analogies to it. The historian Theodore Rosengar-
ten recalled being astonished in the 1960s and 1970s when he heard a vari-
ety of cultural critics and opponents of the war in Vietnam (including Mary 
McCarthy, Howard Levine, and Michael Hess) “compare Sherman’s oper-
ations in Georgia and the Carolinas to crimes committed by Americans in 
Vietnam. They called Sherman our first merchant of terror, the spiritual 
47Ford Madox Ford,  Great Trade Route (New York, 1937), p. 243.
48Ibid., 299; Hale, “Historic Exposures Commended,” p. 302.
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 father of such hated doctrines as search and destroy, pacification, strategic 
hamlets, free- fire zones. You had to won der  whether without Sherman the 
atom bomb might not have been dropped.”49 Perhaps the connection had 
to do with loss and defeat, as C. Vann Woodward described in The Burden 
of Southern History. Perhaps it had to do with the intimacy of the fighting and 
the hand- to- hand targeting of civilians, diff er ent from the massive  battles 
of World War II. Perhaps it had to do with the need to knit a divided nation 
back together.
The most detailed and culturally significant exploration of this relation-
ship came in James Reston Jr.’s 1984 book, Sherman’s March and Vietnam. Res-
ton retraced the March through Georgia, looking to the past to explain the 
more turbulent pres ent. He seemed at times to draw a straight line of con-
nection between nineteenth- and twentieth- century vio lence:
Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman is considered by many to be the author 
of “total war,” the first general of modern  human history to carry the logic 
of war to its ultimate extreme, the first to scorch the earth, the first to wreck 
an economy in order to starve its soldiers. He was our first “merchant of ter-
ror,” and the spiritual  father, some contend, of our Vietnam concepts of 
“search and destroy,” “pacification,” “strategic hamlets,” “ free fire zones.” 
As such he remains a cardboard figure of our history: a monstrous arch- 
villain to unreconstructed Southerners, an embarrassment to Northerners 
who won der if “civilized war” died with him,  whether without Sherman the 
atom bomb might not have been dropped or Vietnam entered.50
Reston did concede that the connection was more meta phorical than real, 
but at the same time he raised real questions about limits during war time, 
and how  those limits could shift. What was the conceptual or theoretical 
difference between destroying property and killing  people?
While conceding that much of what Americans thought about Sherman 
(and by extension his men) was informed by my thol ogy rather than facts, 
 those myths mattered. Reston wanted to shape the inevitable mythologiz-
ing of the Vietnam experience as well. Thus, he concluded that “Sherman’s 
soldiers and West moreland’s soldiers have impor tant  things in common.”51 
49Theodore Rosengarten, “New Views on the Burning of Columbia,” in University South 
Caroliniana Society: Fifty Sixth Annual Meeting, 1993.
50Reston, Sherman’s March and Vietnam, p. 6.
51Ibid., pp. 7–8.
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What they had in common, Reston argued, was being animated by a desire 
for vengeance and reprisals. Where they differed was in questions of scale, 
which was as much a function of technology as of desire.52 Men in the twen-
tieth  century had weapons of mass destruction; Union soldiers did not.
What of  today? Sherman is sometimes invoked in discussions of the Iraq 
War, often in support of a more terrible or total sort of war. On April 28, 
2014, my trusty Google Alert pointed me to a column by Thomas Ricks in 
Foreign Policy. Entitled “Sherman as a Counterinsurgent,” Ricks’s article ar-
gues that Sherman carried out not a soft “hearts and minds” campaign but 
a “tough- minded” “ you’re  either with us or against us” approach, with clear 
po liti cal and psychological dimensions.53 I am not convinced by his argu-
ment, but I am convinced that Sherman’s March, and its relationship to 
what Americans think about war, is still very much alive and relevant  today.
52Ibid., pp. 15–16.
53Thomas E. Ricks, “Sherman as a Counterinsurgent,” Foreign Policy, Apr. 28, 2014, 
http:// ricks . foreignpolicy . com / posts / 2014 / 04 / 28 / sherman _ as _ a _ counterinsurgent.
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For h i stor i a ns ,  t h e  Fourteenth Amendment is one of the three “Civil War Amendments”— the Thirteenth,  Fourteenth, and Fifteenth— 
that remade the nation  after the Civil War. The Thirteenth ended slavery 
and involuntary servitude in the nation. The Fifteenth prohibited discrimi-
nation in voting on the basis of race or “previous condition of servitude.” 
Sandwiched in between them was the  Fourteenth, which is the subject of 
this chapter.
Over time the  Fourteenth has emerged as one of the most impor tant parts 
of the Constitution. Since the mid- twentieth  century, the  Fourteenth Amend-
ment has emerged as a central—if not the central— provision in our con-
stitutional jurisprudence. In the last half  century or so, Section 1 of the 
amendment has been the driving engine of the judicial expansion of civil 
rights and civil liberties. During this period, scholars and jurists have combed 
the rec ords of the Thirty- Ninth Congress, seeking a sure answer to the ques-
tion of what the  Fourteenth Amendment meant.
The search for the “intent” of the  Fourteenth Amendment was at the cen-
ter of the litigation in Brown v. Board of Education. In scheduling reargument 
for the fall of 1953, the Supreme Court asked  lawyers to provide briefs on 
two historical issues:
1. What evidence is  there that the Congress which submitted and the state 
legislatures and conventions which ratified the  Fourteenth Amendment 
Paul Finkelman
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contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not understand, 
that it would abolish segregation in the public schools?1
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the states in ratifying the 
 Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would re-
quire the immediate abolition of segregation in the public schools, was it 
nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the amendment (a) that 
 future Congresses might in the exercise of their power  under Section 5 of 
the amendment, abolish segregation, or (b) that it would be within the 
judicial power, in light of  future conditions, to construe the amendment 
as abolishing such segregation of its own force?2
Paraphrasing the court’s questions of sixty years ago, we might ask, did 
the Congress in 1866 contemplate or understand that the amendment would 
make all forms of racial discrimination illegal?
 These, of course, are “ lawyer” questions rather than “historian” questions. 
For historians, the question of how to understand the meaning of the 
 Fourteenth Amendment takes us beyond the debates on the floor of Con-
gress, to ask questions about the po liti cal and social realities of the age and 
the context of the writing of the amendment. What events  were fresh in the 
minds of the framers of the  Fourteenth as they sought to secure the victory 
of the Union cause?  These stories help guide us to what the supporters of 
the amendment in Congress had in mind when they wrote it.
An understanding of the  Fourteenth Amendment begins not in the 
debates on the floor of Congress but in the history leading up to the amend-
ment. One crucial aspect to our understanding of the  Fourteenth Amend-
ment is the striking changes in the law of race relations that took place 
across the North in the two de cades before the Civil War began. Tied to 
this was the attempt of many Northerners, especially Republicans and 
 those who would become Republicans, to change the law of race relations 
in this period. The second story is about the South, and the  legal repression 
and brutal racial vio lence that took place  there immediately  after the Civil 
War ended.
 These two stories complement each other. The first gives us an insight 
into the  legal and po liti cal history that  shaped Republican thought about 
1Richard Kluger,  Simple Justice (New York, 1976), p. 615, quoting Brown v. Board of 
Education, 345 U.S. at 972 (1954).
2Ibid.
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race and the aspirations of Republican leaders for a racially just society. 
Two key Republican congressional leaders in this story are Representa-
tive John A. Bingham, the primary author of Section 1 of the  Fourteenth 
Amendment, and Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, the 
most power ful member of the House of Representatives, who played a 
key role in the adoption of the  Fourteenth Amendment and in the shap-
ing of Republican policy  toward race. How they felt about race—what 
their prewar and war time positions  were on race— helps us better under-
stand the purpose of the  Fourteenth Amendment. The second story, based 
on the evidence presented to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, helps 
us understand what Congress strug gled against in drafting Section 1 of the 
amendment, and thus illustrates what the Republican leadership of the 
Congress hoped the amendment would accomplish and what it would 
prevent. This history affects our understanding of how the  Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to protect both civil rights and civil liberties 
for all Americans.
Race and Law in the Antebellum North: A Prelude  
to the  Fourteenth Amendment
The general view of antebellum Northern race relations has been  shaped 
by an odd mixture of progressive and conservative scholarship. In the 1960s 
a number of scholars began to look carefully at the nature of race relations 
in the antebellum North and concluded that they  were abysmal. Influenced 
by the civil rights movement in the South, scholars including Leon Litwack 
and Eugene Berwanger discovered that the antebellum North was not a para-
gon of equality. On the contrary, they discovered racism, segregation, and 
other forms of discrimination. Thus, Litwack asserted that on the eve of 
the Civil War “the northern Negro remained largely disenfranchised, segre-
gated and eco nom ically oppressed,” and, just as impor tant, “change did not 
seem imminent.” Similarly, in The Frontier against Slavery, Berwanger claimed 
that “discrimination against Negroes in the  Middle West reached its height 
between 1846 and 1860, the same years in which the slavery extension con-
troversy became most acute.” Berwanger argued that “prejudice against 
Negroes was a  factor in the development of antislavery feeling in the 
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ante- bellum United States.”3 Even abolitionists came  under attack. Jane 
Pease and William Pease argued that some lifelong opponents of slavery 
 were uncomfortable in the presence of blacks, and that many abolitionists 
could never decide “ whether the Negro was equal or inferior to the white; 
 whether equality for the Negro should be stressed or  whether it should be 
damped;  whether civil and social rights should be granted him at once or 
only in the indefinite and provisional  future;  whether, in fact, social and civil 
rights should be granted or  whether only civil rights should be given him.”4
Writing in the early years of the civil rights movement,  these scholars 
wanted to teach Northerners about their own racist past. Recognizing this 
past was a key to changing the nature of mid- twentieth- century race 
relations.
In an ironic twist, conservative scholars seized on this scholarship to reach 
a diff er ent conclusion. If the antebellum North was inherently racist,  these 
scholars argued, the Congress in the 1860s and 1870s could not possibly 
have meant to create an integrated society. Thus, Raoul Berger claimed 
that the framers of the  Fourteenth Amendment could not have intended 
to require integration or substantive equality for blacks. He asserted that the 
“key to an understanding of the  Fourteenth Amendment is that the North 
was shot through with Negrophobia.”5
It is certainly true that in most of the antebellum North full racial equal-
ity was rare. But it is also true that in this period many Republican politi-
cians (or politicians who became Republicans) worked hard to alter race 
relations in order to move  toward a more equal society. Many party leaders 
had long been working for greater equality. For example, in the years lead-
ing up to the Civil War, Republican leaders in Iowa, Wisconsin, New York, 
and Connecticut attempted to create equal suffrage.6 Voting was not on the 
3Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the  Free States, 1790–1860 (Chicago, 1961), 
pp. 279, 291; Eugene H. Berwanger, The Frontier against Slavery: Western Anti- Negro Prejudice 
and the Slavery Extension Controversy (1967; reprint ed., Urbana, Ill., 2002), pp. 1, 4.
4Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease, “Antislavery Ambivalence: Immediatism, 
Expedience, Race,” American Quarterly 17 (1965):682, 695, reprinted in Paul Finkelman, ed., 
Antislavery, Articles on American Slavery, vol. 14 (New York, 1989), pp. 356, 369.
5Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the  Fourteenth Amendment 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1977), p. 10.
6Richard Sewell, Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States, 1837–1860 (New 
York, 1976), pp. 323, 333–35; Phyllis F. Field, The Politics of Race in New York: The Strug gle for 
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agenda in 1866, but the Republican congressional leaders who had long 
been working for racial equality (or something close to it) at the state level 
saw the  Fourteenth Amendment as an opportunity to achieve this goal at 
the national level.
Thaddeus Stevens and Race in Pennsylvania
In 1866 Thaddeus Stevens (fig. 1) was the most power ful member of the House 
of Representatives, and perhaps the most power ful politician in the nation. 
He was also a key member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 
which drafted the  Fourteenth Amendment. In 1866, as a member of the 
Joint Committee, he was in a position to implement his ideology.
For more than four de cades Stevens had been an uncompromising sup-
porter of black rights and racial equality. As a delegate to the 1837 Pennsyl-
vania Constitutional Convention, Stevens worked hard to maintain black 
suffrage in the face of Jacksonian Demo crats, who  were intent on taking the 
vote away from blacks. Stevens was unsuccessful in this effort. This failure, 
however, only increased his commitment to racial equality. From the 1820s 
on, Stevens regularly took fugitive slave cases for  free. His most famous ef-
fort came in the dramatic prosecutions in the wake of the Christiana inci-
dent. In 1851 a slave owner, his relatives, and a U.S. deputy marshal had 
attempted to seize a fugitive slave living with a number of other fugitive 
slaves and  free blacks in Christiana, Pennsylvania (fig. 2). The blacks refused 
to surrender peacefully and instead opened fire on the approaching whites. 
A short  battle ensued, which left the slave owner dead and his relatives 
wounded. The slave who had killed his master calmly traveled by train to 
Rochester, New York, where he visited Frederick Douglass before taking a 
boat to Canada. Meanwhile, President Millard Fillmore and Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster insisted on treason  trials, and the federal prosecutor 
secured indictments for treason for more than forty blacks and five white 
men who had refused to help the marshal arrest the fugitive slaves.7 Part of 
the defense strategy included defying racial conventions; thus, the black 
defendants entered the courtroom accompanied by white  women, to the 
Black Suffrage in the Civil War Era (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982); Eric Foner,  Free Soil,  Free  Labor,  Free 
Men: The Ideolog y of the Republican Party before the Civil War (New York, 1970), p. 261.
7Paul Finkelman, Millard Fillmore (New York, 2011), pp. 119–29.
Fig.  1.  Representative Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, from a photo graph 
ca. 1860–68. (Brady- Handy photo graph collection, Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs 
Division)
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horror of the proslavery prosecutors.  Here, Stevens, as a key strategist in 
the case, demonstrated his belief in fundamental racial equality and his 
willingness to challenge the racial status quo.8
Stevens’s relationships with blacks  were more than po liti cal. He saw them 
as his social equals, and he acted on this belief in his personal life. Stevens 
had a longtime black  house keeper who was prob ably his paramour. But 
what ever their private relations, in public Stevens treated her with re spect 
and dignity. “He always addressed her as ‘Madam,’ gave her his seat in pub-
lic conveyances, and included her in social intercourse with his friends.” 
 Here, again, Stevens challenged prejudice. Indeed, throughout the last half 
 century of his life, Stevens challenged racism. Even in death the congress-
man from Pennsylvania struck a blow for equality. Before he died, Stevens 
8Hans L. Trefousse, Thaddeus Stevens: Nineteenth- Century Egalitarian (New York, 1997), 
pp. 174, 14–15, 49–50.  After the judge in the first trial instructed the jury that the case did 
not amount to treason, the defendant was found not guilty and the remaining cases  were 
dropped by the prosecution. Paul Finkelman, “The Treason Trial of Castner Hanway,” in 
Michal R. Belknap, ed., American Po liti cal  Trials, rev. ed. (Westport, Conn., 1994), pp. 77, 
82, 84–86, 89.
Fig. 2.  A wood engraving published in 1872 depicts African Americans firing on slave 
catchers near Christiana, Pennsylvania, in 1851. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs 
Division)
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made certain he would be buried in a cemetery that accepted the bodies of 
all  people without regard to race.9
Race relations in Pennsylvania during Stevens’s lifetime  were complicated 
and often in flux. The high point of antebellum Northern racism was not 
the 1850s and the eve of the Civil War, as Litwack, Berwanger, and Berger 
claim. Rather, it was in the 1830s— the age of Andrew Jackson— when “Jack-
sonian democracy” came to mean an expansion of rights for white men and 
a contraction of rights for blacks.  Until 1837 black men could vote in Penn-
sylvania, but in that year a new constitution deprived them of that right. As I 
have already noted, Stevens was unsuccessful in fighting this change. By 
the 1840s, however, the racial climate in Pennsylvania had begun to move in 
a more progressive direction. The South’s incessant demands for more slave 
territories and greater federal support for slavery led to greater Northern 
opposition to slavery. This opposition to slavery, and Southern demands for 
protecting and expanding slavery, also led to greater rights and  legal protec-
tions for blacks.
Even while the Jacksonians  were disfranchising blacks, the state enforced 
its laws to protect black freedom. Laws passed at an earlier time, when Penn-
sylvania had been in the forefront of protecting black liberty, remained in 
force. Pennsylvania’s 1826 Personal Liberty Law, for example, was designed 
to protect  free blacks from kidnapping and also provide some mea sure of 
due pro cess for alleged fugitive slaves. In 1837 a justice of the peace invoked 
it to prevent Edward Prigg and three other Mary landers from removing 
Margaret Morgan and her  children from the state. Prigg and his cohorts 
then seized Morgan and her  children without any  legal authority and 
dragged them to Mary land. Pennsylvania authorities quickly indicted Prigg 
and the other Mary landers for kidnapping. Pennsylvania’s governor pushed 
hard to have the Mary landers extradited, but ultimately Mary land returned 
only Prigg to Pennsylvania, where he was convicted of kidnapping. In Prigg 
v. Pennsylvania, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Prigg’s conviction and 
struck down the state’s 1826 Personal Liberty Law. In response to this case 
the state withdrew all support for enforcement of the Federal Fugitive Slave 
Law and the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution, and prohibited its 
officials from aiding in the return of fugitive slaves. This act also altered the 
state’s law with regard to visiting slaves. Before 1847 a Southern master could 
9Trefousse, Thaddeus Stevens, pp. 69, 242.
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bring a slave into Pennsylvania for up to six months. But  after 1847 any slave 
brought into Pennsylvania, even for a moment, became instantly  free.10
Pennsylvania’s position on the rights of  free blacks and the rights of fugitive 
slaves and slaves in transit illustrates the complexity of race relations in that 
state during the time of Stevens’s rise to po liti cal power. Increasingly, the state 
protected black liberty and offered African Americans safe haven from 
bondage. While Pennsylvania took the vote away from blacks in the 1830s, 
the state never attempted to limit their immigration or their right to own 
property. Had the state been as racist as some scholars argue, we could 
imagine new laws making black migration difficult. The 1847 repeal of the 
“six months law,” which since 1780 had allowed visiting masters to bring 
slaves into the state for up to half a year, meant that any slaves brought into 
the state would remain  there as  free  people. Once  there, Pennsylvania blacks 
could own property, enter the professions, attend schools, testify against 
whites in court, and fully exercise their rights to freedom of speech, press, 
and assembly. In Formans v. Tamm (1853), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
ruled that blacks had the same right to own land as whites, even if they did 
not have the right to vote. They could also agitate for full po liti cal rights, as 
well as protest private discrimination. And of course they could, and did, 
participate in all sorts of protests against slavery.11
The opinion in Formans illustrates one aspect of the attitudes of Pennsyl-
vanians on the eve of emancipation. Written by Ellis Lewis, a Jacksonian 
Demo crat who was an ally of President James Buchanan, and no friend of 
10Fugitive Slave Act of 1826, ch. L, 1826 Pa. Laws 150 (Pennsylvania Personal Liberty 
Law); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Paul Finkelman, Supreme Injustice: 
Slavery in the Nation’s Highest Court (Cambridge, Mass., 2018), pp. 140–71; Paul Finkelman, 
“Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s 
Judicial Nationalism,” Supreme Court Review 1994 (1994):247; Paul Finkelman, “Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti- slavery Use of a Pro- slavery Decision,” Civil 
War History 25 (1979):5; Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 159, 1847 Pa. Laws 206–8 (preventing 
kidnapping, preserving the public peace, and prohibiting the exercise of certain powers 
previously exercised by judges, and to repeal certain slave laws). See generally Paul 
Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981), 
pp. 137–39 (discussing the evolution of law in the North from allowing masters to visit  free 
states while accompanied by slaves to immediately freeing all slaves voluntarily brought 
into  free states).
11Act of Mar. 1, 1780, ch. CXLVI, 1780 Pa. Laws 296 (allowing visiting masters to keep 
slaves in the state for up to six months), repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 159, 1847 Pa. 
Laws 206–8; Formans v. Tamm, 1 Grant 23 (Pa. 1853) (upholding black property rights in 
Pennsylvania). See also Paul Finkelman, “ Human Liberty, Property in  Human Beings, 
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,” Duquesne Law Review 53 (2015):453–82.
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abolition, the opinion nevertheless supported some of the fundamental rights 
of “equal protection” of the law that would be enshrined in the  Fourteenth 
Amendment. Justice Lewis argued that “the effect” of ending slavery in 
Pennsylvania was
to give to the colored man the right to acquire, possess and dispose of lands 
and goods, as fully as the white man enjoys  these rights. Having no one to 
look to for support but himself, it would be a mockery to tell him he is a “ free 
man,” if he be not allowed the necessary means of sustaining life. The right 
to the fruits of his industry and to invest them in lands or goods, or in such 
manner as he may deem most conducive to his comfort, is an incident to the 
grant of his freedom.12
Immediately  after the Civil War, former Confederate states would in fact 
enact such laws that mocked the ending of slavery, to prevent blacks from 
having basic common- law rights and in many places denying them the right 
to rent or own land. Thus, the experience in Pennsylvania, even coming 
from antiabolitionist jurists, was that blacks, including former slaves, had to 
have equal protection of the law.
During the late antebellum period, Pennsylvania’s government turned a 
blind eye to the active involvement of blacks and whites in the underground 
railroad, which of course led to more blacks coming to Pennsylvania and 
remaining in the state. On the other hand, state officials continued to pros-
ecute whites accused of kidnapping  free blacks.13 Meanwhile, in increas-
ing numbers the  people of Pennsylvania voted for antislavery politicians such 
as Stevens, Simon Cameron, and William D. “Pig Iron” Kelly, who  were 
ready to fight against  human bondage and for  human equality.
 These experiences and this history  shaped the background that Stevens 
brought to Congress and to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which 
drafted the  Fourteenth Amendment.
12Formans, p. 25.
13Act of Mar. 3, 1847, ch. 159, 1847 Pa. Laws 206–8 (denying state support for 
recapturing fugitive slaves); William Still, The Underground Railroad (1872; reprint ed., New 
York, 1968). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Auld, 4 Pa. L.J. 515 (1850) (charging a master with the 
kidnapping of his runaway slave’s  children); A Review of the Trial, Conviction, and Sentence of 
George Alberti, for Kidnapping [1851] and The Trial of Emanual Myers, of Mary land, for Kidnapping 
Certain Fugitive Slaves, Had at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, November, 1859 [1859], both reprinted in 
Paul Finkelman, ed., Fugitive Slaves and the American Courts: The Pamphlet Lit er a ture, Slavery, 
Race, and the American  Legal System, 16 vols. (New York, 1988), 2:27, 4:121.
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John A. Bingham and Race Relations in Ohio
The experience of Congressman John A. Bingham of Ohio (fig. 3) mirrors 
that of Stevens.14 Like Stevens, Bingham served on the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction. Bingham, the author of Section 1 of the  Fourteenth 
Amendment, was equally a longtime opponent of racial discrimination. And 
like Stevens, he had fought against slavery and segregation. In his home state 
of Ohio, Bingham had witnessed a dramatic change in the nature of race 
relations. In the first de cades of the nineteenth  century, Ohio was one of 
the most racially retrograde states in the North. However, by the 1840s this 
had begun to change, and this change continued through the 1850s as Bing-
ham’s new po liti cal organ ization, the Republican Party, gained power.
In 1804 and 1807 Ohio  adopted elaborate registration requirements for 
blacks entering the state.  These laws  were rarely enforced and  were utterly 
in effec tive in limiting the growth of the state’s  free black community. In-
deed, while  these laws  were on the books Ohio’s black population grew rap-
idly. Nevertheless,  these laws always posed a threat to blacks, who might be 
forced out of the state if they could not prove their freedom or find sureties 
to promise to support them if they  were unable to support themselves. Ohio 
also prevented blacks from voting, serving on juries, and testifying against 
whites. Ohio prohibited blacks from attending schools with whites while de-
nying them meaningful access to public schools, even on a segregated ba-
sis. Such laws  were what led Raoul Berger to argue that the antebellum 
North was “shot through with Negrophobia.”15
However, in Ohio and other parts of the North  there was a profound 
transformation of the law with regard to race in the last two antebellum 
14On Bingham, see generally, Gerard N. Magliocca, American Founding Son: John 
Bingham and the Invention of the  Fourteenth Amendment (New York, 2013).
15In 1800 Ohio had a black population of 337; it had grown by more than 550  percent 
to 1,899 by 1810, despite the fact that anti- immigration laws  were on the books for six of 
 those years. It more than doubled to 4,723 in the next de cade, and doubled again in the 
next de cade, reaching 9,568 by 1830; by 1840 the black population was 17,342, and in 1850, 
a year  after the registration laws went off the books, the census found 25,279 blacks in the 
state, giving it the third- largest  free black population in the North. See United States 
Census, Negro Population, 1790–1915 (Washington, D.C., 1915), p. 57. Ohio Constitution of 
1802, Art. IV, Sec. 1 (limiting the franchise to white males); Act of Feb. 9, 1831, 29 Ohio 
Laws 94 (1831) (relating to juries); Act of Jan. 25, 1807, 5 Ohio Laws 53 (1807) (amending the 
act of Jan. 5, 1804, entitled “An Act Regulating Black and Mulatto Persons”); Act of 
Feb. 10, 1829, 27 Ohio Laws 72 (1829) (providing “for the support and better regulation of 
common schools”). Berger, Government by Judiciary, p. 10.
Fig.  3.  Representative John A. Bingham of Ohio, from a photo graph ca. 1860–75. 
(Brady- Handy photo graph collection, Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
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de cades. This change was especially apparent in Ohio, at precisely the 
time that Bingham, Salmon P. Chase, Jacob Brinkerhoff, James Ashley, and 
other  future leaders of the Ohio Republican Party  were entering politics or 
taking a leading role in the state’s new Republican Party.16
In 1839 the state legislature created an elaborate system for regulating 
the return of fugitive slaves. The law required that owner ship of a fugitive 
slave “be proved” to the “satisfaction” of a state judge while at the same time 
authorizing state officials to aid in the return of bona fide fugitive slaves.17 
This law was consistent with Ohio’s long- standing policy of protecting  free 
blacks from kidnapping while supporting its constitutional obligation to re-
turn fugitive slaves. However, unlike earlier laws that only punished kid-
napping  after it had occurred, this act had the potential to frustrate attempts 
by masters to recover fugitive slaves as well as stopping kidnapping. Thus, 
the law would have made fugitives feel more secure in the Buckeye State 
 because it gave blacks greater protections.
The adoption of this law cuts against the idea of a “negrophobic” Ohio, 
 because the end result of the law was to increase the black population and 
make the state a haven for runaway slaves. If Ohio had been truly “negro-
phobic” it would have done every thing it could to discourage blacks from 
living in the state.  Under such a policy Ohio would have withheld specific 
legislative protection from  free blacks, and instead of creating barriers to 
the return of fugitives, it would have provided legislation to help slave catch-
ers. A truly negrophobic Ohio would have passed laws similar to  those in 
the South, which required law enforcement officers to incarcerate black 
strangers and travelers and advertise them as runaway slaves  unless they 
could document their status as  free  people.
16Brinkerhoff (1810–1880) became a county prosecutor in 1839 and served in Congress 
as an antislavery Demo crat from 1843 to 1847. He was a  Free Soil member of the 
legislature in the late 1840s and joined the Ohio Republican Party when it was formed in 
1856. He was a state supreme court justice from 1856 to 1871.  Others in this cohort 
included Edward Wade (1802–1866), a  Free Soil and Republican member of Congress 
from 1853 to 1861; Benjamin F. Wade (1800–1878), who entered politics in 1835 and became 
a power ful figure as a state senator, judge, and then U.S. senator in the 1840s and 1850s; 
James Ashley (1824–1896), who entered politics in 1858, serving as a Republican member 
of Congress; and William Dennison Jr. (1815–1882), who served as governor of Ohio from 
1860 to 1862 and as postmaster general from 1864 to July 1866.
17Act of Feb. 26, 1839, ch. 37, 1838 Ohio Laws 38 (relating to fugitives from  labor or 
ser vice from other states). For a general history of  these laws, and  others in Ohio, see 
Stephen Middleton, The Black Laws: Race and the  Legal Pro cess in Early Ohio (Athens, 2005).
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As noted above, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania the U.S. Supreme Court barred 
any state from regulating the return of fugitive slaves. This decision struck 
down the personal liberty laws of the  free states, like Ohio’s 1839 Act. In 
response to Prigg, the Ohio legislature repealed the 1839 Act in 1843 and 
reinstated an earlier law, which provided imprisonment “at hard  labor” for 
up to seven years for anyone convicted of removing a  free black from the 
state as a fugitive slave or even attempting to seize a  free black with the in-
tent to remove that person from the state.18 Again, a negrophobic state 
would not have passed a new law to punish the kidnapping of  free blacks.
Starting in 1848—at a time when Bingham was beginning his po liti cal 
 career as the district attorney of Tuscarawas County— Ohio began to rap-
idly change its racial laws while taking an increasingly strong stand against 
Southern slavery. A resolution of that year urged the national Congress to 
prohibit slavery in any territories acquired in the Mexican War. More sig-
nificantly for the background to the  Fourteenth Amendment, in that year a 
new law provided two separate methods for the education of blacks. The 
law for the first time specifically allowed school districts to permit blacks to 
attend schools with whites. The law also authorized the creation of segre-
gated schools for blacks funded by taxes collected from blacks.  These schools 
would be or ga nized on a segregated basis. While considered a mark of dis-
crimination at the time ( just as it is  today), this law was nevertheless an 
impor tant and positive step forward in the expansion of rights for blacks in 
Ohio. Without this  legal provision, blacks had no right to a public educa-
tion, on  either an integrated or a segregated basis. This law marked an im-
provement over  these earlier conditions that denied blacks access to a public 
education. In addition, it allowed blacks to attend schools with whites, if lo-
cal communities did not object. An 1849 law repealed the registration and 
surety bond requirements of the earlier laws, allowed blacks to testify against 
whites, and gave them even greater access to the public schools.19 Laws 
18“An Act to Repeal the Act Entitled, ‘An Act Relating to Fugitives from  Labor and 
Ser vice from Other States,’ ” Act of Jan. 19, 1843, Ohio Laws of 1842, 41:13.
19“Resolution Declaring That So Much of the Ordinance of 1787 as Relating to 
Slavery, Should Be Extended to the Territory Acquired from Mexico,” Resolution of 
Feb. 25, 1848, Ohio Laws of 1847, vol. 46: 314; “An Act to Provide for the Establishment of 
Common Schools for the Education of  Children of Black and Mulatto Persons, and 
Amending the March 7, 1838 Act Entitled, ‘An Act for the Support and Better Regulation 
of Common Schools, and to Create Permanently the Office of superintendent,’ ” Act of 
Feb. 24, 1848, Ohio Laws of 1847, vol. 46: 81; “An Act to Authorize the Establishment of 
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 adopted by Ohio in the 1850s, when Bingham was representing his state in 
Congress, provided blacks with new protections against kidnapping and 
demonstrated Ohio’s hostility to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.
By the eve of the Civil War, blacks did not have full equality in Ohio. They 
still could not vote, serve on juries, or serve in the state militia (although 
this was a result of existing federal law). But, they had far more  legal rights 
than they ever had before. Moreover, the thrust of the newly created Repub-
lican Party was  toward greater racial equality. Far from being “shot through 
with Negrophobia,” Ohio in this period was making steady and significant 
pro gress  toward a more egalitarian polity that provided increasing rights 
for  free blacks. Ohio did not entirely eliminate discriminatory laws at this 
time,  because a substantial number of voters  were Demo crats who opposed 
racial equality and  were  later hostile to emancipation.  After antislavery 
Demo crats such as Chase and Brinkerhoff joined the new Republican Party, 
the Demo crats became extremely hostile to blacks.  These Demo cratic vot-
ers and their representatives in the state legislature, who  were particularly 
power ful in southern Ohio,  were able to block some changes, especially 
 those requiring a constitutional amendment. They  were also able to block 
Republican hegemony in the 1850s and 1860s, and sometimes the Demo-
crats controlled the state legislature. Ohio in the late antebellum period 
was a divided polity, with the Republicans usually, but not always, able to 
control state government.
It was in the context of  these statutes and court decisions, as well as ex-
ecutive actions against slavery, that John Bingham became a key member 
of the Ohio Republican Party and a rising star in national politics. His 
pedigree was deeply connected to antislavery and black civil rights. He 
brought  these ideas to Congress and to his role in drafting the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.
When we consider what the amendment meant, we must begin with the 
backgrounds and experiences of key Republican leaders like Stevens and 
Bingham. We must further consider the racial trajectory of the North— and 
Separate Schools for the Education of Colored  Children, and for Other Purposes,” Act of 
Feb. 10, 1849, Ohio Laws of 1848, vol. 47: 17. See Howard N. Rabinowitz, “More Than the 
Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange  Career of Jim Crow,” Journal of American History 
75 (1988):842 (discussing this issue in the post– Civil War South). Rabinowitz “discovered” 
that what preceded segregation in the South “was normally exclusion” and that “ironically, 
segregation often therefore marked an improvement in the status of blacks.” Ibid., p. 845.
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more significantly the Republican Party in the North. The evidence sug-
gests that for Stevens, Bingham, and other Republicans, black civil rights 
mattered.20
The key to understanding Bingham’s Ohio background is that parts of 
his state  were clearly negrophobic, but that in his northern Ohio district, 
and in much of the state,  Free Soilers and Republicans gained enormous 
power in the late 1840s and 1850s.  These Republicans won elections while 
expanding the rights and liberties of blacks in Ohio. By the mid-1860s they 
 were at their zenith of po liti cal power, and they brought with them a long 
history of civil rights advocacy as well as a track rec ord of successfully mov-
ing Ohio forward in the march to civil rights.
The Southern Context of Reconstruction  
and the Shaping of the  Fourteenth Amendment
Stevens, Bingham, and other Republicans in the Thirty- Ninth Congress 
 were influenced not only by their own long strug gle against racism in the 
North and slavery in the South. The retrograde actions of Southern politi-
cians and the racist brutality of Southern whites in the wake of the Civil 
War also affected their constitutional views. A brief description of race re-
lations in the South in 1865–66 reminds us of why the  Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed and helps us understand what Stevens, Bingham, and their 
Republican colleagues hoped it would accomplish.
The Aftermath of Slavery
In April 1865 the United States successfully suppressed what leaders at the 
time referred to as “the late wicked Rebellion.” The suppression of the 
rebellion involved more than two million soldiers and sailors, 10  percent of 
whom  were African Americans. The majority of  these black men in 
uniform— the “sable arm” of the U.S. Army and Navy— had been slaves 
20See Commonwealth v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 68–69 (1861) (holding that the 
federal Constitution does not impose an obligation on one state to “surrender its citizens 
or residents to any other state on the charge that they have committed an offence not 
known to the laws of the former”). Republicans in New York and Connecticut, for example, 
attempted to create equal suffrage in their state.
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when the rebellion began. Most Northerners understood that  these black 
soldiers had earned their freedom and a claim to po liti cal and  legal equal-
ity. Republican politicians like Stevens and Bingham assumed the end of 
slavery would lead to a new po liti cal real ity in the South that would include 
the votes of the freedmen, as the former slaves  were called. In much of the 
South, blacks constituted a third to a half of the population.  These Repub-
lican leaders venerated and celebrated the idea of a “Republican form of 
government” (as the Constitution required), in which the  people of a soci-
ety elected a legislature and in which all citizens had equal rights  under the 
law. Thus, Northern politicians expected that emancipation, which was 
completed with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in Decem-
ber 1865, would lead to more than simply an end to slavery: they assumed 
it would lead to an entire revolution in the way blacks  were treated and in 
the rights they had.21
Southern whites, however, had other ideas. General Carl Schurz,  after 
visiting the South in 1865, concluded that many, perhaps most, Southern 
whites conceded that blacks  were no longer the slaves of individual masters 
but intended to make them “the slaves of society.”22
The following fall, Southern voters— all of whom  were white and most 
of whom had supported the rebellion— elected new state legislatures. Many 
of  these state lawmakers had served in the Confederate government or in 
the rebellious state governments.  Others had been soldiers— often officers—
in the traitorous Confederate army. The majority had been  either slave 
 owners or members of slave- owning families. Although defeated in  battle 
and deprived of their slaves by a combination of congressional acts, the Eman-
cipation Proclamation, the brilliant military success of the U.S. Army, and 
the Thirteenth Amendment,  these former Confederates  were unwilling to 
accept that the war had fundamentally altered the racial status quo in the 
South. They knew that African Americans could no longer be held as chattel 
21Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 16 (1866). See David Dudley Cornish, The Sable 
Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861–1865 (New York, 1966), pp. 29, 184. Clearly, most 
midcentury Americans saw no contradiction between the idea of the republican form of 
government and the denial of suffrage to  women. At the time most men— and many 
 women— would have defended this result, agreeing that  women  were effectively represented 
by their adult male relatives. Thus the failure to enfranchise  women did not violate the 
republican form of government clause of the constitution. Obviously proponents of 
 women’s suffrage, such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, would have rejected this analy sis.
22Richard N. Current, ed., Reconstruction 1865–1877 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), p. 38.
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slaves, to be bought and sold at the whim of a master; but they  were unpre-
pared to accept that the freedmen  were entitled to liberty, equality, or even 
fundamental  legal rights. Many Northerners  were shocked by the statutes 
that unreconstructed Southern legislatures passed immediately  after the 
war. The statutes indicated how the South planned to treat the former slaves. 
The  Fourteenth Amendment was in large part a reaction to  these laws, 
generally known as black codes.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction
In December 1865 Congress created the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion to investigate conditions in the South. The Joint Committee consisted 
of six senators and nine representatives. Thaddeus Stevens and John Bing-
ham  were key House members on the committee. Also on the committee 
 were George S. Boutwell of Mas sa chu setts and Justin Morrill of Vermont. 
Both had been lifelong opponents of slavery, and both came from states that 
gave  free blacks full  legal rights, including suffrage. The work of this com-
mittee led to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, reported out of the committee on 
April 30, 1866, and to the proposed  Fourteenth Amendment, which Con-
gress passed on June 13, 1866. Eleven members signed the final report. Three 
Southerners and a New Jersey Demo crat refused to sign the report.
This massive report was nearly 800 pages long. The committee members 
interviewed scores of  people— former slaves, former Confederate leaders and 
slave  owners, U.S. Army officers, journalists, Northern ministers, and  others 
in the South. In its report the committee reminded the nation that the for-
mer slaves had “remained true and loyal” throughout the Civil War and “in 
large numbers, fought on the side of the Union.” The committee concluded 
that it would be impossible to “abandon” the former slaves “without securing 
them their rights as  free men and citizens.” Indeed, the “ whole civilized 
world would have cried out against such base ingratitude” if the U.S. govern-
ment failed to secure and protect the rights of the freedpeople. The com-
mittee also found that Southern leaders still “defend[ed] the  legal right of 
secession, and [upheld] the doctrine that the first allegiance of the  people is 
due to the States.” Noting the “leniency” of the policies of Congress and the 
president  after the war, the committee discovered that “[i]n return for our 
leniency we receive only an insulting denial of our authority.” Rather than 
accept the outcome of the war, Southern whites  were using local courts to 
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prosecute loyalists and “Union officers for acts done in the line of official 
duty,” and “similar prosecutions”  were “threatened elsewhere as soon as the 
United States troops [we]re removed.”23
The committee understood that the task before the Congress and the na-
tion involved three  things: preventing former Confederates from reinstat-
ing the same type of regime that existed before the war, protecting the liberty 
of former slaves and guaranteeing them the power to protect their own rights 
within the new po liti cal regime that had to be created, and protecting the 
rights and safety of white Unionists who  were threatened by the vio lence of 
as yet unreconstructed Southern whites who had not accepted the po liti cal 
or social outcome of the war.  After investigating the situation in the South, 
the committee concluded that nothing short of a constitutional amendment— 
what became the  Fourteenth Amendment— would protect the rights of the 
former slaves.
Two categories of evidence  were particularly impor tant in setting out the 
need for civil rights legislation and a constitutional amendment to protect 
liberty in the states. The Joint Committee learned a good deal about condi-
tions in the South by examining the statutes and constitutions  adopted by 
the former Confederate states immediately  after the war. In addition, the 
Joint Committee interviewed hundreds of  people familiar with conditions 
in the postwar South. The information from  these interviews, along with 
some published materials, such as excerpts from Southern state constitu-
tions, filled the nearly 800 pages of the Joint Committee’s report. Both the 
 legal documentation and the evidence from interviews led to the inescap-
able conclusion that the majority of Southern whites  were not prepared to 
accept blacks as equal citizens and that many Southern whites  were will-
ing to use intimidation, vio lence, and murder to prevent racial equality in 
the postwar South.
The Black Codes and State Constitutions, 1865–66
The Southern black codes and constitutions passed in 1865 and 1866  were 
designed to replicate, as closely as pos si ble, the prewar suppression and 
23Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, Resolution and 
Report of the Committee, pp. xiii, xvii– xviii (hereafter cited as Report of the Joint Committee, with 
a reference to the par tic u lar part or section and page numbers).
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exploitation of blacks. The Alabama Black Code of 1865–66 began by ac-
knowledging the new status of blacks, declaring that “[a]ll freedmen,  free 
negroes, and mulattoes” had “the right to sue and be sued, plead and be 
impleaded.” Slaves had never had  these rights. The law also allowed blacks 
to testify in court, “but only in cases in which freedmen,  free negroes and 
mulattoes are parties,  either as plaintiff or defendant.” In addition, blacks 
 were allowed to testify in prosecutions “for injuries in the persons and prop-
erty” of blacks.24 Mississippi enacted similar legislation, which more directly 
and unambiguously provided that blacks could testify against white crimi-
nal defendants “in all criminal prosecutions where the crime charged is 
alleged to have been committed by a white person upon or against the per-
son or property of a freedman,  free negro, or mulatto.”25
 These laws certainly expanded the rights of Southern blacks and gave 
them some  legal protections they had not had before the war. For the 
first time in the history of  these states, blacks could testify against whites. 
However, such laws did not give blacks the same  legal rights as whites.  Under 
 these laws, blacks could not testify in a suit between two whites or at the 
prosecution of a white for harming other whites. Thus, the law in effect de-
clared that blacks  were not “equal” to whites and that their testimony was 
not as “good” as that of whites.  These restrictions undermined fundamen-
tal justice and created dangerous possibilities for  free blacks and their white 
allies. For example, a white suing another white could not use the testimony 
of a black to support his case. More importantly,  under  these laws South-
ern white terrorists could kill a white in front of black witnesses, and  those 
witnesses could not testify at the trial. This would undermine the safety of 
 those white teachers, army officers, Freedmen’s Bureau officers, and Union-
ists who supported black rights and the national government. Thus, while 
 these new laws gave some protection to blacks, the laws did not give them 
 legal equality and they did not even fully protect their civil rights.
The laws allowing blacks to sign contacts and to sue and be sued  under 
them appear, at first glance, to support black freedom, but in fact they under-
mined black rights. Before the war, slaves had no rights to sign contracts, and 
some slave states limited the rights of  free blacks to enter into contracts. 
24Ibid., p. xvii.
25Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, 1865 Mississippi Laws 82 (“An Act for Conferring Civil 
Rights on Freedmen, and for Other Purposes”).
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Certainly laws allowing blacks to enter into contracts appear to be a con-
cession to black freedom since they gave the freedmen rights they had never 
had as slaves. Such basic economic rights  were vital to freedom, and they 
 were rights that slaves had never had. Thus, on the surface, the laws grant-
ing former slaves the right to enter into contracts  were an impor tant sign of 
freedom. But in fact,  these laws dramatically threatened blacks’ civil rights.
Former slaves in the Deep South  were almost universally illiterate, had 
virtually no experience with  either the law or a  free economy, and  were only 
a few months out of slavery. They  were vulnerable to signing contracts— 
which would involve their “mark” or an “x”— that committed them to long- 
term  labor agreements, and to being sued for breach of  these contracts if 
they could not fulfill them. Some of the laws provided that blacks who did 
not fulfill a contract for any reason could be sued and forced to work for 
 free to pay damages, or be denied any pay for work done if they left their 
job—no  matter what the reason— before the end of the contract. The terms 
of the contracts  were almost always completely favorable to the white em-
ployer and exploitative of the black worker.  These laws encouraged plant-
ers to exploit and abuse black workers, especially near the end of a contract 
term, in hopes that  these workers would leave and would not have to be paid 
or might be forced to work for  free to pay damages  under the contract. Laws 
similar to  those in Mississippi  were found in other states. Thus, Major Gen-
eral Christopher C. Andrews told the Joint Committee on Reconstruction 
that conditions in Texas  were such that “[u]nless the freedmen are protected 
by the government they  will be much worse off than when they  were slaves” 
 because the whites  were prepared “to coerce” blacks into working for unfair 
wages  under unfair contracts.26
Other provisions of the black laws more blatantly undermined black free-
dom. Alabama’s law “Concerning Vagrants and Vagrancy” allowed for the 
incarceration in the public work house of any “laborer or servant who loi-
ters away his time, or refuses to comply with any contract for a term of 
ser vice without just cause.”27 Mississippi’s Civil Rights Act of 1865 provided 
that if any laborer quit a job before the end of the contract period he would 
26Report of the Joint Committee, Part IV: Florida, Louisiana, Texas, p. 125.
27Act of Nov. 24, 1865, ch. 6, 1865 Alabama Laws 90 (“An Act for Amending the 
Vagrant Laws of the State”).
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lose all wages earned up to that time. Thus, if a black laborer signed a con-
tract to work for a planter for a year but left  after eleven months, he would 
get no wages. This provision allowed employers to mistreat and overwork 
laborers, including whipping them as had been done  under slavery, know-
ing they dare not quit. Indeed, a shrewd employer could purposefully make 
life miserable for workers near the end of a contract term, in hopes that they 
would quit and forfeit all wages. Mississippi law further declared that any 
blacks “with no lawful employment or business” would be considered va-
grants and could be fined up to fifty dollars. Blacks who could not pay the 
fine would be forcibly hired out to whoever would pay the fine, thus creat-
ing another form of unfree  labor. The same act created a one dollar poll 
tax for all  free blacks. Anyone not paying the tax could also be declared a 
vagrant and thus assigned to some white planter to work at hard  labor.28 
 These laws also prohibited blacks from renting land or  houses in towns or 
cities, thus in effect forcing blacks into the countryside, where they  were 
doomed to agricultural  labor.
Laws such as  these set the stage for a new system of forced  labor. South-
ern states passed  these laws just before, or immediately  after, the ratifica-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment. They  were attempts to reduce blacks 
to a status somewhere between that of slaves (which they no longer  were) 
and full  free  people (which the white South would not allow). The  labor con-
tract laws, tied to the vagrancy laws,  were designed to create a kind of 
serfdom, tying the former slaves to the land, just as they  were once tied to 
their masters.
The new state constitutions  were equally oppressive. The Joint Commit-
tee reprinted some state constitutions and excerpts from  others in its re-
port.29 The Florida Constitution, for example, limited suffrage to whites 
and prohibited any person employed by the United States— white or black— 
from voting in the state  unless he was a resident of Florida before entering 
federal ser vice. The same constitution prohibited blacks from serving as 
jurors and limited their testimony to cases involving blacks.30 The Arkan-
sas Constitution similarly limited voting to whites, banned federal officers 
28Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, 1865 Mississippi Laws 82, 90 (“An Act for Conferring 
Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for Other Purposes”).
29Report of the Joint Committee, Resolution and Report of the Committee, pp. iv– vi.
30Report of the Joint Committee, Part IV: Florida, Louisiana, Texas, p. 26.
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from voting, and discriminated against blacks in other ways.31 The Geor-
gia Constitution was similar, limiting the vote to whites. The state used a 
statute to limit black testimony. This too was included in the committee re-
port.32  These laws and constitutional provisions astounded Northerners. 
Having been defeated in  battle and forced to give up slavery, the South 
seemed as defiant as ever, unwilling to accept the outcome of the war and 
the necessity of treating blacks as citizens. The reaction to  these laws led to 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and to the  Fourteenth Amendment.
Southern White Attacks on Blacks and the Report  
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
The Southern black codes  were not the only cause of Northern astonish-
ment at Southern be hav ior. Even more impor tant, perhaps, was the vio lence 
directed at blacks and their white allies  after the war. 
While Congress debated what became the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Sen-
ator Charles Sumner of Mas sa chu setts received a box containing the fin ger 
of a black man. The accompanying note read: “You old son of a bitch, I 
send you a piece of one of your friends, and if that bill of yours passes I  will 
have a piece of you.”33 This box and note illustrated all too well the mur-
derous and lethal vio lence that Southern whites  were prepared to use to sup-
press black freedom.
The evidence presented in the massive committee report documented the 
dangers to blacks and white Unionists— and the nation itself— posed by the 
refusal of most former Confederates to accept black freedom. Congressman 
Bingham chaired the subcommittee that investigated the situation in Ten-
nessee. Every one agreed that Tennessee had more Union supporters than 
any other former Confederate state, and in the end the committee endorsed 
its immediate readmission to the Union.34 Nevertheless, a sampling of the 
testimony gathered from Tennessee supports the understanding that 
31Report of the Joint Committee, Part III: Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, 
pp. 85–86.
32Report of the Joint Committee, Part III: Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, p. 186.
33James M. McPherson, The Strug gle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil War 
and Reconstruction (Prince ton, N.J., 2014), p. 341.
34Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Resolution and Report of the Committee xix; 
Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Part I: Tennessee, title page and pp. 93, 107.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction    97
the committee that wrote the  Fourteenth Amendment was fully aware of 
the need for a power ful weapon to force change and protect freedom in the 
South. Testimony from other states reveals that the rest of the South was 
even more prone to vio lence  toward blacks and Unionists, and that liberty 
was even more imperiled elsewhere in the former Confederacy.
Major General Edward Hatch testified that throughout Tennessee whites 
 were unwilling to accept black liberty. General Hatch noted that “the ne-
gro is perfectly willing to work, but he wants a guarantee that he  will be 
secured in his rights  under his contract” and that “his life and property” 
would be “secured.” Blacks understood they  were “not safe from the poor 
whites.” He noted that whites wanted “some kind of legislation” to “estab-
lish a kind of peonage; not absolute slavery but that they can enact such laws 
as  will enable them to manage the negro as they please—to fix the price to 
be paid for his  labor.” And if blacks resisted this reestablishment of bond-
age, “[t]hey are liable to be shot.”35
Major General Clinton Fisk, for whom one of the nation’s first black 
colleges— Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee— would be named, testi-
fied about the murderous nature of former “slaveholders and returned rebel 
soldiers.” Such men “persecute bitterly” the former slaves, “and pursue them 
with vengeance, and treat them with brutality, and burn down their dwell-
ings and school- houses.” Fisk pointed out this was “not the rule” everywhere 
in Tennessee, but nevertheless such conduct existed.36 And, as every one ad-
mitted, Tennessee was the most progressive state on  these issues in the 
former Confederacy.
Lieutenant Col o nel R. W. Barnard was far less optimistic than Major 
General Fisk. Perhaps  because he was a field officer, Barnard was more likely 
to see the day- to- day dangers blacks faced. Asked if it was safe to remove 
troops from Tennessee, he replied, “I hardly know how to express myself 
on the subject. I have not been in a  favor of removing the military. I can tell 
you what an old citizen, a Union man, said to me. Said he, ‘I tell you what, 
if you take away the military from Tennessee, the buzzards  can’t eat up the 
niggers as fast as  we’ll kill ’em.’ ” Barnard thought this might be an exag-
geration but told the committee, “I know  there are plenty of bad men  there 
35Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Part I: Tennessee, pp. 107–8.
36Ibid., pp. 112, 120–21.
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who would maltreat the negro.”37 He did not need to emphasize that this 
threat to black life came not from a “bad” man but from a Unionist.
Thus, in Tennessee, where loyal Union men  were more common than 
elsewhere in the South, the dangers to blacks  were  great. In other states the 
dangers  were extraordinarily greater. Major General John W. Turner re-
ported that in  Virginia “all of the [white]  people”  were “extremely reluc-
tant to grant to the negro his civil rights— those privileges that pertain to 
freedom, the protection of life, liberty, and property before the laws, the right 
to testify in courts,  etc.” Turner noted that whites  were “reluctant even to 
consider and treat the negro as a  free man, to let him have his half of the 
sidewalk or the street crossing.” They would only “concede” such rights to 
blacks “if it is ever done,  because they are forced to do it.” He noted that 
poor whites  were “disposed to ban the negro, to kick him and cuff him, and 
threaten him.” George B. Smith, a  Virginia farmer, admitted that whites 
in the state “maltreat [blacks]  every day” and that blacks had “[n]ot a par-
ticle” of a chance “to obtain justice in the civil courts of  Virginia.” He de-
clared that a black or “a Union man” had as much chance of obtaining 
justice in  Virginia as “a rabbit would in a den of lions.”  Others in  Virginia 
explained over and over again how the whites  were trying to reduce blacks 
to servitude with laws and vio lence. The white sheriff of Fairfax County 
noted that the state was “passing laws” to “disfranchise” black voters and 
“passing vagrant laws on purpose to oppress the colored  people and to keep 
them in vassalage, and  doing every thing they can to bring back  things of 
their old condition, as near as pos si ble.”38
Perhaps the most power ful testimony on  Virginia came from U.S. Dis-
trict Judge John C. Underwood, who had lived in the state since the 1840s. 
He described the cold- blooded murder of a white Unionist by a returning 
Confederate officer. The state did not prosecute anyone for the crime. He 
also noted that the murderer of an army officer had “not yet been punished” 
but was “still at large.” He believed that white Unionists in  Virginia  were 
even more vulnerable than blacks  because the army would intercede to pro-
tect the freedmen, while “a Union man could” not “expect to obtain justice 
in the courts of the State.” But if the army abandoned the state and left the 
fate of the freedmen to the native whites of  Virginia, the situation would 
37Ibid., p. 121.
38Ibid., Part II:  Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, pp. 4, 5, 17, 35.
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be radically altered. Judge Underwood quoted a “most intelligent” man from 
Alexandria who declared that “sooner than see the colored  people raised to 
a  legal and po liti cal equality, the Southern  people would prefer their total 
annihilation.”39
Testimony about North Carolina revealed the lethal danger to blacks in 
the South. A black was shot down in cold blood near Camden. A U.S. Army 
captain reported “numerous cases” of the “maltreatment of blacks,” includ-
ing flogging and shooting, and that “instances of cruelty  were numerous.” 
He predicted that without U.S. troops, school houses for blacks would be 
burned and teachers harassed. A minister in Goldsborough reported the 
cold- blooded shooting of a black man in order to take his  horse. When another 
former slave led soldiers to the culprit, this black was also murdered.40
Lieutenant Col o nel Dexter H. Clapp told the committee about a gang of 
North Carolina whites who “first castrated” and then “murdered” a black 
man, but when the culprits escaped from jail the local police refused to even 
attempt to capture them. This gang then shot “several negroes.” One of 
 these men, a wealthy planter,  later killed a twelve- year- old black boy and 
wounded another. A local police sergeant “brutally wounded a freedman . . . 
in his custody.” While the man’s arms  were tied  behind his back, the po-
liceman struck him on the back of his head with a gun. It was  later shown 
that this man had “committed no offence what ever.” This policeman  later 
“whipped another freedman” so that “from his neck to his hips his back was 
one mass of gashes.” The policeman left the bleeding man outside all night. 
A black man who defended himself when assaulted by a white was given 
twenty- two lashes with a whip over a two- hour period, then “tied up by his 
thumbs for two hours, his toes touching the ground only,” then “given nine 
more lashes and then tied up by his thumbs for another two hours.” A planter 
in the same area whipped two black  women  until their backs  were “a mass 
of gashes.” Clapp asserted that away from military posts “scenes like  these” 
 were “frequent occurrences” in “portions” of North Carolina.41
In South Carolina, Brigadier General Rufus Saxton, who had been 
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for his war time valor, reported 
numerous atrocities. In Edgefield local whites treated  free  people as if they 
39Ibid., p. 7.
40Ibid., pp. 198, 202, 203, 206.
41Ibid., pp. 209–11.
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 were slaves. One “freedman [and] three  children, two male and one female, 
 were stripped naked, tied up, and whipped severely,” while a  woman was 
given a hundred lashes while tied to a tree. Another man was whipped with 
a stick, while two  children  were also whipped. Saxton reported shootings, 
whippings (including of naked  women), vari ous forms of torture, floggings, and 
beatings of all kinds. In addition to attacks on blacks by individual planters, ruf-
fians, and gangs, Saxton reported a more ominous trend: “or ga nized 
bands of ‘regulators’— armed men— who make it their business to traverse 
 these counties, and maltreat negroes without any avowedly definite purpose 
in view. They treat the negroes, in many instances, in the most horrible and 
atrocious manner, even to maiming them, cutting their ears off,  etc.”42
The committee heard similar stories from Major General George Arm-
strong Custer, who was stationed in Texas. He reported that whites in that 
state blamed the black man for “their pres ent condition,” and thus they did 
not “hesitate” to use “ every opportunity to inflict injuries upon him in or-
der, seemingly, to punish him for this.” Custer noted that in Texas more than 
500 former Confederates had been charged with murdering blacks or white 
Unionists, but no one had been convicted. Blacks, however,  were routinely 
convicted and jailed for minor offenses. Custer reported that “it is of a weekly, 
if not of daily, occurrence that freedmen are murdered. Their bodies are 
found in diff er ent parts of the country,” but no whites  were ever charged in 
 these cases, even when they  were known. Custer reported that “[c]ases have 
occurred of white men meeting freedmen they never saw before, and mur-
dering them merely from this feeling of hostility to them as a class.”43
Testimony about the rest of the South mirrored the vio lence and denial 
of rights sketched out  here. Blacks dis appeared and  were beaten, maimed, 
and killed. Legislatures passed laws to prevent them from owning land, mov-
ing to towns, voting, testifying in court, or in any other way asserting and 
protecting their rights as  free  people. The committee heard numbing reports 
of vio lence and hatred.
Perhaps even more horrible than the fear of vio lence was the threat of 
reenslavement. Brigadier General Charles H. Howard, who was serving as 
an inspector for the Freedmen’s Bureau, reported instances in Georgia of 
blacks being held on plantations against their  will and of  others being 
42Ibid., pp. 223, 222–29, 234.
43Ibid., Part IV: Florida, Louisiana, Texas, pp. 75–76.
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kidnapped and taken to Cuba, where slavery was still  legal.44 At South New-
port, Georgia, a  woman escaped from the plantation of her former master 
“ after much maltreatment.” She reported that her former master had “in-
sisted that she and her  children  were not  free, [and] that he cared nothing 
for ‘Lincoln’s proclamation.’ ” When she insisted on leaving “she was con-
fined on bread and  water”  until she escaped. However, she was forced to 
leave her  children  behind.45
Howard also reported that at New Altahama, Georgia, army officers had 
investigated “a case where certain parties  were charged with kidnapping col-
ored  children and shipping them to Cuba.” Two  children “mysteriously 
dis appeared” but  were then found in Florida  after their former owner was 
placed “ under bonds to produce the  children.” The former owner could not 
(or would not) explain how the  children got to Florida or how he knew 
where they  were.46 The implication was clear: the former master had kid-
napped the  children, sent them (or took them) to Florida, and was preparing 
to send them to Cuba, where they could be sold as slaves.
Understanding the  Fourteenth Amendment
It was in the context of this history that the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion and Congressman Bingham wrote Section 1 of the  Fourteenth Amend-
ment. What did Bingham, Stevens, and their colleagues desire to accomplish 
with this provision? We can never fully know, of course, but the context of 
the amendment suggests that their goals  were sweeping and broad. Bing-
ham and  others in the majority on the Joint Committee understood that they 
had to protect the life, liberty, safety, freedom, po liti cal viability, and prop-
erty of the former slaves. They had to protect their rights to have meaningful 
contracts.47 They had to be able to protect their families in the courtroom 
and the voting booth, as well as in the marketplace. They had to be protected 
44Ibid., Part III: Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, p. 33. Howard was the 




47For  lawyers, although not necessarily for most historians, this analy sis undermined 
the logic of the early twentieth- century- court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) and was clearly wrong. The idea of “freedom of contract” did not include the right 
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from whipping and other forms of cruel and unusual punishment. They 
desperately needed the protections of the Bill of Rights— fair  trials by fair 
juries, with  legal counsel to represent  these largely illiterate former slaves. 
They needed to be able to express themselves in public, which the First 
Amendment guaranteed them at the federal level, and they need to be pro-
tected so they could or ga nize po liti cally. They needed equal schooling to 
participate in the po liti cal pro cess.
It would have been impossible to detail all  these needs to explic itly pro-
tect them in a constitutional amendment, and thus Bingham did not try. 
Instead, he used large phrases encompassing  grand ideas. He took John 
Marshall’s admonitions in McCulloch v. Mary land 48 to heart. He did not try 
to turn the Constitution into a  legal code. Rather, he produced language 
that would “endure for the ages” and could grow and develop over time. 
His goal was to reverse the racism and vio lence of slavery and its immediate 
aftermath.
At a more basic level, Bingham and the Joint Committee reflected the 
 simple lesson of Major General John W. Turner’s testimony. Turner noted 
that whites in  Virginia  were “reluctant even to consider and treat the negro 
as a  free man, to let him have his half of the sidewalk or the street crossing.”49 
Bingham’s goal was to make sure that African Americans, and all other mi-
norities, had full access to their “half of the sidewalk” in the social world, in 
the po liti cal world, in the schools, and in the workplace. It was a radical 
change to the Constitution and to American notions of federalism. Indeed, 
by trying to bring  those concepts and rights to “all” Americans, their goal 
was nothing short of a revolution in liberty and justice.
to be exploited by power ful employers. That had been the situation in the South before the 
 Fourteenth Amendment. The amendment was designed to prevent this.
4817 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
49Report of the Joint Committee, Part II:  Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, p. 4.
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Representatives  shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the  whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at 
any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of 
the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is de-
nied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty- one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of repre sen ta tion 
therein  shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens  shall bear to the  whole number of male citizens twenty- one years 
of age in such State.
Amendment XIV, Section 2
By t h e e n d of January 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment had been successfully shepherded through the United States House of Repre-
sentatives, a strug gle depicted in the movie Lincoln as told by the director 
Steven Spielberg.1 The nation’s legislature adjourned a few weeks later— 
shortly before, as  things turned out, the Union army defeated the 
1An early version of this chapter was presented at the U.S. Capitol Historical Society’s 
May 2014 conference  under the title “Restoration’s Unfinished Business, December 1865: 
Congress Reconvenes and Addresses the Implications of an End to Slavery.”
Peter Wallenstein
Historicizing the Politics 
of Reconstruction
Congress and the  Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2
104    Peter Wallenstein
Confederate military— and did not reconvene  until nine months had passed. 
That is, the second session of the Thirty- Eighth Congress closed shop on 
March 4, the day of President Abraham Lincoln’s second inauguration, and 
not  until December 4 did the first session of the Thirty- Ninth Congress con-
vene. Meanwhile, in early April, Lincoln had been assassinated, just weeks 
into his second term, and his newly inaugurated vice president, Andrew 
Johnson, had taken over as president.
Members of Congress, when they met that first week of December 1865, 
had reason to think, and they  were right, that they would soon be hearing 
that the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified by enough states to go 
into the Constitution. By then, therefore, the war had ended, more or less, 
and slavery was over, also more or less, and it is easy to suppose that this 
meant that former slaves  were now citizens, even citizens with the same po-
liti cal rights as other citizens, and that it would not take a year or two or 
three  after Appomattox to make that happen.  There was  little reason, how-
ever, to assume that any of that would happen, let alone all of it. Historical 
contingencies occasioned the shape of Reconstruction as it unfolded.
Success in the strug gle for Union victory and universal emancipation, 
 whether in Congress or on countless battlefields, led directly to further fights. 
Members of Congress had to deal with two major implications, neither of 
them close to resolution, of (1) victory in the war and (2) an end to slavery. 
On what terms might the states of the recent Confederacy be restored? And 
who, if not still enslaved,  were the former slaves henceforth to be?
Restoration had been an issue ever since South Carolina’s leaders voted 
to secede in December 1860. Victory in the War of the Rebellion that be-
gan in 1861 had been strug gled  toward since the beginning of the conflict. 
And during the war an end to slavery had emerged not only as a means of 
Union victory but also as a major war aim. Both objectives— victory and 
abolition— having, it seemed, been reached, Congress had to deal with the 
 actual combination.
Questions surrounding the postslavery condition and rights of black 
Southerners have long dominated discussions of that era. For scholars in par-
tic u lar, that is the issue that most colors  today’s sense of the period. But the 
other concern, not of the no- longer- slaves but rather of the no- longer- Confederate 
states, is just as impor tant, and the two issues  were tightly tangled up with 
each other.
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Members of Congress asked, and then had to answer, a key question: How 
could restoration be accomplished safely and effectively? The question was 
never merely one of restoring repre sen ta tion in Congress, challenging as that 
turned out to be, but also one of determining how much repre sen ta tion the 
restored states should have— itself, it is argued  here, the central issue in get-
ting the states restored.
So, in the opening weeks of the new Congress, two core considerations 
occupied lawmakers. One, relating primarily to former slaves and their 
rights  under the law, was subsequently addressed first in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and then, shortly thereafter, in Section 1 of a proposed  Fourteenth 
Amendment. The other, which related primarily to power in the postwar 
nation and appeared as Section 2, gets far less notice in the historical lit er a ture. 
That second concern, in no way secondary, remains hidden in plain sight.
Insisting that Section 2 had towering importance to Republican lawmak-
ers at the time does not diminish the historical significance of Section 1, but 
Section 1 must not get all the attention. The concerns of Americans in the 
1860s can scarcely be respected if the concerns of Americans a  century and 
more  later, in the pres ent, govern what is noticed about the past. Yet the 
question of power, more particularly what was to become of  matters that 
had long ago been settled in the 1787 Philadelphia Convention by means of 
the Three- Fifths Compromise, had at least as much significance to policy 
makers during the immediate aftermath of the War of the Rebellion.
The postwar position of African Americans had many dimensions. We 
cannot understand the politics of Reconstruction  unless we go back to De-
cember 1865 and watch members of Congress wrestle with the many facets 
of that question. What ever they thought about racial justice, they worried 
about po liti cal power. The Republic could not be safe, the victory could 
not be secured,  until the basis of repre sen ta tion underwent fundamental 
renovation.
To sculpt a more realistic repre sen ta tion of the  actual history of the years 
1865–67 requires that the concerns of Section 2 be brought to the fore— 
highlighted in historical understanding, viewed in bold relief. To do so is 
the burden of this chapter. A review of the history of the Three- Fifths Clause 
through the years before the Civil War can illuminate the situation Con-
gress faced once  people who had long been held in slavery no longer counted 
at three- fifths but rather, no longer slaves, at full value.
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Three- Fifths Representation— from 1787 to 1861
Much has been written on the Three- Fifths Clause, a compromise crucial 
to the success of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention that proposed a new 
U.S. Constitution for the states to decide  whether to ratify.2 In a census 
enumeration to be conducted  every ten years, slaves would be counted at 
three- fifths of their  actual numbers to determine a state’s repre sen ta tion in 
the House of Representatives. Through the House, the three- fifths formula 
reached the Electoral College. And through the Electoral College, and its 
se lection of a president, the three- fifths fraction reached the nomination of 
federal judges. The formula was always central to American national 
governance.
The three- fifths formula had real consequences, determining which 
groups of whites would be privileged and which groups disadvantaged. It 
has often been said that had slaves counted five- fifths in 1796, the Republi-
can Thomas Jefferson from  Virginia would have bested the Federalist John 
Adams of Mas sa chu setts for the presidency that year, and that had it been 
zero- fifths four years  later, Adams would have beat Jefferson in their re-
match. Garry  Wills wrote a book titled “Negro President” to get at the cries of 
injustice with which northern Federalist whites assailed the legitimacy of Jef-
ferson’s election  after he won in 1800, thus setting on its long- term course 
what unfolded as the  Virginia Dynasty. New  England Federalists com-
plained that “slave repre sen ta tion” had put Thomas Jefferson in the new 
White House.3
The Three- Fifths Clause is a mainstay of some very fine histories of the 
Early National period, from the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 to the Mis-
souri Crisis of 1819–21. Among books on the politics of slavery in the Early 
Republic, one by George William Van Cleve admirably retraces develop-
ments through  those years. He leaps in chronology, however, from the Lou-
isiana Purchase at the end of one chapter to the Missouri Crisis at the start 
of the next. Regarding the territorial question and its po liti cal, social, and 
economic significance, this narrative strategy makes sense, but it skips the 
War of 1812 and therefore the Hartford Convention.4
2David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York, 2009).
3Garry  Wills, “Negro President”: Jefferson and the Slave Power (Boston, 2003).
4Donald L. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765–1820 (New York, 
1970); Matthew Mason, Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic (Chapel Hill, N.C., 
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James Madison, one of Jefferson’s fellow Republicans from  Virginia, pre-
sided at the White House during the War of 1812, a war that had disastrous 
consequences for the New  England area’s shipping and other economic 
activities. Devastation cried out for relief, and in late 1814 several New 
 England states sent delegates to a convention held in Hartford, the state 
capital of Connecticut, to address the region’s severe military and eco-
nomic prob lems.
Much the leading study of the subject, James Banner’s 1970 book To the 
Hartford Convention offers a brilliant excavation and analy sis of Mas sa chu setts 
state politics in the years leading up to the War of 1812. On the Hartford 
Convention itself, Banner’s findings have largely made their way into text-
books and other general accounts: the “moderates” prevailed, but the con-
vention, in passing some resolutions that addressed their unhappiness at the 
way the nation was run, proposed alterations in the U.S. Constitution. In 
speaking briefly of  these amendments, Banner notes: “The first and most 
impor tant provided for the apportionment of repre sen ta tion and direct 
taxes among the states according to their  free white population.”5  After 
mentioning the proposed zero- fifths formula, the “most impor tant” item, 
he offers no further discussion of the point.
That very first proposed amendment called for removing the phrase 
“three- fifths of all other persons” (i.e., slaves) and instead excluding a new 
group, “all other persons.”6 As for the other proposed amendments, they 
 were significant too. Rather than a  simple majority, as for most business, 
a two- thirds margin would henceforth be required for declarations of 
war, as well as passage of bills to embargo trade with foreign nations or 
to admit new states. With  Virginia demonstrating an endless train of 
2006); George William Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in 
the Early American Republic (Chicago, 2010), pp. 222–25. By no means do all good treatments 
of the subject place the three- fifths formula near the center of national politics; see Don E. 
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s Relations to 
Slavery, completed and edited by Ward M. McAfee (New York, 2001), pp. 40–41, 299 (with 
no index entry for the Hartford Convention).
5James M. Banner Jr., To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of  
Party Politics in Mas sa chu setts, 1789–1815 (New York, 1970), pp. 341–43. Banner’s language 
regarding to the contrary, the “ free white population” in the proposed new clause said 
nothing about the race of  free  people to be included, any more than the original had, only 
that they not be slaves.
6“Amendments to the Constitution Proposed by the Hartford Convention: 1814,” 
http:// avalon . law . yale . edu / 19th _ century / hartconv . asp.
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candidates— successful candidates— for the presidency, each of whom had 
been elected to two terms (as opposed to the one non- Virginian, New En-
glander John Adams, with his single term),  future presidents would serve 
only one term; moreover, no state could supply a winning candidate for 
two successive terms. If the new Zero- Fifths Clause did not prevent the 
election of a Virginian, at least he could serve only a single term, and one 
could not succeed another.7
As for  whether the “moderates” prevailed at Hartford during that win-
ter of their discontent,  here is what they declared about the near  future:
Resolved, That if the application of  these [New  England] States to the gov-
ernment of the United States, recommended in a foregoing Resolution, 
should be unsuccessful, and peace should not be concluded and the defense 
of  these States should be neglected, as it has been since the commencement 
of the war, it  will in the opinion of this Convention be expedient for the Leg-
islatures of the several [New  England] States to appoint Delegates to an-
other Convention, to meet at Boston . . .  on the third Thursday of June next 
[1815] with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so mo-
mentous may require.8
Thus the leading study of the Hartford Convention concludes that the 
moderates controlled it, so the crazies could not take radical action. Yet 
 these demands for changes in the nation’s founding document  were not to be 
negotiated; they must be conceded. If they  were not agreed to, and the emer-
gency continued, delegates planned to meet again. Consider the analogy. 
The Hartford Convention was the First Continental Congress, specifying 
demands and arranging in advance to meet again should  those demands be 
rebuffed. When the First Continental Congress’s demands  were rejected, a 
Second Continental Congress met, and in the end it declared in de pen-
dence.9 Moderates indeed.
The Three- Fifths Clause, then, had been a  matter of serious contention 
at vari ous junctures during the years of the early Republic. At a time of 
par tic u lar crisis, when the stakes seemed so very high in military and eco-
nomic terms, the Hartford Convention Resolutions capture the intensity of 
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Richard R. Beeman, Our Lives, Our Fortune and Our Sacred Honor: The Forging of American 
In de pen dence, 1774–1776 (New York, 2013).
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feeling and the degree of importance that could be related to the three- fifths 
formula.
The issue of perceived unfair overrepre sen ta tion of Southern states in 
national governance persisted over the de cades. True, it did not operate 
alone, nor did it continue to maintain the kind of attention it garnered in 
the mid-1810s. Another issue,  whether Congress could act  under the Com-
merce Clause to terminate the interstate slave trade, surfaced in the 1830s, 
but then it largely faded. Supplanting both was the issue of the expansion 
of slavery, tied up as it was with such crucial questions as  whether the white/
plantation South could continue to dominate on the slavery issue (more 
than that, on any and all issues in national politics),  whether the South could 
continue to maintain parity in the Senate,  whether  free white Northerners 
would have full access to western territories, or  whether  free Northerners 
might be pressed into ser vice to seize alleged fugitives from Southern en-
slavement. For one  thing, population growth outside the South outstripped 
aggregate growth in the slave states such that the Three- Fifths Clause, while 
continuing to be significant, diminished in salience. Its role as a lightning 
rod faded somewhat for a generation and more, but it never went away. As 
William  W. Freehling has contextualized the  matter through changing 
times between the Philadelphia Convention and the 1850s, it carried enor-
mous symbolic freight. Moreover, he notes, time and again— from the Mis-
souri Crisis to the Kansas- Nebraska Act—in close votes in Congress it appears 
to have determined the outcome.10
The Three- Fifths Formula in a World without Slaves
Awareness of the three- fifths formula burst forth with renewed force in the 
immediate aftermath of universal emancipation. Slavery suddenly ended in 
1865, and the Three- Fifths Clause surged to the forefront of national poli-
tics. James G. Blaine, congressman from Maine, was one of the many  people 
10Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The  Free North and Southern Domination, 
1780–1860 (Baton Rouge, La., 2000); William W. Freehling, The Road to Reunion, vol. 1, 
Secessionists at Bay, 1776–1854 (New York, 1990), pp. 146–48, 153–54, 274, 294, 342, 410–11, 
559. See also David L. Lightner, Slavery and the Commerce Power: How the Strug gle against the 
Interstate Slave Trade Led to the Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 2006); Michael A. Morrison, 
Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997).
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who abruptly noticed in 1865 a “somewhat startling result” of emancipation.11 
This was the prospect of a surge in repre sen ta tion from the South once the 
former Confederate states  were restored to normal po liti cal relations, with 
members of the House of Representatives elected by the voters, as well as 
senators by their state legislatures, taking their seats and participating in 
the making of policy for the nation.
The expansion of slavery, or its abolition, or fugitives from enslavement— 
such issues vanished with the declaration of an end to slavery. The issue of 
black repre sen ta tion remained, and it absorbed much of the po liti cal energy 
of the  others.
Delegates to the Hartford Convention found themselves up against a dire 
situation that led them to stipulate conditions for remaining in the Union. 
By contrast, in December 1865 and through the many months that followed, 
Congress sought to impose conditions on the secessionist states before they 
could be safely restored to their former place in the Union.
At the time Congress reconvened in December 1865, what did members 
know that they could not have known—or had not anticipated— nine months 
before? What had they been seeing and hearing and writing? They  were 
aware, for one  thing, of the new black code that Mississippi had recently 
enacted for the express purpose of narrowing black Southerners’ space to 
exercise their new freedom, to make real their escape from  legal enslave-
ment.12 Northerners, prominent and obscure, black and white, had been 
observing early postwar conditions— including journalists who reported 
back from the South on ominous developments regarding white Unionists 
in the region as well as former slaves and other black Southerners.13 Black 
Southerners themselves  were weighing in too.
Manifesto out of  Virginia
In mid-1865, at about the time when President Andrew Johnson began open-
ing the door to regularizing governance in the states of the suddenly former 
11Eric Foner, Reconstruction: Amer i ca’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877 (New York, 1988), 
p. 252.
12William C. Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi (Baton Rouge, La., 1967), 
pp. 121–41.
13Sidney Andrews, The South since the War, as Shown by Fourteen Weeks of Travel and 
Observation in Georgia and the Carolinas (Boston, 1866).
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Confederacy, black Southerners had their own say. For example, meeting 
in Norfolk,  Virginia, in June, three months  after Lincoln’s second inaugu-
ral address and two months  after Robert E. Lee surrendered his army at 
Appomattox, a convention of black Southerners came together.
Styling themselves “citizens,” albeit “colored citizens,” they addressed 
their “fellow citizens” on behalf of “the colored population of the southern 
states generally, and with reference to their claim for equal suffrage in par-
tic u lar.” As they crafted their message, one audience they had in mind com-
prised lawmakers in the nation’s capital—no longer Richmond but by that 
time Washington. The group’s leaders included committee chair Thomas 
Bayne and pastors of two local black churches.14
As they assessed their current situation and their expectations and hopes 
for the  future— African Americans’ dreams for a world without slavery— 
they laid claim to the rights and responsibilities of all  free  people in the world 
they envisioned. They warned that local white leaders  were putting a wide 
range of the dimensions of black freedom in serious jeopardy. They pointed 
out that if many freedpeople  were dependent on rations from the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, such was only right, for a  great many  women and  children had lost 
the breadwinner in the  family when he fought for the Union and for their 
freedom. And they warned that many thousands of trained soldiers might 
have a say in warding off efforts to press them and their families and com-
munities back  toward enslavement.15 Some of  those dimensions are the stuff 
of conventional understanding of the aftermath of war and slavery.  Others 
not so much.
Moreover, mindful of the implications of emancipation for the Three- 
Fifths Clause, they called on the self- interest of mainstream Northerners in 
general and members of Congress in particular— what the convention’s ad-
dress to the nation termed “your own interest”:
You have not unreasonably complained of the operation of that clause of the 
Constitution which has hitherto permitted the slavocracy of the South 
to  wield the po liti cal influence which would be represented by a white 
14Equal Suffrage: Address from the Colored Citizens of Norfolk, Va., to the  People of the United 
States (1865; reprint ed., Philadelphia, 1969), pp. 1, 8–9; Elizabeth R. Varon, Appomattox: 
Victory, Defeat, and Freedom at the End of the Civil War (Oxford, UK, 2014), pp. 197–98; 
“Thomas Bayne,” https:// www . encyclopediavirginia . org / Bayne _ Thomas _ ca _ 1824 
- 1888#start _ entry.
15Equal Suffrage, pp. 3–5, 7.
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population equal to three- fifths of the  whole negro population; but slavery 
is now abolished, and henceforth the repre sen ta tion  will be in proportion to 
the enumeration of the  whole population of the South, including  people of color, 
and it is worth your consideration if it is desirable or politic that the fo-
menters of this rebellion against the Union, which has been crushed at 
the expense of so much blood and trea sure, should find themselves,  after 
defeat, more power ful than ever, their po liti cal influence enhanced by the 
additional voting power of the other two fifths of the colored population, by 
which means four Southern votes  will balance in the Congressional and 
Presidential elections at least seven Northern ones.16
The Senator and the General
In the North, military and po liti cal figures, too, pondered the new exigen-
cies. Senator John Sherman (fig. 1) and his  brother, General William Te-
cumseh Sherman (fig. 2), corresponded throughout the War of the Rebellion 
and then through the late 1860s. Neither can be confused for radical on the 
politics of Reconstruction, but both expressed their recognition that at least 
some policy adjustments had to be made to address the changes that war 
and abolition had brought to American society and politics. They expressed 
their concerns even before Congress could return in December 1865 to the 
nation’s business, and then, as Congress navigated through the next few 
years, they offered their assessments of the changing conditions and the re-
cent past. The core content of both Sections  1 and 2 of the  Fourteenth 
Amendment cropped up again and again.
In May 1865, with Lee’s surrender of his army at Appomattox  little more 
than a month past, the senator wrote the general about his apprehensions 
regarding the coming shape of affairs in the South and the need for a 
policy. He voiced concerns that provide an illuminating backdrop to both 
of the first two sections of the  Fourteenth Amendment as it emerged 
many months  later. He also pointed to how the two sections of the amend-
ment might relate to each other, as he focused first on black repre sen ta tion 
in national governance and then on a white mono poly on votes in state 
lawmaking:
16Ibid., pp. 4–5 (italics in original).
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Fig.  1.  Senator John Sherman of Ohio in a ca. 1865–80 photo graph. (Brady- Handy 
photo graph collection, Library of Congress Prints and Photo graphs Division)
As to negro suffrage, I admit the negroes are not intelligent enough to vote, 
but someone must vote their po liti cal repre sen ta tion in the State where they 
live, and their repre sen ta tion is increased by their being  free. Who  shall ex-
ercise this [additional] po liti cal power?  Shall the rebels do so? If yes,  will 
they not now in effect restore slavery?
 Will they not oppress the negroes? Is it not hard to turn  these negroes 
over to the laws made by the very men who endeavored to overthrow the 
Fig.  2.  General William Tecumseh Sherman in a ca. 1860–90 engraving by J. C. 
Buttre from a photo graph by (E. or H. T.) Anthony. (Library of Congress Prints and Photo-
graphs Division)
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Government?  After all, how much more ignorant are  these slaves than the 
uneducated white  people down South? I assure you, that while I  will not 
commit myself on  these  matters, I feel sorely troubled about them, and would 
be glad to talk with you in re spect to them.17
 There it was, the uncertainty about policy, but the emergent conviction 
that something would have to be done both about repre sen ta tion in Con-
gress and about the condition and status of former slaves in the South. The 
end of slavery, though not yet reflected in a ratified Thirteenth Amendment, 
drove both concerns.
Congress in Session
No sooner than the Congress came back into session in December 1865 did 
members move swiftly to develop a reconstruction pro cess to  counter that 
of the president. And what became the  Fourteenth Amendment’s Section 2 
proved central to their concerns.
On the very first day, December 4, Representative Thaddeus Stevens of 
Pennsylvania offered a resolution that a “joint committee of fifteen mem-
bers” be established to “inquire into the condition of the States which formed 
the so- called confederate States of Amer i ca, and report  whether they or any 
of them are entitled to be represented in  either House of Congress.” The 
next day, a constitutional amendment was proposed to allocate congres-
sional repre sen ta tion “according to the number of voters in the several 
States.”18
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction was soon established, and its 
work through the months that followed led to the formulation of the 
 Fourteenth Amendment, with its vari ous components, as the main basis for 
Reconstruction. Meanwhile, Congress moved in early 1866 on a Freedmen’s 
Bureau Bill and a Civil Rights Bill. A proposal in early January resolved
That, in the opinion of this Committee, the insurgent States cannot, with 
safety to the rights of all the  people of the United States, be allowed to 
17John Sherman to William T. Sherman, May 16, 1865, in Rachel Sherman Thorndike, 
ed., The Sherman Letters: Correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891 
(New York, 1894), p. 251.
18Congressional Globe, Dec. 4, 5, 1865, 39th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 6, 9.
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participate in the Government  until the basis of repre sen ta tion  shall have 
been modified [what became Section 2], and the rights of all persons amply 
secured [clearly Section 1, but Section 2 as well],  either by new provisions, 
or the necessary changes of existing provisions, in the Constitution of the 
United States.19
Black men gaining the right to vote could go a long way  toward achieving 
both of  these ends, but no agreement in Congress had yet emerged along 
 those lines.
William A. Dunning’s classic formulation from 1907, Reconstruction, Po-
liti cal and Economic, 1865–1877, observed the prob lem of repre sen ta tion but did 
not dwell on it.20 A few years  later, one of his doctoral students focused 
squarely on it. Georgia native Benjamin B. Kendrick’s dissertation in no way 
celebrated congressional interference in President Johnson’s policies, and he 
was scarcely sympathetic to what animated the Republicans, but he was very 
clear on their consternation regarding the three- fifths formula: “The par-
tic u lar phase of the negro prob lem which most concerned Republican poli-
ticians in 1865–6 was the prob lem of repre sen ta tion of the colored population 
in Congress.”21
 There was never doubt in Congress that the new dispensation,  unless 
fixed in advance of restoration, would inevitably bring enhanced repre sen-
ta tion for the secessionist states. Kendrick described the majority lawmak-
ers’ commitment to preventing any such outcome:
This state of affairs the Republicans determined to remedy before they would 
consent to admit the representatives from the rebel states. It is not surpris-
ing then to find that the first task undertaken by the committee  after its 
organ ization was the readjustment of the basis of repre sen ta tion. It was with 
this subject that the committee busied itself during the first weeks of Janu-
ary, 1866.22
Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine (fig. 3)—no radical he, but 
nonetheless a Republican— found himself storm- tossed in the maelstrom 
of early postwar politics. As was typical of his colleagues, he hoped and 
19Benjamin B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction: 
Thirty- Ninth Congress, 1865–1867 (1914; reprint ed., New York, 1969), p. 42.
20William Archibald Dunning, Reconstruction, Po liti cal and Economic, 1865–1877 (New 
York, 1907), pp. 67, 83.
21Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee, p. 198.
22Ibid., p. 199.
Fig. 3.  Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine in a ca. 1860–65 photo graph. (National 
Archives and Rec ords Administration, Rec ord Group 11)
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expected that Congress would be able to work with the new president. In 
December, when appointed to cochair the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion, he still held out the hope and expectation that, as he wrote in a private 
letter as late as Christmas Eve, 1865, “ matters can be satisfactorily arranged— 
satisfactorily, I mean, to the  great bulk of Union men throughout the 
States.”23 Fessenden continued to expect no major rupture, as would come 
when the president vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill the following 
February.
But that was still weeks away. As he said during this earlier time, he was 
“ready to support [ Johnson] to the best of my ability, as  every gentleman 
around me is, in good faith and with kind feeling in all that he may desire 
that is consistent with my views of duty to the country.”24
 There, of course, was the rub. So, while Republicans ranged widely in 
their policy desires regarding such  matters as black voting and land distri-
bution, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction tried to develop policies that 
could work and might be widely acceptable in the loyal states even if resisted 
by leading former Confederates.
Among the many Republicans to voice the need for revisiting the basis 
of repre sen ta tion, much along the lines of the manifesto from Norfolk back 
in June, was Roscoe Conkling, representative from New York and a mem-
ber of the Joint Committee:
 Shall the death of slavery add two- fifths to the entire power which slavery 
had when slavery was living?  Shall one white man have as much share in 
the government as three other white men merely  because he lives where 
blacks outnumber whites two to one?  Shall this in equality exist, and exist 
only in  favor of  those who without cause drenched the land with blood and 
covered it with mourning?  Shall such be the reward of  those who did the 
foulest and guiltiest act which crimsons the annals of recorded time? No, sir; 
not if I can help it.25
Writing his  brother the senator in February 1866, General Sherman ex-
pressed a view that called for as  little congressional action as pos si ble, with 
the  great exception that the old Three- Fifths Clause must be renovated:
23Robert J. Cook, Civil War Senator: William Pitt Fessenden and the Fight to Save the American 
Republic (Baton Rouge, La., 2011), p. 194.
24Ibid., p. 193.
25Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee, p. 204.
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I know that the Freedmen Bureau Bill, and that for universal suffrage in the 
District, are impracticable and impolitic. . . .
I think Mr. Johnson would consent to a modification of the Constitution 
to change the basis of repre sen ta tion to suit the changed condition of the 
population [of the] South, but that is all he can or should do.26
Congress was moving further than General William Tecumseh Sherman 
was prepared to go in some  matters, but even he signed on in full support 
of an adjustment in repre sen ta tion.
During the first half of 1866, Congress enacted the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Act and the Civil Rights Act, both of them over vetoes by the president. Beyond 
such legislation, Congress in general and the Joint Committee in par tic u lar 
pushed ahead in their effort to formulate a  Fourteenth Amendment.
The  Fourteenth Amendment
As this omnibus mea sure, reflecting a variety of concerns, took shape, Sec-
tion 1, designed to place the Civil Rights Act in the Constitution so as to 
put it beyond subsequent repeal or judicial invalidation, spoke of civil rights 
and equal protection of the laws. Section 5 empowered Congress to pass ad-
ditional laws to enforce Section 1.
Section 1 has long been most widely associated with the amendment, but 
it was hardly alone. Section 4 was designed to guarantee the U.S. national 
debt that had been taken on to quell the rebellion, to put to rest any uncer-
tainty as to  whether state debt contracted in support of the rebellion had 
any validity, and to end any chance that former slave  owners might seek to 
gain compensation for their losses in that form of property.
Section 2 pointed  toward black suffrage but did not mandate it. Rather, 
Congress continued to defer to the states on the authority to define the elec-
torate, so it offered white Southerners a choice relating voting rights to 
repre sen ta tion: (1) black men have no vote, but white men do not get to vote 
black residents’ repre sen ta tion (as in the first proposal that, a half  century 
earlier, came out of the Hartford Convention and would have established 
the fraction as zero- fifths) or (2) black men get the vote, and black men vote 
26William T. Sherman to John Sherman, Feb. 11, 1866, in Letters, p. 264.
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their own repre sen ta tion, much as the manifesto from Norfolk had argued 
in mid-1865.
 Either way, white men would not get to continue to vote black residents’ 
repre sen ta tion. More to the point, having been defeated in their bid for po-
liti cal in de pen dence they would not get to come back into the Union with 
far greater capacity to cause mischief than ever before.
Congressional Republicans might have distinguished between federal 
elections, on the one hand, and state and local suffrage, on the other. They 
could, that is, have focused on the need to address the implications of the 
death of “three- fifths” solely in elections to the U.S. House of Representa-
tives and the presidency. But they did not.
In part, this was  because each state legislature appointed the state’s U.S. 
senators, so the state electorate could not be separated in practice from the 
upper chamber of Congress. In part, too, it was so that black Southerners 
could protect their own interests as newly freed  people and newly denomi-
nated citizens. What ever rights  were contemplated in the amendment’s Sec-
tion 1, black Southerners would act as voters to promote their well- being 
 under public policies that they would have some say in shaping. That, too, 
was impor tant— “moderate” Republicans shared with “radicals” a sense 
that slavery must be clearly over, that former slaves must be demonstrably 
 free in a world without slavery. Moreover, it seemed imperative that a suf-
ficient constituency be raised that might support loyal/Unionist state gov-
ernments in the South, and white Unionists had proved too scarce as well 
as extremely vulnerable. Yet no congressional supermajority was prepared 
yet to mandate black suffrage.
 Running for their po liti cal lives in the aftermath of the death of slavery 
and in the context of a transformed meaning of the Three- Fifths Clause (as 
well as a po liti cally divided North, thus a potential majority that combined 
former secessionists with Demo crats from loyal states), Republican members 
of Congress fashioned a collection of demands into what they proposed as 
the  Fourteenth Amendment. This was nonnegotiable. It had to become part 
of the U.S. Constitution before the states of the recent Confederacy could 
be safely “restored,” their representatives and senators permitted to take 
their seats. The key component was Section 2.
Seeing the  Fourteenth Amendment through to ratification would be a 
challenge. Not all loyal states, especially such states of the Border South 
as Mary land and Delaware, could be counted on. Looking to mobilize a 
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competing po liti cal party to defeat the Republicans in the fall 1866 elec-
tions, President Johnson declared po liti cal war on the congressional recon-
struction program. The white South saw a power ful ally, and many legislators 
 were prepared to take their chances on the outcome. (Contributing, too, to 
the very widespread Southern white disinclination to accept the terms was 
a lingering uncertainty as to  whether Congress, once the amendment was 
ratified, might come back with additional demands.)
In early July 1866, looking back at the events of the months  after Con-
gress reconvened the previous December, Senator Sherman again wrote his 
 brother. Congress had, he judged,
 adopted no unwise or extreme mea sures. The Civil Rights Bill and consti-
tutional amendments [by which the senator was referring to the vari ous sec-
tions of the  Fourteenth] can be defended as reasonable, moderate, and in 
harmony with Johnson’s old position and yours. . . .  As to the President, he 
is becoming Tylerized [a man without a party]. He was elected by the Union 
party for his openly expressed radical sentiments, and now he seeks to rend 
to pieces this party. . . .  Besides, he is insincere; he has deceived and misled 
his best friends. I know he led many to believe he would agree to the Civil 
Rights Bill, and nearly all who conversed with him  until within a few days 
believed he would acquiesce in the amendments, and even aid in securing 
their adoption.27
Hannibal Hamlin, displaced by Andrew Johnson on the Union Party 
ticket in 1864, would have succeeded to the presidency upon Lincoln’s death 
had he been reelected as vice president. So his approach to the politics of 
Reconstruction is of more than passing interest. He supported President 
Johnson as long as he could, but then in the summer of 1866, as Johnson 
moved to create a rival po liti cal party to support his restoration policy in 
that fall’s congressional elections, Hamlin broke with him, with widespread 
notice.28
In his troubled mind, Section 2 seemed entirely at risk. As his grand son 
recounted a public speech in September by Hamlin back home in Maine:
He urged the country to stand by Congress and the constitutional amend-
ments. Impartial suffrage without distinction of race or color would have 
27John Sherman to William T. Sherman, July 8, 1866, in Letters, p. 276.
28Charles Eugene Hamlin, The Life and Times of Hannibal Hamlin (Cambridge, Mass., 
1899), pp. 507–10.
122    Peter Wallenstein
been the North’s wish [this according to the grand son], but if the [former 
Confederate] States would not accept [black suffrage], the class excluded 
should not be counted in the basis of congressional repre sen ta tion. “Did we 
fight down the rebellion to give the [white] South more power?” was the last 
question Mr. Hamlin asked, and the country pondered it many a year fol-
lowing the madness and folly of Andrew Johnson.29
Alone among the former Confederate states, Tennessee ratified the 
amendment— and saw its members of Congress promptly seated. Then one 
by one over the coming months, both before and especially  after the elec-
tions, each of the ten other states turned down the amendment as the basis 
for Reconstruction.
White Southerners and the  Fourteenth Amendment
Not only did the framers in Congress generally see Section 2 as the center-
piece of the  Fourteenth Amendment, but their opponents in Southern leg-
islatures did as well. The historian Joseph B. James long ago supplied the 
pioneering account of “the framing of the  Fourteenth Amendment,” a fo-
cus that the  legal historian William E. Nelson  later pursued. In a subsequent 
book, on “the ratification of the  Fourteenth Amendment,” the historian 
James E. Bond turned to the next chapter in that story line, as if to ask: What 
came next? How did the amendment as framed and proposed in 1866 make 
its way into the Constitution in 1868? In par tic u lar, Bond examined the rati-
fication pro cess in the eleven states of the recent Confederacy, with one 
chapter on each state.30
Bond was primarily interested in how the framers of the  Fourteenth 
Amendment— definitely including the Southern men making the decision 
 whether to ratify it— understood the meaning of Section 1, with a nod as 
well to Section 5, in which Congress would be empowered to act in support 
of Section 1. What rights did they have in mind when they spoke of citizen-
ship and “equal protection of the laws”? Further out, Bond wished to address 
29Ibid., p. 510.
30Joseph B. James, The Framing of the  Fourteenth Amendment (1939; reprint ed., Urbana, Ill., 
1956); William E. Nelson, The  Fourteenth Amendment: From Po liti cal Princi ple to Judicial Doctrine 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1988), especially pp. 45–52; James E. Bond, No Easy Walk to Freedom: 
Reconstruction and the Ratification of the  Fourteenth Amendment (Westport, Conn., 1997).
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a question regarding the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Originally 
framed to contain the authority of the national government, was the Bill of 
Rights meant henceforth, he asked, through Section 1, to restrain the power 
of state governments as well?
 These are impor tant questions, but on his way to his main interest he ob-
serves the following, of far more relevance to the concerns of this chapter:
The debates [in the South] did not focus primarily on section 1, which  today 
is the  Fourteenth Amendment. . . .  Instead, the debates focused on sections 2 
and 3, which dealt respectively with Negro suffrage and apportionment and 
with the exclusion of rebel leaders from [po liti cal] office. While  those sections 
preoccupied [white] Southerners then,  today they are “dead letters.” . . .  In 
short, the one section which was to become the foundation of so much of 
modern constitutional law was considered [far] less impor tant than the 
 others— though that fact itself reveals much about the original understand-
ing of its [limited] scope.31
On the  matter of repre sen ta tion, Bond mentions what he terms the 
“Southern Compromise Amendment”:
The Southern Compromise Amendment, which some white Southerners 
proffered in [February] 1867, reinforces the conclusion that they did not [es-
pecially] fear recognizing that blacks enjoyed natu ral rights or granting 
them civil rights. In fact, the language of Section  3 of that amendment 
tracks the language of Section  1 of the  Fourteenth Amendment. Had the 
draf ters of the Southern Compromise Amendment understood any of 
 those phrases to guarantee po liti cal or social rights, they would have balked 
at including them. As they understood them, however,  those phrases  were 
so innocuous that they could be “given away” in exchange for conces-
sions on Sections 2 and 3 of the  Fourteenth Amendment, especially if Con-
gress was denied the power to enforce the Section 1 guarantees [certainly if 
congressional majorities proved disinclined to act] and the definition of their 
31Bond, No Easy Walk to Freedom, pp. 8–9. Another close student of the subject offers a 
variation of this assessment; Michael Perman, Reunion without Compromise: The South and 
Reconstruction, 1865–1868 (Cambridge, UK, 1973), pp. 229–47, writes, “Foremost among the 
objections of the Confederates to the substance of the amendment  were the provisions of 
the third clause” (p. 236). Perman quotes one of  those “Confederates” writing to another: 
“You say we can do without representatives in Congress, but we must have a state 
government” (p. 237).
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scope was left exclusively to the states [as became largely true within a few 
years].32
Bond concludes, therefore, that— from his tremendous effort to track down 
and work through the sources necessary to comprehend the pro cess of rati-
fication in each of the secessionist states— the prevailing lit er a ture reverses 
the relative importance in the 1860s, privileging Section 1 (and Section 5) 
over Section 2 (and Section 3).
If the ten recalcitrant states—or at least enough of them to secure early 
ratification— had acceded to Section 1 but definitely balked at Section 2, and 
if Section 2 was even more impor tant than Section  1 to lawmakers in 
Congress, then Section 2 contributes more than Section 1 to historicizing 
the  Fourteenth Amendment in the politics of early post– Civil War 
Amer i ca. Each side saw the aftermath of the old Three- Fifths Clause as 
a core concern.
Congressional Reconstruction and the  
Prob lem of Repre sen ta tion
Two trajectories  were bound to collide: insistence in Congress that the 
amendment be ratified and re sis tance in the South to complying with that 
requirement. Congress would not go forward with restoring the ten remain-
ing secessionist states without having first secured the amendment’s instal-
lation in the Constitution, and  those states would not accept terms that 
required that they choose between black enfranchisement and reduced 
repre sen ta tion.
32Bond, No Easy Walk to Freedom, pp. 257–58. Bond cites for this alternative amendment 
a 1950s article by Joseph B. James— which, however, does not use the name Bond  adopted 
and which never reveals the  actual language of the document they both reference: 
“Southern Reaction to the Proposal of the  Fourteenth Amendment,” Journal of Southern 
History 22 (Nov. 1956):477–97, at pp. 494–96. James in his article (p. 494) characterizes the 
alternative  Fourteenth Amendment as “a compromise proposal as near the original 
 Fourteenth Amendment as Southern sentiment might accept and Northern opposition . . .  
would permit.” The document in its entirety, together with a headnote, “A Southern 
Proposal for a  Fourteenth Amendment,” can be found in Walter L. Fleming, ed., 
Documentary History of Reconstruction: Po liti cal, Military, Social, Religious, Educational, and 
Industrial, 1865 to the Pres ent, 2 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio, 1906–7), 1:238–40.
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In the immediate aftermath of the fall 1866 congressional elections, in 
which the Republicans trounced their opposition, the Repository, a newspa-
per published in Franklin County, Pennsylvania, commented on the impli-
cations of the Republicans’ resounding victory for the ten former Confederate 
states (all but Tennessee) that had refused to ratify the  Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Repository characterized the amendment’s provisions as “designed 
to restore the Union with the least pos si ble incon ve nience to the  people of 
the South and the fewest pos si ble restraints consistent with the peace and 
security of the Government. They  were dictated by considerations of mercy 
as well as expediency.”33
But  those states had rejected the amendment as the basis for restoration, 
the paper observed in the next weekly edition, and “if the South  shall lon-
ger persist in her refusal to accept the terms offered, let us take advantage 
of her refusal, and rebuild the nation’s walls on the sure foundation of equal 
rights.”34
As one  after another among the former Confederate states rejected the 
 Fourteenth Amendment, George William Curtis, editor of Harper’s Weekly, 
offered a similar take. In the December 1 issue, he wrote that “the states 
that remained loyal” through secession and war “are bound to guard the 
country against any danger that may arise from the unrestricted return of 
the rebel States, just as they  were bound to defend it from the consequences 
of the attempted secession.” And the old three- fifths formula certainly posed 
such a danger: “Do the Southern Governors mean us to understand— not 
to put too fine a point upon it— that rebels are humiliated if by their causeless 
and defeated rebellion they have not gained increased po liti cal power?” In 
view of “the experience of the last five years,” what, he wanted to know, 
might lead  people in “the late rebel States . . .  to suppose that the loyal  people 
 will be turned from their purpose?”35
The “terms offered” in the amendment  were rejected in  those ten states 
as  going too far. As a consequence, Northern terms could and must go fur-
ther. Section 2 must go into the Constitution. Congress found another means 
to make that happen.
33Franklin Repository, Nov. 14, 1866, quoted in Edward L. Ayers, The Thin Light of Freedom: 
The Civil War and Emancipation in the Heart of Amer i ca (New York, 2017), p. 405.
34Repository, Nov. 21, 1866, quoted in ibid., p. 406.
35“The Amendment at the South,” Harper’s Weekly, Dec. 1, 1866.
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Congressional Reconstruction
In death as in life, then, Southern slavery roiled national politics, and in a 
manner  little recognized in the lit er a ture on the era: the po liti cal implica-
tions, in the immediate post– Civil War period, of the death of slavery, the 
transformed meaning of the Three- Fifths Clause, and what in turn that 
might mean for power, politics, and policy in a world that had just left se-
cession, war, and slavery all more or less  behind.
Ten of the eleven states of the defeated Confederacy rejected the 
 Fourteenth Amendment, the congressional Republicans’ nonnegotiable basis 
for reunion. They refused to concede that they had to choose between 
Door Number 1 and Door Number 2.
To get the  Fourteenth Amendment ratified, Congress embarked on a ma-
jor new tactic. In  those ten states, new elections would choose delegates to 
new constitutional conventions. In  those elections, black men would vote, 
and thus black enfranchisement came to much of the South in 1867, some-
thing  under two years  after Congress convened for its first postwar session 
in December 1865— and more than two years before the Fifteenth Amend-
ment would attempt to  settle the  matter in another way, for  every state.
In fact, large numbers of African Americans, including both former slaves 
and men formerly in the category of “ free persons of color,” ran for election 
as delegates. Many black candidates won, among them Thomas Bayne in 
Norfolk,  Virginia, and thus participated in the pro cess of framing the new 
constitutions. Regardless of who gained seats as delegates,  those constitu-
tional conventions would, Congress required, provide for black suffrage.
And the legislatures elected  under  those new constitutions, selected to a 
considerable extent with black votes, would promptly ratify the  Fourteenth 
Amendment as a condition of po liti cal restoration. Then perhaps the Re-
public would be secure. Then the senators chosen by  these new state legis-
latures, and the congressmen elected by the voters in this new expanded 
electorate, might be permitted to take their seats in Congress. Not  until then.
The new formula, as introduced first in the  Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Section 2 and then in the March 1867 departure, which led down the path 
to ratification of all of the  Fourteenth Amendment, was designed to result 
in a vastly diff er ent U.S. House of Representatives than would have other-
wise materialized. In view of the means employed for securing adoption of 
the  Fourteenth Amendment, with black men voting in state elections, 
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changes in Southern state legislatures might well produce diff er ent outcomes 
in the appointment of U.S. senators. Beyond a shift in outcomes in elections 
to both  houses of Congress as well as the presidency, changes in  either or 
both the presidency and the Senate would alter the se lection results for all 
federal judges.
A Sherman  Brothers Retrospective
In November 1867, Senator Sherman wrote the general about Johnson’s 
be hav ior in the critical year 1866. He expressed certainty that Johnson’s 
rejection of the  Fourteenth Amendment had fundamentally altered the 
course of postwar policymaking:
The  great error of his life was in not acquiescing in and supporting the 
14th Amendment of the Constitution in the Thirty- ninth Congress. This he 
could easily have carried. It referred the suffrage question to each State, and 
if  adopted long ago the  whole controversy would have culminated; or if fur-
ther opposed by the extreme Radicals, they would have been easily beaten. 
Now I see nothing short of universal suffrage and universal amnesty as the 
basis.36
Both the senator and the general had expressed concern, as early as the 
spring of 1865, about the degree to which former slaves would be permitted 
to shed their enslavement. More than that, each had expressed a commit-
ment that something be done about the old Three- Fifths Clause, the basis 
of repre sen ta tion in the House of Representatives and, through that, the 
Electoral College. They both recognized the contingent nature of Recon-
struction as it unfolded, the probability that had Section 2 provided the 
 actual basis for a postwar regime in 1866, Congress would never have en-
franchised black men in March 1867.
Had the secessionist states accepted Section 2, then the carrot- and- stick 
of enhanced or reduced repre sen ta tion offered in that section might well 
have influenced white voters and white legislators in each of the former Con-
federate states as they considered  whether to accord black men the right to 
vote. What ever they deci ded would have left the contours of the electorate 
36John Sherman to William T. Sherman, Nov. 1, 1867, in Letters, p. 299.
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in each state up to that state’s po liti cal actors to determine, whoever they 
 were at any given time. It would have left that decision where it had tradi-
tionally been located— but within a very diff er ent framework, one that did 
away with the three- fifths formula as a basic fact of life in American politics 
and governance.
What If— Lincoln Biographers and the  
Missing Question
Historians of the Civil War era often ask what Lincoln might have done had 
he lived to complete his second term, scarcely  under way at the time of his 
assassination, or had he at least lived through the first post- Appomattox year.
One biographer, William C. Harris, notes that a policy of early resto-
ration of the sort that Lincoln had seemed to  favor, leaving the  matter of 
determining voting rights in the hands of each state, would necessarily 
have looked to white Unionists to lead the pro cess in each of the secessionist 
states. And white Unionists, he observes, came to the postwar world ex-
pecting “freedom but not equal rights for blacks”; he says that Lincoln, had 
he lived, might have managed to “insure, at least for a time, bona fide free-
dom for blacks,” in other words the right, for example, to own land but 
prob ably not much, if anything, by way of po liti cal rights.37
The leading historian of Reconstruction has long been Eric Foner. His 
book Reconstruction: Amer i ca’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863–1877— certainly the 
dominant account since its publication in 1988— recognizes the three- fifths 
prob lem but overall pres ents the era as a mighty strug gle over the postslavery 
status of black Americans, as primarily, then, a contest over the contours of 
black freedom.38
His prize- winning biography of Lincoln takes a similar approach. Foner 
goes beyond where Lincoln biographies typically go, but he does not address 
the Lincoln who would have found himself confronted by abolition’s impli-
cations for the three- fifths formula. The main question for Foner is how far 
37William C. Harris, With Charity for All: Lincoln and the Restoration of the Union 
(Lexington, Ky., 1997), pp. 265–75, quotes at pp. 268, 275.
38Foner, Reconstruction, pp. 251–61.
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Lincoln would have continued to move in seeking a more robust experience 
of freedom than simply an end to enslavement.39
Both Harris and Foner note Lincoln’s ability to change, to grow, and to 
adjust as conditions changed. Both observe that it is of course impossible to 
say with certainty what he would have done. Both say, too, though, that they 
find it inconceivable that he would have let the relations among the presi-
dent, Congress, and the white South deteriorate to the point that, by late 
1866, they clearly had. Both allude to the vote for at least some  free men of 
color in the South, but neither of them argues the centrality of the conun-
drum that the death of slavery brought to national politics.
Lincoln, it can be hypothesized in view of the quickly emerging issue of 
the postwar meaning of the Three- Fifths Clause, would nonetheless have 
come quickly to the realization that so many Republican members of Con-
gress did. The kinder, gentler Lincoln might well have proved indistinguish-
able on this issue from the members of Congress who came to be seen as 
the radicals on black suffrage. It seems very probable that he would have 
joined the Republican consensus that  there had to be—as Thomas Bayne, 
Senator Sherman, Representative Conkling, and so many  others saw as 
imperative— a fundamental alteration in the three- fifths formula. Most 
Republicans of necessity, given the circumstances they came to see about 
the formula for congressional repre sen ta tion, had to be “radicals.” The 
adjective in that context appears redundant.
In a brief treatment, Lincoln and Reconstruction, the historian John  C. 
R odrigue includes “determining repre sen ta tion in Congress with elimina-
tion of the ‘three- fifths’ clause” among the range of issues that Lincoln 
would have faced had he lived. By no means does Rodrigue wish to down-
play “the importance of Lincoln’s racial thought and its implications for 
postwar reconciliation,” but he observes that perhaps historians’ “tradi-
tional focus” on such  matters is a bit “misplaced.”
Rodrigue does not return to the three- fifths prob lem but rather moves 
to a consideration of black laborers’ widespread landlessness in the postwar 
world.40 Yet he opens up space for an interpretation that something like 
the  Fourteenth Amendment, with Section 2 as well as Section 1— and the 
39Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery (New York, 2010), 
pp. 330–36.
40John C. Rodrigue, Lincoln and Reconstruction (Carbondale, Ill., 2013), pp. 144–45.
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congressional insistence on its ratification as a nonnegotiable condition of 
po liti cal restoration— was perhaps (what ever the details) virtually inevitable.
Then again, had enough former Confederate states ratified the  Fourteenth 
Amendment as it took final shape in 1866, black suffrage in  those states might 
well not have come at all in the postwar years—or not as fully as it did, nor 
when it did.
Perspectives from the 1860s— and from the Pres ent
Historians commonly misperceive the most impor tant section of Congress’s 
handi work in the  Fourteenth Amendment, it is argued  here, or rather con-
fuse what became the most impor tant part in the  middle third of the twen-
tieth  century with what was, for perhaps far more whites in Amer i ca, North 
and South, the most impor tant in 1865–67, when Congress began ponder-
ing what to do in the aftermath of an end to enslavement and then proposed 
the amendment and sent it to the states, looking to gain approval.41 When 
most Southern states rejected it, too many to permit its ratification (if, that 
is, the seceded states  were included in the number, three- fourths of which 
had to ratify the amendment for it to go into effect), Congress had to 
arrange some other means to get the amendment into the Constitution. 
The result is known as Congressional Reconstruction, or sometimes Radi-
cal Reconstruction, which was fi nally embarked on in March 1867, the first 
attempt at securing the  Fourteenth Amendment having been rebuffed by 
most of the secessionist states.
Thus the key to the politics of Reconstruction, hidden in plain sight, gets 
bypassed. Summing up the conventional understanding, a recent book- 
length survey of the era of the Civil War and Reconstruction tarries enough 
41A statement of this thesis of the centrality of the three- fifths prob lem, generally 
bypassed or understated in subsequent lit er a ture, appeared in J. G. Randall and David 
Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (1961; second ed., rev. with enlarged bibliography, 
Lexington, Mass., 1969), pp. 580–86. For another such treatment of the Three- Fifths 
Clause, see W. R. Brock, American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction, 1865–1867 (New York, 
1963), especially pp. 21–23. Garrett Epps supplies a sustained approach along  these lines  
in Democracy Reborn: The  Fourteenth Amendment and the Fight for Equal Rights in Post– Civil War 
Amer i ca (New York, 2006). See also Xi Wang, The Trial of Democracy: Black Suffrage and 
Northern Republicans, 1860–1910 (Athens, Ga., 1997), pp. 14–28, and Mark Wahlgren 
Summers, The Ordeal of the Reunion: A New History of Reconstruction (New York, 2014), pp. 3–4, 
90–104.
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at the  Fourteenth Amendment to point out Sections 1 and 3. Section 1, de-
claring that no state could “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due pro cess of [law],” is clearly of central interest to the authors of 
that book, so one must understand in that context their entire discussion of 
the politics of Reconstruction. As for Section 3, it “barred some prominent 
former Confederates from holding high [as well as lower] po liti cal positions,” 
at least “ until the region stabilized enough to support a genuine two- party 
system.”42 (But that “genuine two- party system” would evidently emerge 
with an all- white electorate, since any provision for, let alone a constitutional 
guarantee of, black suffrage in the South had yet to enter the picture before 
1867.)
So, the postwar black codes that, one  after another, all- white legislatures 
enacted in the former Confederate states, together with such large- scale 
white- on- black vio lence as occurred in 1866 in Memphis and New Orleans, 
 were what “united moderate and radical Republicans.” The authors are 
consistent in this single- minded focus on “the basic civil rights of the freed 
people” as the chief (if not sole) concern among Republican lawmakers in 
Congress as well as among mainstream white Northerners. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, vetoed by President Johnson and then enacted over his veto, 
reflected an urgent response to  these challenges to Republicans’ de-
mands. So far, so good. But in turn, apprehension as to “the president’s 
pos si ble sabotage of the Civil Rights Act,” according to this understanding, 
sufficiently explains what “led Republicans to propose the  Fourteenth 
Amendment.”43
In this view, the  Fourteenth Amendment appears, and properly so, cen-
tral to the politics of Reconstruction, yet the implicit understanding is that 
Section 1 was what was at stake, since Section 2 never gets noticed. “Ten-
nessee had been readmitted to the Union  after ratifying the  Fourteenth 
Amendment in July 1866,” the authors write, and was therefore already re-
stored and thus exempted when Congressional Reconstruction came along 
in March 1867.  After new constitutional conventions (elected this time by 
biracial electorates) worked up acceptable new state constitutions for the ten 
remaining former Confederate states during the months to follow, and  after 
42Gary W. Gallagher and Joan Waugh, The American War: A History of the Civil War Era 
(State College, Penn., 2015), p. 205.
43Ibid., pp. 200–206.
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new legislatures had been elected  under  those instruments, “the last step was 
ratifying the  Fourteenth Amendment.”44 At that point, members of Con-
gress would be admitted from  those ten states, and Reconstruction would 
be complete, the Union restored, and the fruits of abolition secured.
With ratification of the  Fourteenth Amendment, the “basic civil rights 
of the freedpeople” would be protected  under the Constitution, far more 
surely than they had been with the 1866 Civil Rights Act, let alone before 
that. But this view bypasses Republicans’ insistence that the fruits of victory 
also be secured, the Republic safe from subversion in a hostile takeover, 
 whether the security required by Republicans came with black suffrage neu-
tralizing much of the electoral power of white supremacists or with reduced 
repre sen ta tion reflecting a continuation of black disfranchisement.
The End of Three- Fifths in American Po liti cal Life
The congressional framers of the  Fourteenth Amendment knew they wanted 
the gist of what became both Sections 1 and 2. They knew they had to have 
Section 2. Centering Section 2 can make sense of the riddle of Reconstruc-
tion, better identifying the core issue in the politics of  those first postwar 
years.
That Section 2 goes relatively unconsidered in the lit er a ture on Recon-
struction has several pos si ble explanations. The Dunning historians of the 
early twentieth  century  were not looking for reasons the Republicans might 
have been legitimately concerned about their survival as a party and all it 
stood for. (Benjamin B. Kendrick stands out as the  great exception, as he 
sought to understand the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, created by 
Congress in December 1865.) Then came the civil rights  lawyers who, dur-
ing the  middle third of the twentieth  century, litigated against racial dis-
parity as  matters of constitutional law concerning state action and equal 
protection of the laws. In their wake, a new generation of scholars focused 
on Section 1 as the key to Reconstruction—as the key to the “first” Recon-
struction as well as to the “second” Reconstruction.45
44Ibid., p. 206.
45For an able review of the main currents of Reconstruction historiography, see 
Michael Perman, “The Politics of Reconstruction,” in Lacy K. Ford, ed., A Companion to 
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Subterranean developments are by their nature not particularly vis i ble, 
even if they fundamentally alter the landscape. Even scholars who acknowl-
edge the prob lem of repre sen ta tion typically move on as if it requires no 
further consideration in tracking the politics of Reconstruction.
The deliberations that led to both Section 1 and Section 2, the need to 
amend the Constitution, the sense of urgency that the amendment be rati-
fied before restoration of the secessionist states, all  these had their beginnings 
as soon as Congress met in December 1865. The combination of victory 
and abolition, in the context of the old Three- Fifths Clause, mandated 
close attention to what became the  Fourteenth Amendment’s Section 2 as 
well as what became Section 1.
the Civil War and Reconstruction (Malden, Mass., 2005), pp. 323–41. Notably missing, 
however, is an emphasis on Section 2.
Fig. 4.  A po liti cal cartoon by E. W. Kemble in 1902 satirized the lack of congressional 
enforcement of the second section of the  Fourteenth Amendment, depicted as a broken 
blunderbuss at the feet of Congress as a sleeping fat man. (Library of Congress Prints and 
Photo graphs Division)
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The  Fourteenth Amendment was simply central to the congressional pol-
itics of the early post– Civil War years. True, by the end of the nineteenth 
 century and for well into the twentieth, Section 1 proved pretty in effec tive; 
but it supplied the constitutional basis for the civil rights strug gle of the 1950s 
and 1960s. Section 2 also faded in significance (fig. 4), even more so, as the 
threat of reduced repre sen ta tion was never implemented, despite widespread 
black disfranchisement over much the same period; and leaders of the one- 
party former Confederacy  were able to thwart congressional legislation in 
support of civil rights  until even  later than when federal courts began act-
ing to revive the promises of Reconstruction. For the Thirty- Ninth Con-
gress, however, Section 2 stood even taller than Section 1.
Well before the Black Codes of 1865–66, or the tussle in 1866 between 
President Johnson and Congress over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the 
Civil Rights Act, or the white- on- black vio lence that made headlines that 
year, the emphasis on what became Section 2 can be seen in such declara-
tions from mid-1865 as the black manifesto from Norfolk and the correspon-
dence between the Sherman  brothers.
Po liti cal tensions over black repre sen ta tion recurred  under slavery and 
returned with emancipation— reverberated from 1787 to 1815 and reached 
a new crescendo in 1865–67. By the time of that last crisis, one response to 
the issue of who, if anyone, would vote African Americans’ repre sen ta tion 
went in a novel direction.  Under the Resolution of 1867 they would vote it 
themselves. For a time, at least, it was so.
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St u de n ts of A m e r ic a n  legal history have recently developed a sig-nificant interest in popu lar constitutionalism— the concept that the 
 people themselves rather than judges should determine the substance and 
meaning of the constitution. Historians have convincingly shown that from 
the 1760s, when major issues first arose about the power of Parliament to 
tax and regulate the colonies, to the end of the eigh teenth  century, the  people 
debated publicly what their constitution meant and resolved differences 
mainly through popu lar, sometimes even violent, action. Events such as 
the Boston Tea Party— indeed, the War of In de pen dence itself— come to 
mind. Judicial decision making played only a minor role in constitutional 
debate.1
According to twenty- first- century law, in contrast, the  people have  little 
power over the constitution; judges determine what it means. Since Cooper 
This chapter was delivered in nearly its pres ent form in May 2015 as the keynote 
address at the annual symposium of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society. My thanks to Paul 
Finkelman and the society for inviting me to speak. At that time, the chapter was an early 
draft of what now appears as chapter 9 of William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial 
Amer i ca, vol. 4, Law and the Constitution on the Eve of In de pen dence, 1735–1776 (New York, 2017). 
As readers of this chapter and the book  will plainly see, my views changed substantially as 
I continued during the interim to think about the  matters discussed herein.
1See, e.g., Larry Kramer, The  People Themselves: Popu lar Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review (New York, 2004); John Phillip Reid, Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 4 
vols. (Madison, Wis., 1986–93); William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial Amer i ca, 
vol. 4, Law on the Eve of Revolution, 1730–1775 (New York, 2017).
William E. Nelson
Sectionalism, the  Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the End of 
Popu lar Constitutionalism
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v. Aaron in 1958,2 the Supreme Court of the United States has claimed fi-
nal, dispositive authority over constitutional interpretation; it has repeatedly 
asserted “the basic princi ple that the federal judiciary is supreme in the ex-
position of the law of the Constitution.”3 When and how did this change 
occur?
The core claim of this chapter is that the change occurred when it be-
came impossible in the mid- nineteenth  century to envision the American 
 people as a cohesive po liti cal entity. Instead, the nation had become divided 
into majority and minority factions, which then sought to use the written 
constitution of 1787, as originally drafted and ratified by the Founding 
 Fathers, in support of their interests and to prohibit emerging majorities from 
acting contrary to  those interests.
Let me begin with the eigh teenth  century, whose popu lar constitutional-
ism rested first and foremost on the fact that the  people  were interpreting a 
customary constitution rather than a formally enacted document. The con-
stitution was not a set of written commands issued by an authoritative body 
informing government officials of the scope and limits of their power. Of 
course,  there  were some writings, such as Magna Carta, the Declaration of 
Rights, and the Act of Settlement, that  were part of the constitution, but 
the reason for their inclusion was not their enactment by the king or Parlia-
ment. They  were part of the constitution  because the  people had come to 
accept them as such.
The eighteenth- century En glish constitution consisted of  those funda-
mental norms and practices, some in writing but some not, to which the 
En glish  people as a  whole had consented and by which they had come over 
time to be governed. Of course, perfect agreement did not exist as to the 
specific content of  those norms and practices. Some individuals  were always 
challenging what ever tentative and fleeting consensus most other  people had 
accepted. Thus, the eighteenth- century constitution did not consist of read-
ily identifiable, fixed rules; ultimately, the constitution, in the notable lan-
guage of John Phillip Reid, was “what ever could be plausibly argued and 
forcibly maintained.”4
2358 U.S. 1 (1958).
3Ibid., p. 18.
4John Phillip Reid, “In a Defensive Rage: The Uses of the Mob, the Justification in 
Law, and the Coming of the American Revolution,” New York University Law Review 49 
(1974):1043, 1087.
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The imprecision of the constitution gave it  great flexibility over time. The 
En glish constitution of 1760 was not the same as the constitution of 1690, let 
alone that of 1630. It had evolved. Parliamentary legislation had contrib-
uted to the evolution, but the evolutionary pro cess did not consist solely of 
constitutive acts. Indeed, some acts, such as Oliver  Cromwell’s Instrument 
of Government, had come to possess no force at all. What made the consti-
tution evolve was the gradual, sometimes imperceptible changes in the pub-
lic’s understanding of the norms and practices that composed the foundation 
on which government rested.
The document drafted in 1787 and ratified in 1788 that we now view as 
the Constitution of the United States— that is, as the entire American 
constitution— was not, I urge, so understood by the  people of 1787–88. 
Rather, it was simply part of a still largely customary American constitu-
tion. I disagree with Jefferson Powell’s claim that the  great “innovation” of 
the Revolutionary era “was to identify ‘the Constitution’ with a single nor-
mative document instead of a historical tradition”—as a written superior 
law set above the entire government against which all other law and all gov-
ernment action is to be mea sured.5
I do not deny that some Americans in the late 1760s began to argue that 
“the fundamental Pillars of the Constitution should be comprised in one act 
or instrument” so that “not a single point may be subject to the least ambi-
guity.” They urged that it was necessary to limit government “by some cer-
tain terms of agreement” that would provide security against “the danger 
of an indefinite dependence upon an undetermined power.” By 1776, the idea 
that “all constitutions should be contained in some written Charter” surely 
was in the air.6
But older concepts of a customary constitution and popu lar constitution-
alism also persisted. James Otis Jr. had argued as early as 1761 that “an act 
against natu ral equity is void” and that the  people and even the courts should 
“pass such acts into disuse.”7 Many Americans afterward continued to be-
lieve that all law must be consistent with higher law and natu ral equity and 
5H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent,” Harvard Law 
Review 98 (1985):885, 902. See also Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 
1776–1787 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969), p. 260.
6Quoted in Wood, Creation of the American Republic, pp. 267, 268.
7John Adams’s Report of the First Argument in February 1761 in Paxton’s Case, Quincy 
469, 474 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1761).
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should be held null, void, and of no effect if it was not. Thus, for John Dick-
inson, rights  were
not annexed to us by parchments and seals. They [ were] created in us by 
the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws of our nature. They [ were] 
born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken from us by any  human 
power, without taking our lives. In short, they are founded on the immuta-
ble maxims of reason and justice.
Philip Livingston was another who, before the Declaration of In de pen dence, 
agreed that  people  were entitled to their rights “by the eternal laws of right 
reason.”8
The coming of in de pen dence changed nothing. Eleven states drafted 
written constitutions between 1776 and 1780 to fill in gaps in their custom-
ary constitutions created when British authority was expelled from the col-
onies. But  these written constitutions, it was argued, needed to adhere “to 
the ancient habits and customs of the  people . . .  in the distribution of the 
supreme power of the state.” As state legislatures went into operation  under 
their written constitutions, critics continued to assert that even if statutes 
 were consistent with some constitutional text,  those that “militate[d] with 
the fundamental laws, or impugn[ed] the princi ples of the constitution, 
[ were] to be judicially set aside as void, and of no effect.” It continued to be 
said that all law “must be restrained within the bounds of reason, justice, and 
natu ral equity.”9
Clearest of all in criticizing written constitutions was a series of articles 
by Noah Webster in 1787–88. Webster wrote that “liberty is never secured 
by such paper declarations; nor lost for want of them.” According to Web-
ster, government
takes its form and structure from the genius and habits of the  people; and if 
on paper a form is not accommodated to  those habits, it  will assume a new 
form, in spite of all the formal sanctions of the supreme authority of a 
State. . . .  Unless the advocates for unalterable constitutions of government, 
can prevent all changes in the wants, the inclinations, the habits and the 
circumstances of the  people, they  will find it difficult, even with all their 
declarations of unalterable rights, to prevent changes in government. A 
8Quoted in Wood, Creation of the American Republic, pp. 293, 294.
9Quoted in ibid., pp. 431, 456 (emphasis in original).
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paper- declaration is a very feeble barrier against the force of national hab-
its, and inclinations.10
The nation’s first de cade of experience  under the federal constitution in 
many ways proved Webster right; think, for example, how quickly the  actual 
procedures for electing the president became radically diff er ent from what 
the framers had put down on paper.
 Lawyers and judges similarly continued to have recourse to higher law 
norms outside written constitutions well into the nineteenth  century. For in-
stance, in the de cade  after Webster’s articles, when the Georgia legislature 
repealed an act  under which a vast tract of land in Mississippi had been sold, 
investors in New  England who had bought some of the land sought an opin-
ion from Alexander Hamilton, who was then in private practice, about the 
legitimacy of the repeal act. Hamilton responded that it was “a contraven-
tion of the first princi ples of natu ral justice . . .  to revoke a grant of property 
regularly made for valuable consideration,  under legislative authority.”11 
Congressman Robert Goodloe Harper similarly argued that the Georgia 
land sales  were contracts and that it was “an invariable maxim of law, and of 
natu ral justice, that one of the parties to a contract, cannot by his own act, 
exempt himself, from its obligation.”  After the Georgia repeal had become 
a significant national po liti cal issue, Jedidiah Morse gave wide publicity to 
the Hamilton- Harper view in his American Gazetteer, where he wrote that “it 
was generally agreed by the informed part of the community, that . . .  the 
[Georgia] repealing law must be considered as a ‘contravention of the first 
princi ples of natu ral justice . . .’ and void.”12
When the Georgia repeal act came before the Supreme Court in 1810 in 
Fletcher v. Peck,13 Chief Justice John Marshall relied in part on the written 
constitution’s contract clause. But he also invalidated the act on the ground 
of “general princi ples which are common to our  free institutions,” which 
“prescribe some limits to the legislative power,” among them that “the prop-
erty of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired,” could not “be seized 
10Quoted in ibid., p. 377.
11Alexander Hamilton’s Opinion on the Georgia Repeal Act, in C. Peter Magrath, 
Yazoo: Law and Politics in the New Republic; The Case of Fletcher v. Peck (Providence, R.I., 
1966), pp. 149, 150.
12Quoted in ibid., pp. 20, 23.
1310 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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without compensation.”14 In his concurring opinion, Justice William John-
son relied only on “general princi ple, on the reason and nature of  things, a 
princi ple that  will impose laws even on the Deity.”15
Other cases similarly invalidated legislation on the basis of general princi-
ples of natu ral justice and equity rather than written constitutional text.16 
McCulloch v. Mary land,17 in turn, revealed another aspect of popu lar consti-
tutionalism and the customary constitution. The case, involving the consti-
tutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, was about the power of 
Congress  under the constitution of 1787, not about the application of funda-
mental, higher law norms antecedent to that written constitution. Nonethe-
less, Chief Justice Marshall did not resolve the case by turning only to an 
analy sis of the written text or to a discussion of what  those who had drafted 
and ratified the text intended when they used the language they chose. 
He also examined the meaning that had been given to the constitution 
since its adoption. He noted that even when Congress first established a 
bank, the question of its constitutionality was never concealed from “an un-
suspecting legislature, and pass[ed] unobserved.” From the outset, the argu-
ments in  favor of the bank  were “completely understood, and [ were] opposed 
with equal zeal and ability.”  After consideration “first in the fair and open 
field of debate, and afterwards in the executive cabinet,” the bank opened. 
Although the charter of the First Bank was not renewed, “a short experi-
ence of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it exposed the 
government, convinced [even]  those who  were most prejudiced against the 
mea sure of its necessity.” Marshall therefore concluded that such “an expo-
sition of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the 
faith of which”  people had advanced “im mense property,” could not “be 
lightly disregarded.”18
As late as the 1860s, even the  people themselves did not always consider 
the document of 1787–88, frozen in time, as the entirety of Amer i ca’s con-
stitution. They paid heed to other norms and practices beyond the 1787 text. 
Consider the abolitionists. One leading abolitionist, Lysander Spooner, for 
1410 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
1510 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139, 143 (concurring opinion).
16See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 386 (1798); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 
(1815); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829); Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. 
Ch. 162 (N.Y. Chancery Ct. 1816).
1717 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
1817 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401–2.
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example,  adopted a common position that the Declaration of In de pen dence, 
with its aspirational language about the equality of all men and their en-
titlement to liberty, was “the constitutional law of this country for certain 
purposes”; he continued that slavery was “so entirely contrary to natu ral 
right; so entirely destitute of authority from natu ral law; . . .  that nothing 
but express and explicit provision can be recognized, in law, as giving it 
any authority.”19 Some two de cades  later, a Lincoln supporter named Gros-
venor Lowrey called the written constitution “not the cause, but the means of 
American freedom.” Thus, whenever the constitution was “the subject of 
consideration,” it was necessary, according to Lowrey, to look beyond and 
“through the Constitution to that broader charter on which it rests [—] . . . 
a higher law which  shall sustain and be in agreement with it.”20
In sum, the customary constitution and popu lar constitutionalism 
remained vibrant and effectual into the era of the Civil War. The  people, 
along with judges and po liti cal leaders, continued to play a significant role 
in determining the constitution’s substance and meaning. In  doing so, they 
scrutinized the text of not only the 1787–88 document but also other docu-
ments, especially the Declaration of In de pen dence, as well as unwritten 
doctrines of higher, fundamental law. Fi nally, the customary constitution— 
that which could be plausibly argued in a fashion convincing to large 
numbers— retained enormous capacity for change: both the antislavery 
constitutionalism around which the Republican Party coalesced in the late 
1850s and the secessionist constitutionalism of the South that had scarcely 
existed thirty years earlier.
Nonetheless, as slavery became an increasingly divisive issue in Ameri-
can life in the years  after 1830, change began to occur in how judges and 
po liti cal leaders thought about the constitution. It had made sense into the 
1820s, when the United States still possessed a comparatively cohesive po-
liti cal order, to think of the  people as an entity and of the constitution as 
a set of customary practices which that entity collectively could change 
over time. But once the nation became divided into sections— a majority 
antislavery section and a minority proslavery section— the constitution’s 
19Lysander Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (Boston, 1845), pp. 39, 43–44.
20Grosvenor P. Lowrey, The Commander- in- Chief: A Defense upon  Legal Grounds of the 
Proclamation of Emancipation; and an Answer to Ex- Judge Curtis’ Pamphlet, Entitled “Executive 
Power,” 2nd ed. (New York, 1863), in Frank Freidel, ed., Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 
1861–1865 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 1:474, 480–81.
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capacity for collective change vanished; instead, diff er ent groups in the slav-
ery debate sought to show how the written constitution of 1787, as originally 
drafted and ratified by the Founding  Fathers, supported their interests. In 
par tic u lar, the South argued and the Supreme Court agreed that the origi-
nal constitution embraced a binding bargain that protected slavery from an-
tislavery ideas that  were developing in the North.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,21 which relied on the Constitution’s fugitive slave 
clause to invalidate a Pennsylvania anti- kidnapping statute, was an early 
manifestation of the changing modes of thought. In his opinion for the court, 
Justice Joseph Story wrote that
it is well known, that the object of this clause was to secure to the citizens of 
the slave- holding states the complete right and title of owner ship in their 
slaves, as property, in  every state in the Union into which they might escape 
from the state where they  were held in servitude. The full recognition of this 
right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of property in 
all the slave- holding states; and, indeed, was so vital to the preservation of 
their domestic interests and institutions, that it cannot be doubted, that it 
constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union 
could not have been formed. Its true design was to guard against the 
doctrines and princi ples prevalent in the non- slave- holding states, by pre-
venting them from intermeddling with, or obstructing, or abolishing the 
rights of the  owners of slaves.22
Note how this originalist analy sis by Justice Story differed sharply in its ap-
proach from the popu lar constitutionalist analy sis with which Chief Justice 
Marshall had begun McCulloch v. Mary land.
Similar recourse to originalist analy sis occurred again in Chief Justice 
Roger Taney’s opinion in Scott v. Sandford.23 Taney, who, like Story, was con-
cerned with protecting the South from the growing antislavery pop u lism of 
the North, wrote that the court could not
give to the words of the Constitution a more liberal construction . . .  than 
they  were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and  adopted. 
Such an argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called 
on to interpret it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust,  there is a mode 
2141 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
2241 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611.
2360 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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prescribed in the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it 
remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time 
of its adoption. . . .  [A]s long as it continues to exist in its pres ent form, it 
speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent 
with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was 
voted on and  adopted by the  people of the United States. Any other rule of 
construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court.24
The Civil War, which broke out four years  later, saved the Union, but it 
did not bring an end to sectionalism on issues of race. The idea of a cohesive 
body politic that could transform the constitution over time remained a 
mirage. One result was that the constitution increasingly came to be seen 
as a body of fixed, po liti cally enacted rules rather than an accumulation of 
flexible, customary, popu lar norms.
In par tic u lar, the Unionists who won the Civil War and controlled 
Congress in its aftermath, like antebellum Southerners whose views had been 
reflected in Prigg and Dred Scott, came to understand the constitution as a 
mechanism for the permanent codification of their values in the event a time 
should come when a majority of the American  people no longer shared them. 
 Those Unionists used the Reconstruction amendments, especially the 
 Fourteenth, for that end. In short, “the  Fourteenth Amendment was un-
derstood” not as a constitutional provision subject to  future popu lar inter-
pretation but “as a peace treaty to be administered by Congress in order to 
secure the fruits of the North’s victory in the Civil War.”25 The Union army 
had suffered 364,511 deaths in the war— more than one out of  every fifty 
men who lived in the North.26 Northerners understood that it would “take 
a good deal of whitewash to cover the blood that ha[d] been shed.”27 
“[T]he loyal sentiment of the Country” demanded that the “brave boys who 
offered their lives upon the Altar of their country” not be “sacrificed . . .  in 
vain.”28 Thus, the goal of the Reconstruction amendments in general, and of 
the  Fourteenth Amendment in par tic u lar, was to establish “a permanent 
2460 U.S. (19 How.) at 426.
25William E. Nelson, The  Fourteenth Amendment: From Po liti cal Princi ple to Judicial Doctrine 
(Cambridge, Mass, 1988), pp. 110–11.
26Ibid., p. 46.
27John W. Pease to John Sherman, Mar. 14, 1866, in John Sherman Papers, Library of 
Congress (LC), Washington, D.C.
28W. Bryce to John Sherman, Jan. 21, 1866, in Sherman Papers, LC.
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peace”29 “to the end that the curse of civil war may never be visited upon us 
again.”30 The goal was “to secure in a . . .  permanent form the dear bought 
victories achieved in the mighty conflict,”31 in the words of a June 1866 reso-
lution of the Union Party of Ohio, “upon such stable foundations that re-
bellion and secession  will never again endanger our National existence.”32
Such an understanding of the  Fourteenth Amendment, not as one of 
many norms and practices contributing to the nation’s  future constitution 
but as a stable foundation anchoring that constitution, transformed Ameri-
can constitutionalism. Now that Unionists had  adopted the antebellum, pro- 
Southern originalism of Prigg and Dred Scott, no significant interest group 
viewed the constitution as a body of custom that could evolve over time. 
Instead, the constitution became a permanent command put in place by 
war time victors who demanded security for the fruits of their victory. 
Determining the meaning of the constitution thus no longer authorized  those 
who would be affected by its meaning to decide what they wanted it to mean. 
Instead, the meaning of the constitution was set in stone by  those who had 
drafted and ratified it. The  people who had to live  under the constitution 
no longer had a role to play in deciding what it meant. The constitution’s 
meaning instead had to be parsed by experts— lawyers in the role of foren-
sic historians— who could look back into the past to intuit what the draf ters 
and ratifiers had intended. Popu lar constitutionalism was gone; originalism 
had replaced it.
Of course, this overstates both the suddenness and the thoroughness of 
the shift from a customary to an originalist constitution. As just seen above, 
originalism emerged before the Civil War, and the idea of the constitution 
as custom has persisted, as exemplified by Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s 
mid- twentieth- century dissent in Poe v. Ullman,33 where the justice supported 
his decision on the ground of “ those rights ‘which are . . .  fundamental; which 
belong . . .  to the citizens of all  free governments’ ”— rights extracted from 
a “tradition [that] is a living  thing”— that is, from “the traditions from 
29Samuel Craig to Thaddeus Stevens, Feb. 5, 1866, in Thaddeus Stevens Papers, 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
30Congressional Globe, Mar. 19, 1864, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1203 (remarks of Rep. 
James F. Wilson [R- IA]).
31“Governor’s Message,” Iowa State Register (Des Moines), Jan. 15, 1868, p. 3, col. 7.
32Resolutions of June 19, 1866, in Sherman Papers, LC.
33367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
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which . . .  [the nation] developed as well as the traditions from which it 
broke.”34
I am guilty of overstatement, however, for a good reason—to make a cen-
tral analytical point. If one conceives of constitutional provisions as funda-
mental but flexible norms and practices by which a cohesive, demo cratic 
community governs itself at any given moment in time, then the  people of 
the community at that moment in time possess collective power to deter-
mine what  those constitutional provisions mean, and a court charged with 
deciding a case should look to the  people of the moment for guidance. If, by 
contrast, one conceives of constitutional provisions as codifications of past 
po liti cal or military victories designed to assure the victors that even if they 
lose power and become a minority their victories  will be preserved in the 
 future, then experts of some sort are needed to determine exactly what the 
past codified, and a court charged with deciding a case should look to ex-
perts for guidance, not to ordinary  people.
The  Fourteenth Amendment can be understood both as a flexible, foun-
dational norm and as a permanent guarantee designed to secure in all times 
the rights even of minorities. The Supreme Court has tended to understand 
it mainly as the latter. Let me end by offering two reasons why the amend-
ment can be understood in both ways, as well as why I think the court has 
understood it mainly as a permanent guarantee protecting minorities.
The first reason for the amendment’s flexibility is the language the draf-
ters used in Section 1. The draf ters may have wanted the  Fourteenth Amend-
ment to serve the  future as a stable anchor of the peace they understood the 
Civil War had won. But they could not agree among themselves on the spe-
cific terms of that peace. In par tic u lar, they could not agree  whether to 
extend the right to vote to freedmen. So they papered over their disagree-
ment with vague language— privileges and immunities, due pro cess, and 
equal protection— that the Supreme Court, the institution eventually 
charged with enforcing the draf ters’ anchor of peace, could not possibly 
enforce with precision. The justices quickly recognized that their task was 
to “construe” the  Fourteenth Amendment “as it was understood at the time 
of its adoption,”35 but they could not determine how it was understood 
when  adopted  because it had purposely been drafted so that diff er ent  people 
34367 U.S. at 541–42.
35Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857).
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could understand it differently:36 as the Republican state chair of Ohio ex-
plained to Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase in 1866, it was necessary in pre-
senting the  Fourteenth Amendment to the  people “[i]n the Reserve 
Counties . . .  [to] openly advocate impartial suffrage, while in other 
places . . .  not only to repudiate it, but to oppose it.”37 As a result, although 
the justices  were “in the condition of seeking for truth” in their efforts to con-
strue the amendment,38 they ultimately had to turn to the differing un-
derstandings of the  people about the amendment’s meaning.
The second reason why the  Fourteenth Amendment can be read  either 
as a flexible norm or as a permanent, inflexible guarantee is that its draf-
ters and ratifiers wrote Section 1 so as to codify the higher law norms of the 
customary constitution. In my view, they did not codify specific, fixed norms. 
All that the framers did, on the basis of their understanding that states 
granted most higher law rights to their most favored citizens, was to insist 
that the states grant what ever rights they provided to any one citizen equally 
to all citizens.39 On this view, states have power to modify the  Fourteenth 
Amendment’s meaning by altering the rights they provide to their most fa-
vored citizens.
Other scholars have theorized, however, that the language of privileges 
and immunities and due pro cess directly incorporates specific norms into 
the constitution.40 But even on this theory,  there may be flexibility. The 
framers might have incorporated into the constitution not only specific 
higher law norms but also the customary constitution’s understanding of the 
 people’s capacity over time to revise  those norms. The speech that Thad-
deus Stevens, a key drafter of the  Fourteenth Amendment and its man ag er 
on the floor of the House of Representatives, made when he presented the 
amendment to the House supports this view. Although Stevens found the 
amendment an “imperfect . . .  proposition,” he argued that it was necessary 
36See Nelson, The  Fourteenth Amendment, pp. 142–44.
37B. R. Cowan to Salmon P. Chase, Oct. 12, 1866, in Salmon P. Chase Papers, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C.
38Joseph P. Bradley to Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, July 19, 1874, in Joseph P. Bradley 
Papers, New Jersey Historical Society, Newark, N.J. (emphasis in original).
39See Nelson, The  Fourteenth Amendment, pp. 115–21.
40See Robert J. Kaczorowski, “The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to Enforce 
Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly,” Fordham Law Review 73 (2004):153, 
210–12, 217–30; Robert J. Kaczorowski, “Congress’s Power to Enforce  Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted,” Harvard 
Journal of Legislation 42 (2005):187, 207–30, 265–80.
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to “take what we can get now, and hope for better  things in further legisla-
tion; in enabling acts or other provisions”41 as the amendment’s meaning 
developed over time. On the other hand, the framers might have codified 
in permanent form the specific higher law norms that existed in 1866; the 
frequently reiterated language about the  Fourteenth Amendment’s perma-
nence that I noted earlier supports this interpretation.
Despite occasional references to a “living constitution” and a “living tra-
dition,” the Supreme Court and constitutional scholars since the New Deal 
nonetheless have largely understood the  Fourteenth Amendment to have 
codified a permanent, unchangeable set of princi ples. Both the court and 
scholars have tended to look back to the Reconstruction era to determine 
the content of  those princi ples. Think, for example, of the debates about the 
 Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights42 or about 
Congress’s power  under Section 5 to broaden the amendment’s meaning.43 
Even in Brown v. Board of Education, the court began its analy sis by directing 
counsel to inquire into original intent.44 The customary constitution and 
the power of the  people to give it meaning are, in large part, dead.
Paradoxically, a concern about the constitution’s demo cratic pedigree is 
one reason for popu lar constitutionalism’s demise. Chief Justice Taney in 
the Dred Scott case expressed this concern as well as anyone ever has. The 
constitution itself, he noted, prescribes how the  people may amend it; for 
the court to usurp the power to change it would be “altogether inadmissi-
ble” for a “tribunal” of appointed, lifetime judges, who have power only “to 
interpret it.”45 But  there is also another, deeper reason for popu lar constitu-
tionalism’s demise. If, as footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products Co. 
maintains, the main duty of the Supreme Court is to protect discrete and 
insular minorities,46 it cannot do so by administering a constitution that 
the  people have continuing power to revise. A customary constitution, sub-
ject to change at the  will of some significant majority, sometimes  will enable 
that majority to trample on the rights of po liti cally powerless minorities. 
41Congressional Globe, June 13, 1866, 39th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3148.
42Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion of Justice 
Black) with Charles Fairman, “Does the  Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of 
Rights: The Original Understanding,” Stanford Law Review 2 (1949):5.
43See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
44See Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
45Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 426 (1857).
46See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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One need only remember the internment of Japa nese Americans during 
World War II or the long history of Jim Crow in the post– Civil War South. 
Minorities need the protection of robust, fixed princi ples that majorities can-
not modify. Although a court charged with enforcing such princi ples may 
not always do so effectively, the existence of a constitution composed of fixed 
princi ples at least gives the court a chance.
So let me say this in conclusion. One way to think of a constitution— what 
we now see as the classic British way—is as a body of custom that  people 
governed by the constitution can change over time. Alternatively, a consti-
tution can be understood as a written guarantor of fixed rights. Americans 
 today and often in the past have confusingly thought of their constitution as 
both. But the Civil War and the Reconstruction amendments brought a ma-
jor shift in emphasis— from emphasis on a flexible constitution interpreted 
by the  people to emphasis on a fixed guarantor of rights administered by 
forensic experts in the chambers of the Supreme Court.
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In 1961,  t h e poet and novelist Robert Penn Warren wrote, “The Civil War is, for the American imagination, the  great single event of our his-
tory. Without too much wrenching, it may, in fact, be said to be American 
history.” Even then, a  century  after Fort Sumter, he believed that the Civil 
War remained “our only ‘felt’ history— history that lived in the national 
imagination.”1
When Warren wrote  those words in his short, brilliant book The Legacy 
of the Civil War, the nation was just beginning to commemorate the conflict’s 
centennial. It was a major undertaking: a presidentially appointed, blue- 
ribbon national panel, led by Ulysses S. Grant’s grand son, was convened to 
coordinate scores of cele brations— and almost  every state had its own sepa-
rate commission. National parks  were spruced up to accommodate hundreds 
of thousands of visitors. Stamps  were issued. Coins  were struck.
What a difference fifty years can make. Contrast  those commemorative 
cele brations with the sesquicentennial that drew to a close in 2015. Again, 
stamps  were issued. Coins  were struck. But the recession of 2009 choked off 
incipient plans for a national commission, and no one seemed particularly 
bothered to protest. Few national events took place. And while crowds still 
visited battlefields, the numbers  were smaller, and the commemorations 
1Robert Penn Warren, The Legacy of the Civil War (1961; reprint ed., Lincoln, Neb., 
1998), pp. 3–4.
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lower in key. If the centennial was a national event, the sesquicentennial, 
for many Americans, was more of a novelty, and a momentary one at that.
Maybe this is just the difference between a centennial and a sesquicen-
tennial. It is not as if we as a country have deci ded that the Civil War did 
not  matter. The Civil War still has  great meaning as history— books about 
Lincoln, Grant, Stonewall Jackson, and other luminaries are guaranteed 
best sellers. But is the war any longer the “felt” history that Warren could 
so confidently assert it to be? And if not, what relevance does the Civil War 
have  today?
First, let us examine why, besides the nice roundness of the number one 
hundred, the centennial was such a big deal in Amer i ca— and what War-
ren meant by “felt” history.
For one  thing, the Civil War was still very much pres ent in American 
society. Albert Woolson, the last surviving verifiable Civil War veteran, had 
died just a few years earlier, in 1956. The country was still dotted with war 
 widows, who in their youth had married aged veterans. And many Ameri-
cans, Robert Penn Warren among them, had fond memories of growing up 
on the knee of a grand father or  great  uncle who had fought in the war. War-
ren’s grand father, Gabriel Penn Warren, was a Confederate veteran who 
served with Nathan Bedford Forrest’s cavalry. “He loved to relive the war 
with me,” he told an interviewer. “We’d lay it all out on the ground using 
stones and  rifle shells.”2
The war was everywhere around him, from as far back as he could re-
member. In a 1961 interview, Warren said, “It was very much alive, not as 
an issue, but as a real ity of life. It  wasn’t a  matter of argument; it touched 
every one’s life. In this very static society, every one you knew over a cer-
tain age had been in it . . .  and it was just a part of the emotional furniture 
of life.”3
Moreover, in 1961, unknowingly on the eve of Vietnam, the Civil War fit 
within a narrative of American wars as good wars. Commemorating the 
centennial as a fight for Union— which is how it was overwhelmingly 
celebrated— allowed Americans of the early 1960s to link their own sacri-
fices during World War II and  Korea to this  grand narrative of the national 
2Peter Still, “An Interview with Robert Penn Warren,” in Gloria L. Cronin and Ben 
Siegel, eds., Conversations with Robert Penn Warren ( Jackson, Miss., 2005), p. 112.
3Interview with L. G. Bridson, 1961, cited in David W. Blight, American Oracle: The Civil 
War in the Civil Rights Era (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), p. 34.
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martial experience. Men who marched as veterans of the twentieth- century 
wars could recall when, as boys, they watched much older men march as 
veterans of the Civil War.
But  there was also a ner vous tension about the centennial. As the histo-
rian Robert J. Cook describes in his book Troubled Commemoration: The Amer-
ican Civil War Centennial, President Dwight  D. Eisenhower created the 
presidential commission in 1957, the same year that he sent federal troops 
into  Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce the Supreme Court’s Brown decision.4 
Race relations— imbalanced yet largely static for nearly one hundred years— 
were being questioned. The meaning of the war as a fight for Union, as a 
war  after which the white  people on both sides reconciled, was beginning to 
be challenged—by a recalcitrant Jim Crow South as much as by civil 
rights activists.
It was all the more impor tant, then, that the commission,  under the 
president’s direction, dramatize a single, overarching theme for its 
commemoration— namely,  unionism and postwar reconciliation. The dif-
ficult, unanswered questions raised by the war— the meaning of freedom, 
the debts of white Amer i ca for black enslavement, the country’s ac cep tance 
of Jim Crow racism despite emancipation— were ignored. But they  were ig-
nored in part  because they  were ever more pressing; in 1961, the same year 
that the centennial began, the sit-in movement erupted in North Carolina. 
Four years earlier, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson had pushed through the first 
modern civil rights act, and now he was vice president. Change was com-
ing, and the  future was uncertain; but an embrace of the past, as a way of 
holding off that  future, was still very much  viable. For a moment, whites on 
both sides of the North- South divide could look back to the war as both a 
cautionary tale and a reminder that, in the end, they  were all Americans, 
and leave aside the issue of where, if at all, black Americans fit into that 
equation.
And, of course, this was not a hard task. Anglo- Saxon, Protestant whites 
still dominated Amer i ca, not just in the hegemonic sense but demographi-
cally. The United States was over 85  percent white. And even  after the waves 
of migration at the turn of the past  century, most American whites could 
reach back, not too far in their past, to find relatives who had fought in, or 
4Peter J. Cook, Troubled Commemoration: The American Civil War Centennial, 1961–1965 
(Baton Rouge, La., 2007), p. 56.
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at least lived through, the Civil War. (It goes without saying that the  people 
leading the conversation about the war  were all men.)
In short, the high profile of the centennial was achieved both  because it 
had a strong base of support in a relatively unified white culture and  because 
it responded to an unease within that culture about the very history it cel-
ebrated. It was “felt” history, at least for the moment.
Is it still “felt” history?  Things are, obviously, very diff er ent  today. First 
of all,  there is the cultural and demographic distance. It is only fifty years 
 later, but a lot has happened in  those fifty years. As a boy, Warren could 
look around him in his small hometown of Guthrie, Kentucky, and see men, 
many of them related to him, who had fought in the war or had  fathers and 
grand fathers who had. He could travel just south of the town to see the site 
where Confederate troops from Tennessee had invaded the state in 1861.
And yet, of course, Warren did not stay in Guthrie, and  today even  those 
of us who can trace our families back to the war have almost completely 
lost that sense of rootedness that was so impor tant to a “felt” sense of Civil 
War history. My  father was born in Nashville, not far from the Kentucky 
town where his parents  were born, and on back down the  family tree to a 
Union soldier from nearby named Wiley Patrick, who died outside Atlanta. 
In contrast, I was born in upstate New York, grew up in Nashville, moved 
to Washington, D.C., for college, and now live in New York City, where my 
 children  were born.
We do not just move around, we marry around. Again, consider my par-
ents and ancestors. My  mother is from Louisville, and she can trace her 
own history back to an Indiana soldier who died in Louisiana. My  father’s 
parents grew up just a few miles apart, in Kentucky. But I married a Jewish 
girl from Maine whose  great grandparents immigrated from the Pale of Set-
tlement. The parents of my  children’s friends are Pakistani, Japa nese, and 
Nigerian. My  children may someday dive into the history of the Civil War, 
but it  will not be  because it is, to them, “felt” history.
More dramatically, the demographic makeup of the country has changed. 
My  children live in a world where whites, once the majority of the population, 
 will likely represent less than 50  percent by the time they can vote.  Today 
 there are 129 million more Americans than  there  were in 1961— about a 
60  percent increase in fifty years. One landmark often forgotten in recol-
lections of the tumultuous 1960s was the passage of the 1965 Immigration 
Act not long  after the end of the centennial commemoration, which opened 
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the doors to national populations that had long been barred from our shores. 
As a result,  today  there are tens of millions of native- born Americans whose 
families  were not  here for the centennial of the Civil War, let alone the Civil 
War itself.
Along with that numerical change has come a cultural change. We may 
still be a white- majority country, but we are a decidedly multicultural coun-
try.  There  were Hispanic Americans in 1961, and Asian Americans, but the 
notion of mainstream Latin American culture, or Asian American culture, 
was by and large unthinkable.  Today we celebrate  these cultures, and even 
as we incorporate them into that ever- simmering soup called American 
culture, we also re spect their identities and uniqueness. As a result, young 
 people  today look back to 1961 with only slightly more familiarity than they 
do to 1861.
Then  there is the  really dramatic stuff.  Little did Americans in 1961, at the 
beginning of the Civil War centennial, know what they  were about to go 
through: a civil rights revolution, a racial revolution, an immigration 
revolution, a feminist revolution, a  whole long list of cultural revolutions that 
would fundamentally alter the meaning of “Amer i ca.”
As a result, we can no longer speak of “a” meaning of the Civil War, let 
alone any sort of collective “felt” history,  because it is getting harder and 
harder to talk about American history with any sort of sense of consensus 
about its meaning.  There are histories, not one single history, and diff er ent 
 people  will look at diff er ent parts of  those histories differently. And while 
enormous debates  will rage over how we interpret them— witness the re-
newed fight over slavery reparations and the role of racism in American 
history— most Americans are comfortable with the idea that no one histori-
cal account can speak for every one.
Even to the extent that we can speak of any collective American histori-
cal view, it is one that is substantially more jaundiced  today than it was in 
1961. It is skeptical of, if not hostile to, patriotism, national symbols, the mili-
tary, and calls for collective sacrifice— values that connected 1861 and 1961 
but not 2011. If Americans in 1961 could look back one hundred years and 
imagine a moral world that largely echoed their own, that is much harder 
to do  today.
Ironically, none of this would  matter,  really, if the Civil War  were settled 
history, the way the Revolutionary War is (mostly) settled history. It might 
at one point have seemed settled, but the meaning of the Civil War has 
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changed completely since 1961. More than changed—it has fractured. The 
events of the 1960s, and  every de cade since, have raised unanswered ques-
tions about the meaning of freedom, the role of the state in securing that 
freedom, the guilt of a country founded on race- based enslavement, and the 
failed promises of the war and postwar Reconstruction.
Let me take this irony a bit further. It may seem, in our lack of commemo-
ration and fanfare over the sesquicentennial, that we are a much less histori-
cally minded  people  today than we  were in 1961. It is easy, and common, for 
pundits to lament declining awareness of our past— fewer  people reading 
history books, fewer resources for historical preservation, shrinking academic 
history departments. And it is true that we do not have, as Warren put it, a 
sense that the Civil War “stands  there larger than life, massively symbolic 
in its inexhaustible and sibylline significance.”5
In fact, I would argue that we are more historically minded than our 
pre de ces sors. For all its inexhaustible significance, the popu lar history of 
the war in 1961 was still largely built on myth.  Today we shatter myths; we 
are professionals at tearing down idols. Warren writes in awe of Lee and 
Jackson and Robert Gould Shaw and Sam Davis. But we know better. We 
might not pay heed to history in the same way  people did in 1961, but that 
is to a large extent  because we are skeptical about what “history” means. 
We refuse to accept history as a single narrative, as a pantheon of heroes 
and villains. Instead, we see history as an unfinished puzzle, to be contem-
plated instead of celebrated.
We understand that the Civil War, or rather its echo, still rings. Warren 
was looking back to a period rapidly drawing to a close;  others, at the same 
time, saw a new one just beginning. Speaking at the Lincoln Memorial on 
August 28, 1963, just two years  after Warren wrote his book, Martin Luther 
King Jr. intoned: “Five score years ago, a  great American, in whose sym-
bolic shadow we stand  today, signed the Emancipation Proclamation.” And 
yet, he said, “One hundred years  later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of 
poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity.” The meaning 
of the Civil War, he said, was not complete and had to be contested:
In a sense  we’ve come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the ar-
chitects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and 
5Warren, The Legacy of the Civil War, p. 80.
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the Declaration of In de pen dence, they  were signing a promissory note to 
which  every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, 
yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the “unalienable 
Rights” of “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” It is obvious  today 
that Amer i ca has defaulted on this promissory note, insofar as her citizens 
of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, Amer i ca 
has given the Negro  people a bad check, a check which has come back 
marked “insufficient funds.” But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice 
is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that  there are insufficient funds in the  great 
vaults of opportunity of this nation. And so,  we’ve come to cash this check, 
a check that  will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the secu-
rity of justice.6
Life for minorities in Amer i ca is inarguably better than it was in 1963, 
and yet the line “a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of 
material prosperity” could well describe Baltimore in 2015 or Ferguson or 
Baton Rouge or any number of poor, black neighborhoods and cities around 
the country. And the notion that civil rights activists are striving to “cash a 
check”—to call into question the meaning of the Civil War and demand 
that the country recognize its legacy—is only more salient  today.
 Every time we, as a nation, are reminded of this fact, we are also reminded 
of how the war was not a glorious triumph or a meaningful sacrifice, but 
rather one halting, tragic step in a story that continues to be told. And so, 
to answer my question, the Civil War is no longer “felt” history, but it is still 
vital history. If it can no longer be celebrated or mythologized, if we no lon-
ger rush to see it commemorated with parades and commissions, that does 
not mean we do not appreciate its importance. But we are no longer sure 
what that importance is— indeed, we are no longer sure that we  will ever 
fully know what the war meant. We  will continue to be fascinated by it, but 
we  will do so not with self- righteousness or nostalgia or certainty but with 
skepticism, humility, and patience.
6Martin Luther King Jr., “I Have a Dream,” Address Delivered at the March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom, King Papers, The Martin Luther King Jr. Research 
and Education Institute, Stanford University, https:// kinginstitute . stanford . edu / king 
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